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ABSTRACT
Liberal Learning in American Higher Education
May 1981
Kevin F. Grennan, A.B., Harvard College
M.A., University of Massachusetts
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor David Schuman
This study explores the often conflicting assumptions that
the public and practitioners make about American higher
education. In particular, it proposes that we have allowed much
of these assumptions to assume the status of myth. The
consequence is an imprecision in higher education: it is seen as
both training for jobs and at the same time providing us with a
heightened aesthetic and moral sense. This is rarely true.
The review of the literature of the history of higher
education reinforces this confusion. Curricular shifts are
recorded with very little examination of the consequences they
may have on the institution, itself; new missions, goals, and
purposes are added with little concern for the overall effect
this process of accretion may have. In the last 100 years,
disciplines, majors, and other academic responses have occurred
to meet the training needs of industry; the atmosphere and goals
of the arts, literature, and science are highly professional, as
well
.
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The consequences for higher education include trivialization
of courses and majors, isolation of units within the
universities, learning that exists only in-order-to acquire
)
narrow skills or credentials, and a continuing rationalization of
the connection with the marketplace. There is a. lack of critical
self-analysis by the institutions.
Proposals for reform have, on occasion, been advanced in
recognition of this proliferation of purpose. However, the trend
in American higher education seems to be moving ever closer to
vocationalism, in spite of proposed reforms. This movement is
being effected at the expense of general or liberal education.
The consequences of this trend do not seem to be a major concern
in most educational circles, or to be fully understood.
The study concludes that an important, even vital part of
higher education is being sacrificed to the utilitarian ideal.
This reality may force a rethinking of our myth; perhaps, even a
reform of our educational ideal.
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Introduction
When we use the 'term "education," particularly as part of
the phrase "higher education," we use it as a portmanteau word
and there is as much disagreement as agreement on the contents of
that term, both what is and what should be. These
interpretations form the "myth" of education: myth in the sense
of expressing something deeply felt by the individuals who
discuss education, participate in it, and pay for it. Myths are
those essentially unexamined but widely held pieces of folk-lore
that achieve and maintain a life all their own. To question them
is seen as rude and even iconoclastic. Myths are at the
foundations of our thinking and acting.
Myths can be "real." Real in the sense that the myth
exists, of course, but also in the sense that what we believe can
also happen. If part of the myth of higher education is that we
become more intelligent, and after going to college one actually
is so and acts it, then that is "real." The myth works. And of
course, the business about being more intelligent is in fact part
of the myth. But only part. Because another part has to do with
being more intelligent about very specific things, like biology
in order become a doctor, or accounting in order ^ become an
accountant, and so forth. Sometimes that part of the myth
doesn't work. When a myth does not work we are disappointed and
frustrated. And then we start tinkering with those institutions
1
2that serve the myth.
We believe that institutions of higher education house
teaching, research, and service; all these are for the common
weal. Out of these institutions come bright, well-rounded men
and women who will be better citizens, better employees in better
jobs, better in every way. At the same time, some critics are
lashing out at these young men and women and calling them the
"new Carthaginians,” highly skilled technicians with no
appreciation of their culture, or other cultures.
That is a most important criticism. It strikes at the heart
of the myth when people complete their higher education yet do
not act as educated men and women; we have to be concerned, as
well, when individuals act in an educated manner yet have never
attended or completed college.
This dissertation is going to examine the current state of
higher education in America. In the first chapter, I will define
that imprecision and expand on those concerns, and I will also
discuss another goal for higher education, the eupractic man or
woman
.
In the second chapter, in order to provide a clearer
understanding of the present condition of higher education, I
review the past. Most histories of education concentrate on
the specifics of institutions and their evolutions, curricular
changes occurring, as it were, in a kind of ivy-covered vacuum.
How often do any of us, as practitioners in the broad field of
I
3education, stop to ask ourselves, "What am I doing here?" What
are our real roles, and what should they be? What I intend to
accomplish in this history is to underscore the tension that has
always been present in higher education — the tug-of-war between
courses of study pursued for vocational or instrumental purposes
and those for less instrumental ends.
In Chapter III, I will look more closely at the evolution of
American higher education in the twentieth century, and will
demonstrate the proliferation of missions and goals of the
academy while at the same time the loss of any sense of focus,
other than the immediate needs of society.
The chapter will also carefully review three major proposals
for revising the curriculum in order to return the undergraduate
experience to something more closely aligned with liberal
education and less directly linked to the workplace.
The fourth chapter is a detailed examination of one
institution in the 1970s, the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst. This case study intends to show one institution’s
trends to vocationalism in higher education, explain the origins
of those trends, and suggest some consequences.
The final chapter will summarize the versions of higher
education that have developed in America, and will also posit
some scenarios for the future.
CHAPTER I
TENSIONS IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
The Liberal Arts versus Vocationallsm
In 1974, I attended the Twenty-Ninth National Conference on
Higher Education, sponsored by the American Association for
Higher Education. During. that conference I found the opportunity
to engage in rather lengthy and at time heated discussions with a
colleague over the issue of curricula. We argued (without any
satisfactory resolution) the merits of a "liberal arts" or
"general education" approach as opposed to a more "narrow"
approach that was avowedly vocational, a degree in business, or
engineering. Obviously we were airing biases based on personal
experiences. We did not realize that we were anticipating a
national debate.
It was, therefore, timely that one of the speakers at the
conference was James O’Toole, chairman, HEW Task Force on Work in
America. His topic was "Education, Work, and Quality of Life,"
and it is worth quoting one of his conclusions:
. . .
one is inevitably drawn to traditional
liberal education as the most relevant form of
career education. All we know for certain about
the future is that it will be turbulent and
filled with unpredictable change. Historically,
the people most able to adapt to the vicissitudes
of social life have been the liberally educated.
The person who has learned how to learn can
always pick up a skill that has become essential.
For the liberally educated, learning has always
been a way of life. The person best able to cope
4
5with change is the one who has the broadest
background and is thus the most flexible.
(O’Toole, 1974, p. 20)
There was much about that statement that I found pleasing,
and so, apparently, did most of the persons in attendance.
Before and since that time, O’Toole’s argument has been used by a
variety of individuals and institutions to defend a "traditional
liberal education” against the encroachments of students, other
institutions, tax-payers, citizen-activists, and their own
bureaucracies. Indeed, not long after, the United States
Commissioner on Education, Terrel H. Bell (1975), addressed the
question, "Does the small private college have a future?" by
answering, "Yes ... if it rolls with the times." He went on to
say that if the colleges in question were going to survive they
would have to adapt themselves to those economic strains that
affect them; more important, they would have to change
academically by providing the knowledge students need to succeed
in the world of work. A college totally devoted to the liberal
arts is "kidding itself. ... To send young men and women into
today’s world armed only with Aristotle, Freud, and Hemingway is
like sending a lamb into the lion’s den. It is to delude them as
well as ourselves" (Bell, 1975).
Later that year David A. Trivett (1975), in an article
entitled "Jobs and College Graduates," agreed that "’general
education’ and ’liberal arts’ are usually losers when the debate
turns to the relationship of education and jobs," but pointed out
6that "the ’bad press' liberal arts receive because of
difficulties students 'encounter finding jobs is harmful because
potential students and budget watchers are misled into making
decisions on the basis of inadequate facts." Trivett cited
several studies that indicate the traditional placement surveys
take place too soon after graduation, that longitudinal studies
show liberal arts majors ‘ are "satisfactorily employed," employed
in jobs with career potential, making decent salaries, and that
one survey demonstrated that "of those graduates who were in
business administration, the majority did not major in business
but in a liberal arts discipline."
"Aha, chalk up another one for the liberal arts," I thought.
At first. Because when I went back to consider what was being
said about higher education, there was a basic consideration
being left out consistently, and something else being counted
that seemed to dominate everything. Briefly put, what was being
left out was that education has an intrinsic worth and that,
indeed, the unexamined life is not worth living; what was counted
was the value of learning how to learn, and the justification of
education in terms of gaining particular kinds of employment. In
this content, the liberal arts were being compared with those
more avowedly vocational degrees, and were being condemned or
praised on the same bases and criteria.
An outstanding example of this sort of educational
perspective is an article that appeared in the September, 1967
7issue of College Management
.
entitled "Vocational Education for
Future Scholars." The focus of the article was the new and
unstructured curriculum of Amherst College, and the courses
entitled "Problems of Inquiry." Its message was clear: the
liberal arts were the vocational education for tomorrow's college
faculty.
One might ask where this notion originated that a college
education was supposed to supply anything other than skills for
jobs? In order to answer that question I must draw as much on my
personal experience as on the statements or writings of others.
In doing so, I am expressing part of the "myth" of education.
For certainly the framers of the Constitution of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts had something other than vocational training in
mind when they incorporated the following language in Part 2,
Chapter 5, Section 2:
Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused
generally among the body of people, being
necessary for the preservation of their rights
and liberties; and as these depend on spreading
the opportunities and advantages of education in
the various parts of the country, and among the
different orders of the people, it shall be the
duty of the legislatures . . .to cherish the
interests of literature and the sciences, and all
seminaries of them.
This demonstrates their version of the myth; they saw wisdom,
knowledge, and virtue as the outcome of education. The use of
this wisdom, knowledge and virtue anticipates Jefferson (l8l6):
"If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of
8civilization, it expects what never was and never will be” (p.
4).
Somehow this transcends Commissioner Bell’s more utilitarian
approach. It is also drawing on Plato’s argument in the
Republic ; in order to fully discuss a just society we must
explore the kind of education that will bring that society into
existence and sustain it. There is a thread from Plato’s
understanding that education was basic to conceptualizing and
running the state to the understanding of the Massachusetts
legislators that it was basic to the preservation of rights and
liberties.
I think I can round out this version of the myth of
education with a quotation from Daniel G. Aldrich, Jr. (1965),
Chancellor of the University of California at Irvine:
If formal higher education is to be meaningful to
a man it must have given him somehow, somewhere
a sense of values and the courage with which to
defend them. Such a sense of values derives from
an ability to discriminate not only right and
wrong but also between the significant and the
trivial, between that which is cheap and shoddy
and that which has integrity and beauty. To put
the matter another way, the educated man should
have a well-developed and refined good taste
which he uses as a yardstick in making his moral,
social and aesthetic judgments.
Aldrich’s statement, of course, runs directly counter to
the version of the myth as expressed by O’Toole, Bell, and
Trivett. What the latter were expressly not talking about was a
’’well-developed and refined good taste:” rather, they were either
9extolling some instrumental skill they felt the liberal arts
could impart, or denying the value of them completely (Bell).
These differing versions of the myth actively work at
cross-purposes. The result can be more than dissonance within
the myth; it can be the re-focusing of institutional resources
on the training aspects of the myth and the ultimate and
inevitable neglect of -that approach which declares the riddle of
Man a more important investigation than the acquisition of
certification in the methodology of earning a living.
Listen, for example, to these voices from Cambridge,
Massachusetts in 1976; in March, Amanda Aldrich, a Radcliffe
College sophomore, "described the student body as intensely
job-oriented, careful to avoid risks in education, and seemingly
unconcerned with educational breadth” (Botstein, 1976, p. 24).
Six months later, in September, Derek Bok (1976b), President
of Harvard University, addressed the freshman class of the
College and told them;
What society lacks today is not people who are
trained for skilled jobs and professional
careers. What society needs are people with a
sufficient breadth of knowledge to provide them
with judgment, perspective and taste — people
with a sensitivity for the problems of others and
a strong sense of ethical principles. These are
the subtler goals of a liberal arts education and
it would be tragic if you were to disregard them
in favor of a short-sighted effort to use these
college years to get a head start on your
professional training.
Six months and a world separate those two statements.
10
I can bring some of these issues into clearer focus by
examining my own undergraduate experience. When I applied to
Harvard College in the 1950*s, my reasons were the usual melange:
parental expectations
,
peers
,
a brother who was already in
college, and some vague notions about getting smarter and
preparing for a career. College seemed the logical, the only
place in which one achieved these nebulous goals.
Once in college I chose a major, tried to make a connection
between it and some arbitrary career choice, and muddled my way
through the next four years. I was not a very good student: I
maintained a "gentleman's 'C’” and led a varied and active social
life. The pursuit of the beautiful and true was conducted (if at
all) as an extracurricular activity. I no longer thought that I
would find it in my courses: they had become requirements for
graduation—necessary but often unpleasant. Graduation became
the goal.
Robert Paul Wolff (1969) has pointed out that
The "undergraduate” years, either in school or
out, should be devoted to the successful
completion of a critical stage of intellectual
maturation, not to the accumulation of precisely
one hundred and twenty points of credit. (p. 150)
If that stage were completed in my case it occurred in spite of,
not because of the educational process taking place, Yet, for
those individuals actually experiencing the process, Wolff is
helpful:
The child as a student masters a number of
11
and inatheniatical skills and absorbs a
body of information with very little psychic
conflict. But on the threshold of adulthood, he
is suddenly faced with a problem much greater
than any his schooling has ever posed. He must
decide who he is, and hence who he is going to be
for the rest of his life. He must choose not
only a career, a job, an occupational role, but
also a life-style, a set of values which can
serve as his ideal self-image, and toward which
he can grow through the commitment of his
emotional energies. These choices are fateful,
dangerous, highly charged, and are felt as such
by the young man- or woman-to-be. (p. 16-17)
I do not agree with all that Wolff contends is happening, but it
is safe to say that an identity crisis of some magnitude occurs
for most young adults during the period one normally attends
college. An example was the compulsion I felt to elect a major:
I made this choice under the impression that I had to (I did) and
that the major was to connect in some explicit or implicit
fashion with one’s career choice (this notion was never
discouraged) . In a way, I was lucky, since I was attending one
of what Wolff labels the ’’top colleges" and was among those
students
confronted with a mixed program of broad survey
courses designed to make him "liberally" or
"generally" educated, more specialized courses
from among which he could select a sample, and
his last year or two, a departmental "major"
requiring him to concentrate on a single
discipline. In addition, he would have the
opportunity to do independent research, usually
as a means to a a degree with honors. The
premises of this sort of undergraduate program
were basically two: first, that the typical
freshman had not yet had a chance to roam at will
in the realm of ideas, acquainting himself with
the excitements and potentialities of
12
intellectual life . , and second, that several
years should be given over to relatively
uncontrolled experimentation before a young man
or woman was required to make a decision about a
career, (pp, 91-92)
As a consequence, when I decided sometime in my junior year
that I did not want to pursue law as a career (I had no idea what
I would substitute: it had suddenly occurred to me that I no
longer envied or pitied those people who could at the age of
eighteen decide to be a doctor and begin the arduous and
single-minded pursuit of that grail — as for me, there would be
time enough to decide), I did not feel that I had made a fatal
error in my choice of major or that I had completely wasted my
college career 'to that point.
But what I had done up that point was to narrow my focus, to
narrow it not because I wanted to master a specified body of
knowlege or a form of intellectual discipline before going on to
another body or form, but to narrow it because it appeared
necessary to do so in order to prepare myself for an occupational
role. Even then I knew that that narrowed focus was a
diminishment of the educational process and consequently of me.
In other words, while I had not "wasted" my college career, that
college career had not measured up to its potential because for
most of it I thought I was pursuing a credential, not an
education.
The interesting but disconcerting fact was that, after
completing my baccalaureate degree, society began to treat me as
13
if I had somehow gotten smarter and had at the same time
developed the "refined good taste" Aldrich (1965) refers to. I
certainly had taken many courses and learned many things which I
never knew before. But I also knew that I was not as smart as
most people wanted to believe, and that my developing sense of
the aesthetic had been aided more by my extracurricular
activities than by my classroom assignments. Looking back, the
Harvard College I attended in the 1950s was considerably
different from the Harvard Henry Adams (1961) knew in the I850s
but his description of the experience seems apt:
In effect, the school created a type but not a
will. Four years of Harvard College, if
successful, resulted in an autobiographical
blank, a mind on which only a watermark had been
stamped, (p. 55)
Apparently, that water mark was sufficient: people assumed
that since I had completed a long and expensive rite of passage
that I could move to a level in society commensurate with my
newly acquired taste and capability. My having graduated from
college raised their expectations.
One form of raised expectations is that of the fitting job,
or occupational role. Let me try to explain that with a story.
The year before I entered college my older brother informed
me that a man named Fletcher (who worked as a purchasing agent
for my father) had "wasted his education." My brother meant that
Fletcher, who had graduated from Harvard in the twenties, should
have secured more prestigious employment. My brother saw that
14
there should be a correlation between the amount and quality of
one’s formal education and the job one held in life. He was not
expressing a radical view for his age, the times, or the culture,
but something vital was left out of that normal and ordinary
conclusion. There was no room for any consideration of
Fletcher's life: was he a good and decent man, was he happy, did
he have a well-developed
.
and refined good taste which he used as
a yardstick in making his moral, social, and aesthetic
judgements? The more I think about that moment the more clearly
I realize that my older brother had fastened on to the real
purpose of college in America: what we really want from our
advanced education is a "better" job, and we want that even if we
haven’t read Dewey.
Plato . . . laid down the fundamental principle
of a philosphy of education when he asserted that
it was the business of education to discover what
each person is good for, and to train him to
mastery of that mode of excellence, because such
development would also secure the fulfillment of
social needs in the most harmonious way. His
error was not in qualitative principle, but in
his limited conception of the scope of vocations
socially needed; a limitation of vision which
reacted to obscure his perception of the infinite
variety of capacities found in different
individuals. (Dewey, 1916, p. 309)
In other words, the refined good taste, real or assumed, was
lumped together with "mastery of that mode of excellence" (again,
real or assumed) -the real value being the utility of the college
experience in getting and holding a job. (Certainly Aldrich was
talking about something quite different.)
15
Let me go back and tie some of these thoughts together.
Most of what I have been discussing is in the realm of
"assumptions," assumptions about the process of going to college.
Many of these assumptions have to do with a connection between
college and what one does after college, one’s career. For
example: my choosing a major; the choices Wolff cites; the
premises of the "top colleges" again cited by Wolff; the raised
expectations that I noted; by brother's perceptions; Dewey's
educational philosophy. Behind all of these assumptions is the
belief that education is preparation or training for a vocation;
less explicit but there nevertheless is the simultaneous belief
that the vocations prepared or trained for will be prestigious
and rewarding.
During the palmy days of the fifties and the sixties such
belief was well-founded. White-collar, well-paying jobs did
indeed follow hard on the heels of four years of college. And
looking back on my own experience I can see that for many the
connection between major and career was not often causal; what
was causal was the degree itself . What happens when the
cause-and-effect no longer works? What happens when our credo is
challenged? What happens when people start writing (and reading)
articles called "The Declining Value of College Going"?
For decades the American higher educational
system has both provided individuals with
training and education promising high earnings
and occupational status, and supplied society
with skilled specialists and white-collar
16
workers. In the 1950s and 1960s in particular,
the job market for college graduates was
exceptionally strong; education was a major means
to socioeconomic mobility and national economic
growth. . . . With a bull market, there was
little incentive to examine the value of college
education carefully; whatever it was that was
being taught was paying off in good jobs for
graduates. The response was simply to expand
higher education —
. . . (Freeman & Holloman,
1975, p. 24)
The very language i-s instructive. A college education has a
measurable "value" like any commodity; the educational process is
one of inputs, throughputs, and outputs; we operate in a world
of supply and demand. Higher education, under pressure,
describes itself in a way that Hannah Arendt (1958) deplored in
her book. The Human Condition ;
it is only in the exchange market, where
everything can be exchanged for something else,
that all things, whether they are products of
labor or work, consumer goods or use objects,
necessary for the life of the body or the
convenience of living or the life of the mind,
become "values." This value consists solely in
the esteem of the public realm where the things
appear as commodities, and it is neither labor,
nor work, nor capital, nor profit, nor material,
which bestows such value upon an object, but only
and exclusively the public realm where it appears
to be esteemed, demanded, or neglected, (pp.
163-164)
What Arendt describes here is the absolute neglect of any
consideration of higher education as anything other than
vocational preparation. What may have been ambiguous in my mind
in the fifties, was clarified in a period of stress. The
response from both within and without the academy was not to
17
point out that the assumptions were false or inappropriate, but
to engage in a self-examination to discover how the academy had
failed to impart marketable skills to its graduates.
Certainly there are some other assumptions about the purpose
of a college education. Aldrich’s (1965) assumption, for
example, does not deal in the "values" of Freeman and Hollomon
(1975), and his articulation strikes a responsive chord within
me. Even in those unreflective years before and during my
undergraduate experience I somehow had the notion that getting
educated meant something liberating or broadening. And those two
abstractions implied to me that I would comprehend more about
myself, about my social and natural environments. And it
necessarily meant something more — that as a result of increased
comprehension I would act in manner that would demonstrate my
liberation. This acting out would, of course, take place not
only in my vocation but in my life. Aldrich means that as well,
and it occurs to me that either we were and are dead wrong, or
that higher education moved rapidly while we weren’t watching.
Or that there has always been — right from the beginning — a
kind of tension or ambiguity within the institution of education
and in the public’s view of that institution. And that in
moments of stress or challenge it is not so much a process of
clarification as an actual shifting of goals that takes place.
In other words, the academy can and will accomodate essentially
conflicting assumptions in periods of calm but (apparently) will
18
move rapidly and openly into the camp of utility and market
/
values when really pressed.
This tension was addressed by Matthew Arnold in 186? in his
famous essay, "Sweetness and Light.”
Plenty of people will try to give the masses
,
as
they call them, an intellectual food prepared and
adapted in the way they think proper for the
actual condition of the masses. The ordinary
popular literature is an example of this way of
working on the masses. Plenty of people will try
to indoctrinate the masses with the set of ideas
and judgements constituting the creed of their
own profession or party. Our religious and
political organizations give an example of this
way of working on the masses. I condemn neither
way; but culture works differently. It does not
try to teach down to the level of inferior
classes; it does not try to win them for this or
that sect of its own, with readymade judgments
and watchwords. It seeks to do away with
classes; to make the best that has been thought
and known in the world current everywhere; to
make all men live in an atmosphere of sweetness
and light, where they may use ideas, as it uses
them itself, freely, — nourished, and not bound
by them. (1867/19^7, p. 60)
Arnold makes it quite clear that culture (or Aldrich's "refined
good taste") is an admirable goal but always in danger of
neglect. It is equally clear that what Arnold identifies as
culture would fit neatly within most general descriptions of what
an educated person should have. But my own experience and the
testimony of others demonstrates that that goal is not often met
or, worse, is set aside for the more measurable and economically
beneficial one of vocational preparation. In the process, the
very opportunities for the liberating effects of education are
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necessarily being reduced or eliminated.
That is, a process of competition is set up between the
instrumental course of higher education and that course I
identify as the liberating one. There may be a problem with the
latter course, as well, if we assume that a liberal arts degree
in the opposite of the professional degree. For when, as at
Amherst College (see above) and other prestigious (and not so
prestigious) liberal arts colleges, even the liberal arts are
preparatory to a specific career, that polarity does not work.
W. Roy Niblett (1974) contributes an historical perspective
to this development of specialists and the preoccupation of
higher education with preparation for Vocations.
The two great wars of this century acted as
further encouragement to places of higher
education to produce people qualified in
scientific and technical ways. ... they became
training grounds for the greater and greater
numbers of experts and specialists the nations
required. Such directed demands have continued,
among the causes being the pursuit of affluence
by the developed countries and the calculating
rationalism dominant in both capitalist and
communist countries. ... A channelling of mental
energy down narrow avenues can yield dividends —
with trained and clever economists, computer
scientists, engineers, surgeons, research
chemists, management experts, in great demand
these last thirty years. On both sides of the
Atlantic, however, the 1950s were years in which
idealism in universities, including a concern
with general education, was subjugated to what
seemed an overriding need for the production of
specialists and professionals — a view which
still predominates in spite of the significant
efforts to replace or modify it. (p. 119)
spite of this production of specialists, we stillYet in
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assume that someone graduating from a college or university is
indeed entering the company of educated men and women. Education
is anticipated as the product of such schools. And when we use
the word education in that way we are talking about the refined
good taste which one uses in one's daily rounds, in contrast to
training, or to narrow specialization.
Eupraxia
Let me attempt some conclusions. There exists a continuing
confusion within the institutions of higher education as to the
meaning of "education." This is more than semantics: there may
have always been tension between the goals of an education, but
according to Freeman and Hollomon and others, that tension is
rapidly being resolved.
Even in those institutions that one assumes would champion
the liberal arts (which one would normally assume, again, as an
antidote to credentialling) there are signs of concern and
confusion. For example, Robert L. Belknap and Richard Kuhns
(1977), of Columbia, describe it this way;
our universities have lost their old unanimity as
to the areas of acceptable ignorance. . . . the
curriculum as the sanctuary of traditional bodies
of lore and modes of thought has been in part
replaced by the curriculum as the exposition
ground for the latest literary and social
experiments. . . We have turned our college into
a transitional layer between sophisticated
education, which is now for kids, and narrow
professional training, which distinguishes the
practical, working elite, (pp. 26-28)
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In the 1970s, Harvard, Columbia, Amherst, and others seemed
to attempt a redress of an imbalance between the liberal arts (or
general education) and the more frankly vocational disciplines.
These institutions are, through their actions, saying that the
disparate versions of the myth can co-exist. While this
co-existence will be covered in greater detail in a later
chapter, it is important to note that the Columbias and Harvards
represent about one percent of the four-year colleges and
universities in the country. The "mean, mode, and median of
American higher education" is a quite different case, as
described by Michael Cohen and James C. March (1974):
In these schools the enrollment market dominates
budgeting. Sometimes, for some of them, the
demand for education has served to blunt the
obviousness of the "customer"; but for most of
them most of the time, the budgeting problem is
one of finding a set of allocations that produces
an educational program that attracts enough
enrollment to provide the allocations, (pp.
101-102 )
It is extremely unlikely that institutional support would be
afforded liberal education in those institutions at the expense
of more marketable programs. When times are flush, accomodations
are easily made for all sorts of programs. But when budget cuts,
and programmatic cuts, have to be made, the curriculum is
determined on the side of the market analysis.
Even when the cuts are not severe, the perception of the
faculty and the administration that justification of degree
programs must demonstrate utility produces some interesting
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academic li^ybrids.
At the University of Massachusetts’ Amherst campus, attempts
at modifying the undergraduate curriculum in the 1970s took the
form of the "Educational Liaison Project," which discussed
innovations that would provide "minors" for those students who so
desired them. Some minors considered included "business skills
for arts majors," "business skills for engineers," and similar
"cross-cultural" efforts. One could perceive these as (in some
cases) reinforcing the idea of college as vocational preparation,
or (in others) attempts to boost sagging enrollments in the Arts
and Humanities.
There are other, more obvious responses. At the University
of Massachusetts, again, a story in the December 1, 1977 issue of
the student newspaper contained the following analysis;
The Academic Affiars Council cites increased
career options and the need for 71,000 medical
technologists by 1985 (Department of Labor
Predictions) as the rationale to discontinue the
four-year medical technology program currently
operating in the division of Public Health in
favor of a five-year program within the
department of micro-biology.
(
Massachusetts Daily
Collegian
,
p. 1)
The majority of institutions of higher education in this
country are not only going to adapt and adjust existing programs,
but will create whole new programs in response to perceived
training needs. The process of higher education then is
justified in the public mind and in the institutional practice on
an instrumental basis. Education is a commodity in these
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circumstances, valued for its measurable use to the community or
to the individual.
The development of knowledge, skills, and forms of
understanding are, in fact, in the greater interest of the
community, and in the interest of the individual as well. They
can provide certain satisfactions or rewards
,
they can overcome
environmental hardships and mitigate evils. One could cite
numerous cases where the development of certain skills have not
only been important but essential to the survival of the
individual and to the successful development of community. In
short, they provide a living: this means food, a home, and the
perquisites of position and power.
The problem with this approach to education is that it
inevitably mitigates against any attempt for breadth of
understanding (one aspect of "being educatd") as being
insufficiently instrumental, non instrumental, or even
anti-instrumental. Like O’Toole’s argument about "learning how
I
to learn," to regard my education only as "instrumental" would
cause me tremendous frustration: why not package such a skill in
I
!
a single three-semester-hour course, rather than allow me to
i
( infer it from 120 semester hours in a variety of disciplines,
j
many of which I never mastered?
Either the frankly instrumental, or the more subtle approach
of O’Toole are manipulative of individuals toward unspecified
I
social ends. Furthermore, they posit that getting a job, and
I
I
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holding it (or being able to move quickly from Job to Job)
constitutes the good life. And that out of the Job-holding will
flow profit, goods for consumption, and other benefits. What
this approach does not deal with, and where this definition of
education is. deficient, is the issue of whether knowlege and
understanding and wisdom per se constitute the good life.
This is more than a fine point. To move in the direction of
extrinsic value, or instrumental Justification, is to declare for
the universal relativity of everything. One selects a major and
pursues an ’’education" in anticipation of its exchange value in
an ever-changing marketplace. This is basic to the thesis of R.
P. Dore’s (1976) book. The Diploma Disease ;
The effect of schooling, the way it alters a
man’s capacity and will to do things, depends not
only on what he learns, or the way he learns it,
but also on why he learns it. That is at the
basis of the distinction between schooling which
is education, and schooling which is only
qualification, a mere process of certificaton —
or ’ credentialing, ’ as American sociologists have
recently started to call it. (p. 8)
On the other hand, if we focus not on the processes of
training individuals in highly skilled tasks so that they may
enter the work force with certain, specifiable advantages, but
rather on the concept of an "educated man or woman," we are
forced to reconsider the entire higher education enterprise.
This concept goes beyond training, the acquisition of narrow and
specialized skills, the development of a capacity to reason, or
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the articulate justification of beliefs and conduct. One could
accomplish all these goals and still not deserve the accolade of
"educated man." The educated man transforms all he sees and
does, he lives and enjoys a level of life that is thicker and
higher than that of someone else who is not educated. In Robert
Pirsig’s (1975) terms, an educated man has developed a sense of
Quality:
Quality is shapeless, formless, indescribable.
To see shapes and forms is to intellectualize.
Quality is independent of any such shapes and
forms. The names, the shapes and forms we give
Quality depend only partly on the Quality. They
also depend partly on the a priori images we have
accumulated in our memory. We constantly seek to
find, in the Quality event, analogues to our
previous experiences. If we didn’t we'd be
unable to act... .
In a sense, . . . it's the student's choice of
Quality that defines him, (pp. 243-244)
Thus, a sense of Quality, something that is unique to each
person and which defines him. But it's more than just that. A
truly educated man lives his wisdom, demonstrates his
understanding, acts his knowledge. An educated man is, must be,
eupractic. He will be, by definition, inclined to act rightly,
or he will not be acting as an educated man . If he does not do
so, his education will have become the pile of "inert ideas" that
Whitehead (1929) deplored.
This eupraxia is not instrumental; the educated man does
not act in certain ways in order to ...; if he does, he is, in
fact, applying a skill. On the contrary, an educated man acts
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rightly because, that is an intrinsic feature of being educated.
The truly educated man can only reveal that quality in his
actions, in his intercourse with other humans.
In acting and speaking, men show who they are,
reveal actively their unique personal identities
and thus make their appearance in the human
world, while their physical identities appear
without any activity of their own in the unique
shape of the body and sound of the voice. This
disclosure of ’’who" in contradistinction to
"what" somebody ‘is — his qualities, gifts,
talents, and shortcomings, which he may display
or hide — is implicit in everything somebody
says and does. (Arendt, 1958, p. 179)
Therefore, in order to have truly educated people, the "process"
must be one of educing from us those inherent standards rather
than laying on a veneer.
You have to have some feeling for the quality of
the work. You have to have a sense of what’s
good. That is what carries you forward. This
sense isn’t just something you’re born with,
although you are born with it. It’s also
something you can develop. It’s not just
"intuition," not just unexplainable "skill" or
"talent." It’s the direct result of contact with
reality . Quality, which dualistic reason has in
the past tended to conceal. (Pirsig, 1975, p.
278 )
Such a process should go on throughout one’s life. Therefore, it
seems evident that it may be detrimental to the process and the
objective to confine education to those institutions currently
designated as colleges and universities.
What we have is not just two versions of the myth of
education, but two quite antithetical beliefs. It is more than a
case of instrumental versus non-instrumental education. If we
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consider the impact of a relative view of everything, we see that
such a view is going to violently reject that philosophy that
insists on standards and universals. In an institution that
measures success in the values of the marketplace, in the credo
that ’’what works is right” and where man and utility to man is
the measure of all things, lip-service is all that can be
expected for philosophies of education that propose there can be
no measurement of ’’outcomes” other than the lives, themselves, in
their richness and complexity, of the students.
William Butler Yeats (1927) considered this in his poem,
’’Among School Children.”
0 chestnut tree, great-rooted blossomer.
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
0 body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance.
How can we know the dancer from the dance? (11. 61-64)
My dance is me. It is my opportunity to reveal myself. How I do
that will, in all likelihood, reveal more to you, the public,
than to myself. The dance and the dancer will be
like the daimon in Greek religion which
accompanies each man throughout his life, always
looking over his shoulder from behind and thus
visible only to those he encounters. (Arendt,
1955, pp. 179-180)
And as the public observes, measures, and judges it should be
doing so in the full realization that it is seeing me as ’’who” I
am, rather than ’’what” I do for a living. I will then be known
as either an educated man or not.
David Schuman (1978) has put this a little differently:
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I am more and more convinced that one way to
understand and make judgements about anindividual's actions is to begin with that
person's aesthetic sense of the world. Of the
people I know best, either by interviewing or
simply knowing, no one lacks this aesthetic
sense. It is, as I am using it, a pre-conscious
sense of the rightfittingness of the world, (p.
That "rightfittingness" with which we are all endowed is the
basic stuff for an education. The truly educational work of our
lives, one that should be but rarely is enhanced by those
institutions that proclaim education, is the discovering,
nurturing, and refining of those aesthetic senses in order that
we may not only articulate them (in the sense of describing them)
but act them out in our lives. Education, then, is the process
of educing the aesthetic sense or senses; as such, it never ends
until life ends. We cannot tell the dancer from the dance; only
in the living of a life are we able to make meaning of it, take
its measure; only after the completion of one's earthly rounds
can we discover the educated person.
CHAPTER II
MAJOR THEMES IN HIGHER EDUCATION
No other technique for the conduct of life
attaches the individual so firmly to reality as
laying emphasis on work; for his work at least
gives him a secure place in a portion of reality,
in the human community. (Freud, 1961, p. 27)
The Medieval View
A conventional historical review begins by examining the
12th and 13th century monastery and cathedral schools. Following
Constantine’s Edict of Milan (313) Christianity moved from the
role of target of officially sanctioned persecution to the
religion of the Roman state. By the fifth century a majority of
Romans were Christian, and "Christianity and civilization were
thus made coterminous; only the rustic, the paganus
,
was not a
member of the Church" (Hay, 1965).
As Christianity became more widespread, it became less
accessible: success as a religion for the masses created a need
for a specialized priestly calling, and an elaborate hierarchy —
a church which was fundamentally Roman: Roman in
its attitude to the theoretically omnipotent
emperor, in its organization by cities, in its
adoption of Latin as a vehicle of prayer and
praise, in its practical identification with the
limits of Roman power. Even the monastic
movement, which was in a sense a reaction from
the compromises involved in the adoption of
Christianity as the official creed of the mass of
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Oman citizens, reveals an authoritarianism, a
respect for law, an itch for system, which bears
witness to the strength possessed by these
characteristically Roman attitudes in the sixth
century and later. (Hay, 1965, p. 11)
Through the efforts of that highly structured society we have
records of the pre-medieval period, and a body of knowledge
around which were formed the first, tentative groupings of
masters and students that became the universities.
Literacy was virtually restricted to the clergy. They wrote
and spoke Latin, a small pocket of experts surrounded by a
vernacular-speaking majority.
The day-to-day acts of administration and
government (apart from those in the Church
itself) were . . . normally conducted in the
vernaculars, but they were recorded almost always
in the Latin of the clerks who wrote them down in
the charters (carta, cartula = a piece of
parchment) confirming legal actions such as
alienations of lands or public alliances between
princes, and in the chronicles composed by the
monastic historians. Even the ephemeral
vernacular literature of relaxation was more
often than not written down by a priest so that
we perforce regard the whole period through
clerical spectacles. (Hay, 1965, p. 54)
Whatever sciences and scholarship existed in the Middle
Ages, then, were the almost exclusive province of the Churches
specialists; this "control" could extend to the secular
literature as well. With Latin as the language of the Church,
"grammar" was part of the clergy's basic equipment (Kristeller,
1972). "Rhetoric" or prose style, and "dialectic" or logic,
equally derived from the antiquity of the Roman schools, formed
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the trlvium, which was the normal fare of the monastery school
where novices were trained, and of the bishops' schools, centered
at the cathedrals, where candidates for ordination received
instruction. The trivium
,
when combined with the more advanced
subjects of the quadrivium (music, astronomy, geometry,
arithmetic), formed the curriculum of the medieval schools.
These, then, were the "liberal arts."
They were "liberal" in that they were "worthy of a free
man" (The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1968); they were,
technically, "arts," in the sense of being in "the nature of
instruments for more advanced studies, or for the work of life"
I
(The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1968). The illustrative
j
quotation used by the Oxford English Dictionary for the yoking of
i
I the two words, "He being a Master in all the seuen liberall Arts,
is not so ignorant in grammar" (1568), is from William Fulke
(1538-1589), so we may assume that medieval scholars did not
i
.
conceive of these branches of learning in quite the same way we
do when such a term is used.
In fact, Nathan Schachner (1962) in The Mediaeval
I
I
]
Universities points out that:
j
Practically all the knowledge of the age (11th
j
century) was based on the work of five unoriginal
and for the most part inaccurate compilers of the
fifth and sixth centuries. In those centuries of
gloom and defeat there was no thought of pursuing
novel investigations; only desperate attempts to
salvage what each author thought valuable out of
the funds of learning yet available, (p. 13)
I
I
I
I
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He cites Boethius (ca. 475
-524), Isidorus (d. 636), and
Martianus Capella (ca. 424) for their contributions, the last
famous chiefly for introducing later times to the
ancient division of the Seven Liberal Arts, into
whose sanctified compartments the Middle Ages
tried to force all learning. (Schachner, 1962,
pp. 13-14)
Another author, commenting on the scholarly heritage available to
the Middle Ages, writes:
literature . . . was desperately ill-served by
the handful of savants and the few academies, the
pedestrian poets and rhetorical writers of the
third and later centureis. It was at this stage,
indeed, that scholarship became a mere knowledge
of grammar, literary ability consisted in the
composition of pastiches
. and the classical
writers were usually read in epitomes. (Hay,
1965, p. 8)
In addition to the monastery and cathedral schools, there
were "parish” schools. In England, the first Church statement on
this matter is provided by the Council of Cloveshoe, 747; the
objectives — and this pertained for all Europe — were repeated
for the next several centuries:
About 994, an English synod prescribed "that
priests shall keep schools in the villages and
teach small boys without fee: priests ought
always to keep schools of schoolmasters in their
houses, and if any of the faithful is willing to
give his little ones to be educated he ought to
receive them willingly and teach them kindly."
(Coulton, 1955, p. 386)
Very few parishes realized this objective. There were also
"palace” schools: the first and most notable was at Charlemagne’s
Court, and was led by Alcuin.
33
The Cathedral School of Notre Dame, Paris, however, is
generally acknowledged as the institution most responsible for
the development of what we now call universities. For it was
there that Abelard studied in 1099, and perfected the method of
Scholasticism. In the process he joined in the debate between
Nominalism and Realism, the reigning intellectual and theological
controversy of the day. His skill and cleverness won him a
significant following among what were turning out to be
professional students. The great accomplishment of Abelard was
his method:
In him. Logic, the epitome of the syllogism, as
exemplified in such of the Logical Works of
Aristotle as were than known, came to complete
fruition. He set Reason upon a throne in realms
where Authority had hitherto been the only guide.
Everything, he insisted, must prove amenable to
the active processes of the mind, to the rigorous
following of major premise, minor premise, and
conclusion; even the sacrosanct articles of
theology. Nothing was immune from his method; he
must understand in order to believe. (Schachner,
1962, pp. 32-33)
Once Abelard had "mastered" the curriculum of the Cathedral
School of Notre Dame he was given a licence to teach by the
Chancellor, William of Champeaux (the chancellor was the head
teacher of the school, appointed by the bishop), and therefore
became a "master of arts." Abelard, called the "peripatetic of
Palais" (Schachner, 1962), taught at several sites, but
ultimately (and painfully) felt the control of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy. During the century of his eminence, masters formed
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guilds to, in effect, close their ranks, control the teaching and
the content, and the process of conferring of degrees. At the
same time they provided themselves a measure of independence from
the local bishop:
the masters followed the example of all the
trades of their day, and formed a guild, a trade
union. Banded together they had numbers,
strength; numerous and strong, they could protect
their pupils from harm. They could resist
oppression from whatever source; and like any
other society of the kind, they could select
their members. So it was in Paris. In Bologna
the masters were chiefly natives, who required no
such protection. There it was the students . . .
who banded together into a "universitas” or
union." (Schachner, 1962, p. 44)
Later, such refinements as the ius ubique docendi
,
the right
to teach anywhere, were developed, primarily because of the
enormous and genuinely international prestige of the great
schools, the studia generalia
,
places where students were
received from all parts of Europe. It was requisite for such a
studium generale to possess at least one of the higher Faculties
of Medicine, Law or Theology, in addition to the basic Arts
Faculty; to have a charter authorized by a Pope, King or Emperor;
and to regularly examine students and award degrees.
It is interesting that with the twin successes of "system,"
the New Logic of Abelard, and the guilds of the masters, a kind
of decline set in:
By the time the Universities emerge, toward the
end of the century, Chartres, the school of
letters, was declining, Orleans was fast becoming
a law school, and the fresh liberal culture of
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the twelfth century was already submerged in a
formalized professional curriculum that was to
hold its own right up to the late Renaissance.
It sounds paradoxical, but it is true, that the
Universities were never to have that broad
attitude toward learning they possessed before
their formal inception. (Schachner, 1962 dd.
37-38)
The ’decline** did not affect the numbers of scholars who
attended. These numbers were drawn primarily, if not
exclusively, from the nobility and what we should call the upper
middle class of the economic strata (Coulton, 1955). Not only
did the composition of the student body reflect the burden of the
costs of such schooling, it demonstrated some real class
distinctions. In a world where there were churchmen for prayer,
soldiers for fighting, and artisans and peasants for labor, there
was considerable concern to restrict movement or trespass from
one division to another. In 1391, the English House of Commons
petitioned the king that no bondman be suffered to send his sons
to school, "in order to advance them by clergy" (Coulton, 1955).
Once enrolled in the universities, the young scholar could pursue
studies leading to a lucrative profession, or pursue another
extreme, the rather debauched life that found fertile ground in
the university towns. It is certain, however, that relatively
few pursued their education through to the conferring of the
degree: Coulton (1955) states that "only a small minority ever
proceeded even to the half-degree of Bachelor, let alone to
Master" (p. 409).
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One attempt to summarize this section would be to call the
university ”a distinctly medieval institution” (Kerr, 1963). It
was during this period that the dominant features of university
life were developed; a name, a central and stable location,
faculty with relative autonomy and control over examinations,
students, teaching methods, and an administrative structure that
divides the teachers into "faculties." Paris and theology,
Bologna and law, Salerno and medicine, Montpellier, Toulouse and
Prague; the development of Oxford and Cambridge from the Paris
model, but placing particular emphasis on the residential college
instead of the separate faculties as the primary unit. In the
idealized version of history, the university became the center
for the professions, the location of the great disputes in
theology and philosophy, the home for the classics. A more
critical view is provided by Schachner (1962):
The utilitiarian spirit became the curse of the
Universities. In the early days of Abelard the
sprit of scholarship was comparatively
disinterested; men and boys travelled over half
Eupope, and willingly subjected themselves to
untold hardships, to drink at the mainsprings of
intellectual life; but that eagerness for
knowledge per se died down as the formal
Universites rose to power and prominence.
Learning, education, became a matter of achieving
a degree, of obtaining a social cachet , of
opening up paths to riches and fame and easy
preferment in Church and State. . . . the Arts,
which should have been the backbone of the
University, became a narrowed field, relegated to
mere boys.
The true reason for the University’s existence
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was then found in the higher Faculties, the
professional schools. Of these by far the most
popular was the Civil Law Faculty. There was
good reason for this. The Law Graduate had an
unlimited field before him. Private practice was
exceedingly lucrative, and all the higher
positions in municipality and State, in
Parlements and Councils, were open to him. Even
in the Church ' the knowledge of Civil Law was
highly advantageous, (pp. 372-373)
We should also note that "scholarism" (scholasticism) was
still very much in evidence in the seventeenth century; one
reason for the narrowing of the Arts course was the prominence of
Logic. The humanists of the Renaissance were constantly
asserting the importance of the studia humanitatis
,
the
rediscovered Latin and Greek literature for example, against the
claims of the other, more utilitarian subjects. This was the
intent of the so-called defenses of poetry, where poetry
represents all humanist learning, and of their repeated attacks
on scholasticism (Kristeller, 1972).
We may judge the impact of the humanists on the curriculum
by the assessment of Milton, for whom, ”at Cambridge, the endless
intricacies of scholastic logic left him 'half dead with
boredom'” (Carey, 1969). Milton, more fortunate than most, I
imagine, was able to achieve his revenge in Paradise Lost : there
he depicted the devils in Pandemonium, having lost the power of
intuitive reasoning which differentiates angels from men, engaged
In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
Of providence, foreknowledge, will and fate.
Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute.
And found no end, in wandering mazes lost. (II, P-
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558-561)
The Lessons of Socrates
Yet, before the seventeenth Century Milton, before the great
universities of the Middle Ages, the Cathedral schools, and the
monasteries, there was Plato. In Part I of the Republic
.
Socrates, in dialogues with Cephalus, Polemarchus and
Thrasymachus
,
seeks a definition of a just society:
We began by looking for a definition of justice;
but before we had found one, I dropped that
question and hurried on to ask whether or not it
involved superior character and intelligence; and
then, as soon as another idea cropped up, that
injustice pays better. I could not refrain from
pursuing that
.
So now the whole conversation has left me
completely in the dark; for so long as I do not
know what justice is, I am hardly likely to know
whether or not it is a virture, or whether it
makes a man happy or unhappy, (pp. 39-40)
In the dark or not, Plato has established some principles. One
of these is that a just ruler, like a physician, or a ship's
captain, is practicing an art for which training and direction
can be provided. While looking for those who can best be trained
for this art, he develops a theory of society emerging from
shared needs, and based on areas of expertise, the "innate
differences," the "native aptitude for their calling" will be
discovered in the "guardians" of the state as well as in the
shoemakers. Each man would have "... one trade, for which he
was naturally fitted; he would do good work if he confined
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himself to that all his life, never letting the right moment slip
by."
The selection of the guardians of the Republic will reflect
an attempt to "find out who are the best guardians of this inward
conviction that they must always do what they believe best for
commonwealth." This process will begin in early childhood and
will involve observation, the setting of tasks, and subjecting
candidates to ordeals of toil and pain. In terms of Socrates'
"noble lie" those fit to rule as Guardians would have gold in
their composition, the Auxiliaries, silver, and farmers,
craftsmen, merchants, and others, iron and brass. Roles in life
would be assigned on the basis of the "mixture of metals in the
souls of the children," and would not necessarily be hereditary.
With gold in the composition of their souls. Guardians would not
have the needs of the lower classes, would not be allowed
material gold or silver, or any private property beyond the
barest necessaries. This would prevent Guardians from falling
into the trap of luxuriousness.
As for their schooling, it would commence with physical
training, poetry and music. The education in poetry and music
being
the counterpart of bodily training. It educated
our Guardians by the influence of habit,
imparting no real knowledge, but only a kind of
measure and harmony by means of melody and
rhythm, and forming the character in similar ways
through the content of the literature, fabulous
or true. It taught nothing useful for so high a
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purpose as you now have in view. (p. 237)
Then, an intensive course of physical and military training,
calculating and number theory, geometry, solid geometry,
astronomy, harmonics, and dialectic. This last is the process
described in the allegory of the Cave, when one emerged, then
looked
at the living creatures outside the Cave, then at
the stars, and lastly at the Sun himself, he
arrived at the highest object in the visible
world. So here, the summit of the intelligible
world is reached in philosophic discussion by one
who aspires, through the discourse of reason
unaided by any of the senses, to make his way in
every case to the essential reality and persevere
until he has grasped by pure intelligence the
very nature of Goodness itself. This journey is
what we call Dialectic, (p. 252)
It is important to remember that, having reached this point,
the individual left the "academy" to involve himself in his
society. To allow this to not happen would be to pervert the
system as Plato had developed it:
It is for us, then, as founders of a
commonwealth, to bring compulsion to the noblest
natures. They must be made to climb the ascent
to the vision of Goodness, which we called the
highest object of knowledge; and, when they have
looked upon it long enough, they must not be
allowed, as they now are, to remain on the
heights, refusing to come down again to the
prisoners or to take any part in their labours
and rewards, however much or little these may be
worth, (p. 233)
It is a kind of intellectual’s noblesse oblige (albeit forced, on
occasion). But clearly, Plato intends that the educational
process for the most gifted in the Republic would result in those
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persons involving their lives in the system and perpetuating the
values inherent in that society.
The process of education that he describes is not, strictly,
a means to being educated, if we think of ’'means” as a
value-neutral route to an end. There is more here than a cause
and effect relationship that might characterize the taking of
certain drugs and the consequent heightened sense of
consciousness. For Plato, there is a "logical link between the
content to which the learner is introduced in the learning
situation and that which is constitutive of his performance when
he has learnt" (Peters, 1973, p. 24l)
.
For Socrates, and for Plato, if there was order in the body,
there was health; similarly in the soul, and in the body politic.
In the Gorgias
, Socrates convinces Callicles that the
self-controlled soul has sense and discipline. And the
self-controlled man "will do what is right in regard both to gods
and to men." This fitting, or just conduct is, of course,
eupraxia, and Socrates takes it a step further. For not only in
the Republic
,
but in the Gorgias as well, Socrates describes the
necessity of involvement in the life of the community.
To me, at least, this seems to be the end and aim
which a man must keep in mind throughout his
life. He must turn all his own efforts and those
of his country to bring it about that justice and
self-control shall effect a happy life. (Plato,
1979, p. 83)
This goes far beyond mere know-how. The utilitarian case
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for knowledge was made by Polus, in the Gorglas
. and Socrates
pointed out how rhetoric may be technically perfect in its
application but absolutely wrong if used not in the pursuit of
truth. There must be a concern for something higher than
utility, or skill, or the truths of empirical science.
There are some noteworthy challenges to that philosophy.
For example, in 1589 Christopher Marlowe's Faustus used his
university education at Wittenberg to rise from "base stock," and
So soon he profits in divinity.
The fruitful plot of scholarism grac'd.
That shortly he was grac'd with doctor's name.
Excelling all whose sweet delight disputes
In heavenly matters of theology;
Till swoln with cunning, of a self-conceit.
His waxen wings did mount above his reach.
And melting Heavens conspir'd his overthrow;
For, falling to a devilish exercise.
And glutted more with learning's golden gifts.
He surfeits upon cursed necromancy. (I. i. 15-25)
A comparison of Plato's Guardian and Marlowe's Faustus
reveals a dramatic difference: education, for Plato, is the
pursuit of Truth, and should create a public commitment and
responsibility; for Faustus, it provided an occasion to pervert
his studies for purely personal gain. Marlowe's audience would
have immediately recognized Faustus' error; of course, they may
have sympathized with his cause.
We could temper Schachner's view of the utilitarian
tendencies of the universites by pointing out that in Marlowe's
time, and later, in Milton's, the Arts course at Oxford and
Cambridge was preeminent (law, for example, was more profitably
1
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and practically acquired through study and residence at the Inns,
or through apprenticeship). Given the social and economic
background of the undergraduates, and their subsequent careers
(someone like Spenser comes immediately to mind), Plato’s ideal
was at least acknowledged. I should hasten to point out that
carried to extremes this could be identified as another kind of
"utility;” I should also point out that in practice it was not so
systematic or "intended" as Plato would have it. But it did set
a pattern of noblesse oblige .
In England, this pattern persisted into the nineteenth
century and reflected that society's attitude toward class as
well as education. Ronald Dore (1976) has noted that
England, at the end of the eighteenth century,
had many schools . . . but it was far from having
a school system . . .
Those schools were not intended as channels of
social mobility (it was even less common than in
Chaucer's day for orphans to become 'poor clerks
at Oxford' and eventually princes of the church).
They were there to prepare children for a place
in society which their parentage had determined
with more or less certainty. Gentlemen students
went to Oxford to learn to be gentlemen — so
that 'their reason, fancy and carriage be
improved by lighter institutions and exercises,
that they might become rational and graceful
speakers, and be of an acceptable behaviour in
their counties' (Seth Ward — a
seventeenth-century author admittedly — .
.).(p. 16 )
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Higher Learning iji Found Land
After God had carried us safe to New England, and
^
we had builded our houses, provided necessaries
^ for our livelihood, rear'd convenient places for
Gods worship, and settled the Civill Government:
One of the next things we longed for, and looked
after was to advance Learning and perpetuate it
to Posterity; dreading to leave an illiterate
Ministry to the Churches
,
when our present
Ministers shall lie in the dust. ( New England 's
First Fruits
,
1643)
The Cambridge connection . When the higher learning arrived in
the new found land, it was in the form of Harvard College located
in New Towne (later called Cambridge). The change in the town's
name was not without significance: the majority of the original
trustees of the College had graduated from England's Cambridge.
The English curriculum—the Liberal Arts, the Philosophies
(mental, moral and metaphysical), and the Classics (Greek and
Latin literature) — was reproduced, and with the obvious
absence of a Higher Faculty, America had a college, not a
university.
We should note that — to address some historical concerns
— the initiative for the founding came not from students (as at
the University of Bologna) , nor from a faculty (as at the
University of Paris), but from the government which controlled
both civil and religious society. And while the stated aim was
to "advance Learning" — quickly qualified by the application of
that learning by a literate Ministry — the residents of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony saw the educative process as vital to
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the effective running of the government and the perpetuating of
their values to posterity. Furthermore, Morison (I960) points
out that it would be a mistake to "lay too much emphasis” on the
concern about the "illiterate Ministry." The General Court of
Massachusetts had appropriated, in October 1636, L400 "towards a
schoale or colledge," and by 1650 Harvard had profited from its
first benefactor (John Harvard, who left his library of about
four hundred volumes and half his estate valued at less than
L800), and was under the leadership of its second president
(Henry Dunster). It also had its first formal Charter that
declared Harvard's purpose
to be 'The advancement of all good literature,
artes and Sciences,' 'the advancement and
education of youth in all manner of good
literature Artes and Sciences,' and 'all other
necessary provisions that may conduce to the
education of the English and Indian youth of this
Country in knowledge and godliness.' (Morison,
I960, pp. 31-32)
There is no mention in the Charter of training ministers, and as
early as 164? President Dunster was seeking to expand the
traditional curriculum, and
to obtain some of the 'other necessary
provisions.' He asked for means to purchase
suitable books, 'especially in law, physicke,
philosophy, and mathematics' for the use of the
scholars, 'whose various inclinations to all
professions might thereby by incouraged and
furthered.' (Morison, I960, p. 32)
Despite the attempts at expansion, and encouragement of interest
in the professions (it is not clear whether Dunster was
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anticipating or responding to such interests), Harvard was
clearly following the English model of higher education:
The bachelor’s course was intended to be, and
was, a liberal education for the times, having no
practical or professional value, equally suitable
for a future divine, physician, or ruler.
President Oakes addressed one of his graduating
classes as ’gentlemen, educated like gentlemen’
.
Two ends and objects of their education were
constantly held up to students in the puritan
century: the attainment of a greater knowledge
of God, through knowledge of his word and works;
and . . . eupraxia . . , variously translated
(as) ’good conduct,” ’right action,’ and ’true
welfare.’ . . . One of the theses frequently
debated at commencement was ’ Eupraxia is the
object and goal of the Arts.’ (Morison, I960, pp.
43-44)
If we consider this, and the substantial financial support
provided Harvard (and, later, other institutions) by the civil
government, it is clear that there was an expectation that
college graduates would return to society endowed with an
appreciation for its history, traditions, values, and goals and
therefore better prepared to serve in that society. The Platonic
ideal on which I speculated earlier is, again, in evidence.
Changes in the new world . Almost a century after Dunster, John
Winthrop was appointed to the Hollis Professorship in Mathematics
and Natural Philosophy at Harvard in 1738, allowing science to
make significant inroads at that institution (Rudolf, 1962).
Another attempt to move seriously in new academic directions in
the new world was made at the College of Philadelphia. Here,
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William Smith addressed the issue of the "American condition" and
its needs: that is, that "peace and economic abundance would
require of Americans a special effort in ’forming a succession of
sober, virtuous, industrious citizens and checking the course of
growing luxury’" (Rudolf, 1962, p. 32). With the support of that
most practical American, Benjamin Franklin, Provost Smith
established, in 1756:
a three year course of study which put as much as
one third of the time into science and practical
studeis . He was not permitted to establish a
parallel "mechanic arts" college as a companion
to the traditional classical college, but in the
classical college he emphasized English, English
literature, and other tool subjects that would be
useful to a far wider range of men than had
sought and found utility in the old curriculum,
Provost Smith’s program of studies was the first
systematic course in America not deriving from
the medieval tradition nor intending to serve a
religious purpose. (Rudolf, 1962, p. 32)
By 1799, in papers called forth by the American
Philosophical Society’s competition for the best plan of an
American system of Education, the movement toward utility,
practicality, and even of anti-intellectualism, was apparent.
The plans spoke much of science, of preparation
for democratic citizenship, of escaping from the
past. Rush (Benjamin Rush, a Philadelphia
physician) suggested setting up special schools
"for teaching the art of forgetting." He
distrusted the ancient languages. "While Greek
and Latin are the only avenues to science,
education will always be confined to a few
people," he argued, remarking that "it is only by
rendering knowledge universal, that a Republican
form of government can be preserved in our
country." He warned that the ancient languages
could stand in the way of the development of the
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country as well as in the way of its
preservation. Said Rush ”To spend four or five
years in learning two dead languages, is to turn
our backs upon a gold mine, in order to amuse
ourselves catching butterflies." (Rudolf, 1962.
p. 43)
The pursuit of butterflies did not seem particularly
American to one of our most distinguished critics from abroad,
Alexis de Tocqueville. After his journey through the United
States in I831 he wrote at length, with some warmth and
considerable insight about his pragmatic American friends. For
Tocqueville, Americans accept
tradition only as a means of information, and
existing facts only as a lesson used in doing
otherwise and doing better; to seek the reason of
things for oneself, and in oneself alone; to tend
to results without being bound to means, and to
aim at the substance through the form. (Vol.II,
pp. 1-2)
In Tocqueville' s perception, it is natural and normal for
Americans to actively question "traditions," and (to turn to our
concern) to be impatient if not hostile with curricula that do
not address the immediate, or do not seem practical and useful.
Americans as observed by Tocqueville were (are) an empirical and
pragmatic people. As he develops his analysis, Benjamin Rush's
contrast of gold mines and butterflies is resonating in the
background:
in most of the operations of the mind, each
American appeals to the individual exercise of
his own understanding alone.
America is therefore one of the countries of the
world where philosophy is least studied, and
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where the precepts of Descartes are best applied.
(Vol. II, p. 2)
Franklin and the self-made man . Benjamin Franklin had,
apparently, only a few years of elementary schooling, yet he
tells us in his Autobiography that in 1727 he "had formed most of
®y ingenious acquaintance into a club for mutual improvement
which we called the Junto" (Franklin, 1958, p. 54). "Morals,
politics, or natural philosophy" were the subjects for
discussion, and Franklin with characteristic modesty proclaimed
the Junto "the best school of philosophy, and politics that then
existed in the province." At the same time, he is quick to point
out, his fellow disputants were not lax in "exerting themselves
in recommending business to us" (p. 55). Out of the Junto came
the plans and original subscriptions and even the books for "the
mother of all the North American subscription libraries, now so
numerous" (p. 64). As Franklin describes it, the venture was a
great success:
The institution soon manifested its utility, was
imitated by other towns and in other provinces;
the libraries were augmented by donations;
reading became fashionable; and our people,
having not public amusements to divert their
attention from study, became better acquainted
with books, and in a few years were observed by
strangers to be better instructed and more
intelligent than people of the same rank
generally are in other countries, (p. 72)
And for Franklin, himself:
This library afforded me the means of improvement
by constant study, of which I set apart an hour
or two each day, and thus repaired in some degree
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the loss of the learned education by father once
intended for me. (p. 73)
What Franklin seems to be living out, here, is a rather American
dynamic between the absolute drive for the useful and the human
need for "knowledge" (Tocqueville, 1974, Vol II, pp. 65,66).
Such a tension would not be easily resolved in a country that
provided an equality of condition (if only for a brief moment in
its history), and the opportunity to earn one's rank. Given such
conditions, and a limited number of institutions in which to
attempt a resolution, a curriculum that had stayed constant at
Cambridge since the twelfth century would not be satisfactory.
And by the close of the eighteenth century in America, as we have
seen, the social climate was significantly different from that of
the Colonial period. Hofstadter (1961) has observed
It was to serve the traditional and aristocratic
needs of this upper crust that the colonial
colleges, with their conservative adherence to
the classical curriculum, were designed, while
the middle classes beneath them, whose base was
small shopkeeping and special crafts, were
satisfied to send their children to good private
academies with curricula based less upon the
classics and more upon a program of practical
studies, (p. 149)
The vision of Jefferson . In 1779, Thomas Jefferson, in his
capacity as Governor of the State of Virginia, and as a member of
the board of visitors of the College of William and Mary,
proposed to the Virginia Legislature the abolition of the
professorships of divinity and oriental languages, in order to
"free men from superstition, not inoculate them with it" (Rudolf,
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1902, p. iti). He also proposed a series of new professorships,
including anatomy, chemistry, law and police (public
administration), medicine, modern languages, and natural history,
among others. The legislature did not enact his programs, but
Jefferson’s interest in higher education was never diminished.
In l8l4, in a letter to Peter Carr, Jefferson picks up
several of the threads we have already identified and weaves a
syncretistic whole of them in his comprehensive proposal for a
system of higher education in Virginia. First, he stresses the
logic and, indeed, the necessity of developing an educational
system that is locally appropriate. Jefferson based this on his
personal study of the organization of institutions of higher
education in other countries, after which he concluded that no
two were alike:
Yet, I have no doubt that these several
arrangements have been the subject of mature
reflection, by wise and learned men, who,
contemplating local circumstances, have adapted
them to the condition of the section of society
for which they have been framed . . . . The
example they have set, then, is authority for us
to select from their different institutions the
materials which are good for us
,
and, with them,
to erect a structure, whose arrangement shall
correspond with our own social condition, and
shall admit of enlargement in proportion to the
encouragement it may merit and receive. (Crane,
1963, p. 38)
Jefferson conceived that while all require education, the amount
required was determined by class or ’’destiny." "The mass of our
citizens may be divided into two classes — the laboring and the
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learned" (Crane, 1963, p. 39). Education, therefore, becomes the
passport to a white-collar Job: "The learned class may still be
subdivided into two sections; 1) Those who are destined for
learned professions, as a means of livelihood; and 2) The
wealthy, who, possessing independent fortunes, may aspire to
share in conducting the affairs of the nation, or to live with
usefulness and respect in the private ranks of life" (Crane,
1963, pp. 39-40), While all classes would complete the
elementary schools (the first grade of education), Jefferson's
university would provide both sections of the learned class with
instruction in the general schools (the second grade), in "all
the branches . . . of useful science" that is. Language,
Mathematics, and Philosophy. His definitions of these branches
are unique, and comprehensive. For example, under the branch of
Language, he includes languages and history, grammar, poetry,
composition, criticism, rhetoric and oratory.
At the successful completion of the above course of study,
one could pursue training in the professional schools, the third
grade of Jefferson's system. There were three main departments:
1st Department, the fine arts, to wit: Civil
Architecture, Gardening, Painting, Sculpture, and
the theory of Music; the
2d Department, Architecture, Military and Naval;
Projectiles, Rural Economy (comprehending
Agriculture, Horticulture and Veterinary,)
Technical Philosophy, the practice of Medicine,
Materia Medica, Pharmacy and Surgery. In the
3d Department, Theology and Ecclesiastical
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Foreign. (Crane,
In this way, Jefferson ensured the advanced training of lawyers,
ecclesiastics, physicians, military men, "agricultors,” and, in
the school of fine arts, gentlemen, architects, pleasure
gardeners, painters and musicians. Perhaps most important was
Jefferson’s "school of technical philosophy."
The school of technical philosophy will differ
essentially in its functions from the other
professional schools. The others are instituted
to ramify and dilate the particular sciences
taught in the schools of the second grade on a
general scale only. The technical school is to
abridge those which were taught there too much
in extenso for the limited wants of the artificer
or practical man. These artificers must be
grouped together, according to the particular
branch of science in which they need elementary
and practical instruction; and a special lecture
or lectures should be prepared for each group —
and these lectures should be given in the
evening, so as not to interrupt the labors of the
day. (Crane, 1963
,
p. 42 )
All of society would have access to his university; all of the
productive forces in society, that is. It is interesting to note
that Jefferson began his proposal with the statement that "the
laboring (class) will need the first grade of education to
qualify them for their pursuits and duties; the learned will need
it as a foundation for further acquirements" (Crane, 1963
,
p.
39 ). As we have seen, his second and third stages of education
merely further the amount of general or specialized training
provided segments of society. It is, then, in the best interests
of the government to provide a variety of educational
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opportunities to its workforces, and those opportunities should
be designed to reflect the production needs of the nation.
In the America that was observed and described by de
Tocqueville, Jefferson conceived a uniquely American institution.
In his proposal for higher education in Virginia, he still
anticipates that those who benefit from education will, in turn,
benefit society; what is missing, at this point in our
educational history, is the explicit sense of societal
responsibility that was present earlier. Jefferson saw that ”it
is highly interesting to our country, and it is the duty of its
functionaries, to provide that every citizen in it should receive
an education proportioned to the condition and pursuits of his
life" (Crane, 1963, p. 39).
While Jefferson never saw his grand plan implemented, we can
readily see that the current American educational system is very
like his projection. It is interesting that he could state so
clearly the connection between higher education and work, and, in
effect, suggest the resolution of the tension we saw in Franklin.
A third example is helpful, and necessary to provide some
balance. Jefferson and Franklin were outside the educational
establishment, and their proposals would properly be considered
with suspicion, even resentment. There were many critics and
innovators, however, who came from within the establishment.
Conflict within the colleges . A year after Jefferson's letter to
Carr, George Ticknor and Edward Everett became the first
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Americans to attend a German university for the purpose of doing
advanced scholarly work. At Goettingen, Ticknor participated in
the rich scholarly traditions that were becoming the envy of
academics on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly the
concepts of Lernfreiheit and Lehrfreiheit (Rudolf, 1963).
Further, Ticknor was able to do the kind of advanced work that
was not available in American institutions, which still lacked
any higher faculties.
After three years of study Ticknor returned to Harvard and
took the position of Smith Professor of French, Spanish and
Belles-lettres, and, in 1825, his Remarks on Changes Lately
Proposed or Adopted in Harvard University
,
was published.
In this interesting document, Ticknor made some rather
sweeping recommendations for change in American higher education.
At the same time, he paid tribute to the very institution of
education and commented on its place in American society:
The age in which we live has been appropriately
called the age of improvement; and certainly,
among the demands made by its peculiar spirit,
none has been more constant, more extensive, or
more earnest, than the demand, in this country,
for an improved state of education. . . . For the
generation, on whom now rest the cares of life
among us, feel very sensibly, how much more
lightly their burthen (sic) could be borne, if
they had more of that knowledge, which is, indeed
power everywhere, but nowhere so truly and
entirely, as in the midst of free institutions;
so that there is, at this moment, hardly a father
in our country, who does not count among his
chief anxieties, and most earnest hopes, the
desire to given his children a better education,
than he has been able to obtain for himself.
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(Crane, 1963, p. 77)
In the first place, Ticknor states that a college such as
Harvard, with its resources and numerous instructors,
.
should open its doors to all; for, if its resources be properly
and efficiently applied, it has means of instruction for all”
(Crane, 1963, p. 79). Because of those abundant resources,
Ticknor feels that many of the emerging public and private
institutions, agricultural schools, law schools, or other
specialized institutions are unnecessary. In other words.
Harvard could meet these societal needs more rapidly and in
better fashion than the newer colleges and institutions.
The great increase of manufacturing
establishments, which all require men of peculiar
skill and knowledge to manage them; the
improvement in all the arts, which supposes a
corresponding improvement in the education of
those who are devoted to them; and the practical
intelligence and general character of the whole
country, which demands, in its best sense, a
liberal education for many persons in all classes
of the community; — all these have long since
made requisitions on our best places for public
education, which have not yet been fully answered
at any of them, but which the general uneasiness
will not suffer to remain unanswered much longer.
(Crane
,
1963, p. 80)
Ticknor concludes with a "sort of cynosure. .
.; and that
is, the principle of thorough TEACHING" (Crane 1963, p. 80). It
is clear that Ticknor is asking for the facilities as well as the
opportunities for rigorous, advanced work in the academic
disciplines. "Who, in this country, by means here offered him,
has been enabled to make himself a good Greek scholar?" (Crane,
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1963, p. 8l). He warns that this must happen at Cambridge and at
the larger colleges, and happen
speedily; for new institutions are springing up,
which, in the flexibility of their youth, will
easily take the forms that are required of them,
while the older establishments, if they suffer
themselves to grow harder and harder in their
ancient habits and systems, will find, when the
period for more important alterations is come and
free Universities are demanded and called forth,
that, instead of being able to place themselves
at the head of the coming changes and directing
their course, they will only be the first victims
of the spirit of improvement. (Crane, 1963, p.
82)
If we grant Ticknor the privilege of several hidden agendas,
his criticisms are interesting. In a way, they are classic in
that they demonstrate how the inside critic tends to want to
reform education (and probably any other institution) . While
Jefferson was able to look over the broad expanse of education
here and abroad and formulate, in effect, a far-sighted and
really different program for education, Ticknor wants to change
by a process of accretion . Proposals for change in American
higher education were not received lightly by Jefferson's or
Ticknor 's contemporaries. Both Jefferson and Ticknor, in their
own ways, were trying to move American higher education in new
directions, hopefully directions that would be appropriate to the
needs of their society. Their recommendations are important, and
characteristic of the informed criticism of the colleges of the
period.
The response from the establishment is best captured in the
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"Yale Report" of 1828. This product of the Yale faculty under
President Jeremiah Day was an uncompromising defense of the
status quo; that is, the concept of a residential college that
concentrated on instilling discipline and piety in its graduates.
Day was sensitive to the suggestion "that our colleges must
be new-modelled ; that they are not adapted to the spirit and
wants of the age; that they will soon be deserted, unless they
are better accomodated to the business character of the nation"
(Crane, 1963, p. 84). He rejected this notion and, in the
process, articulated the establishment’s position; that view
from within the institutions of higher education demonstrates a
subtle but significant shift from the intended effects of the
"liberal arts" of the colonial period as seen by Morison, while
still retaining much of that curriculum:
What then is the appropriate objectof a college?
... if we have not greatly misapprehended the
design of the patrons and guardians of this
college, its object is to LAY THE FOUNDATION OF A
SUPERIOR EDUCATION: and this is to be done, at a
period of life when a substitute must be provided
for Parental superintendence . . .
.
The two great points to be gained in intellectual
culture, are the discipline and the furniture;
expanding its powers, and storing it with
knowledge. The former of these is, perhaps, the
more important of the two. (Crane, 1963, p. 85)
Day goes on to explicity reject any notion that a collegiate
education prepares one for a specific occupation. One's
education is begun, but not completed in the college; rather, one
has "a thorough foundation in the principles of science.
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preparatory to the study of the practical arts” (Crane, 1963, p.
91).
What was happening was something more profound than a debate
over the inclusion of a "modern” language in the curriculum; what
was breaking out was something akin to academic warfare over the
basic concepts of the higher learning in America. At this point,
Yale's Discipline and Piety (having overcome the eupraxia of an
earlier, colonial Harvard) were fighting off Jeffersonian
Utility; Ticknor has begun the mobilization for Research and soon
it too would begin its advance; and in the later nineteenth
century. Liberal Culture would be revitalized and join the fray.
I want to acknowledge, immediately, the problems built in
to the use of such categories. For example, their fallibility is
readily apparent when we consider the "utility” present in
"discipline and piety,” and so on. Further, there never was a
chartered "discipline and piety school,” with lists of members.
But they are handles by which to grasp the educational nettle, a
nettle that is contantly changing. And Laurence R. Veysey (1965)
has argued that, for a brief time at least, these categories
provided specific conceptions of "the university,” which was a
"primordial, scarcely thought-out vision” in America before 1865.
The Nineteenth Century
In order to understand the higher education in America
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during the nineteenth century I must discuss those categories
identified by Veysey. After considering them, separately, we may
be able to better consider the syntheses of the present century.
Discipline and Piety . To begin with, this approach to education
had not only subtly shifted the eupraxia of the colonial college
out of center focus, it was the dominant mode in higher education
and, as such, was firmly entrenched and just as firmly resisting
change. In that sense, it had a stifling effect not unlike that
of scholasticism in the medieval period and later. This
narrowing of the college was challenged by some professional
educators, as well as influential dabblers like Jefferson.
For example, Amherst in 182? established a "parallel" course
of study, emphasizing English literature, modern languages, and
the sciences as substitutes for the ancient languages. Union
College offered an alternate scientific course after 1828, and
the University of Vermont announced a rearrangement of course
offerings to permit electives and departmental specialization.
Vermont, however,
.
refused to grant the bachelor’s degree until
the student completed the full, classical course (unlike Amherst
and Union)
.
These experiments were received with apathy and,
with the exception of Union’s scientific course,
were abandoned after brief trial. The "partial
course," a mere caricature of Jefferson’s and
Ticknor’s ideal of an open university, continued
to be offered at many institutions but it was
never popular and fitted poorly into the rigid
framework of the college system. (Crane, 1963,
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PP. 16, 17)
It would seem that the Yale faculty had carried the day,
with the influential 1828 Report,
a vindication of the residential college and of
the prescribed classical and mathematical course,
tied to a forthright statement of the moral and
pedagogical objectives they were intended to
achieve* The traditional curriculum was upheld
as ideally suited to discipline the mental
"faculties,” such as reason, imagination, and
memory
,
and as an indispensable prerequisite to
all advanced education. Parental supervision of
students in a monastic college was imperative,
since most undergraduates were impressionable
adolescents. (Crane, 1963, p. 17))
An interesting criticism of the nineteenth century classical
curriculum, however, is provided by one who survived it, Henry
Adams. Writing of his undergraduate days at Harvard (1854-1858),
Adams gives the perspective the apologists for the "traditional"
curriculum and process lacked:
Harvard College, as far as it educated at all,
was a mild and liberal school, which sent young
men into the world with all they needed to make
respectable citizens, and something of what they
wanted to make useful ones. Leaders of men it
never tried to make. Its ideals were altogether
different. The Unitarian clergy had given to the
College a character of moderation, balance,
judgement, restraint, what the French called
mesure ; . . . In effect, the school created a
type but not a will. Four years of Harvard
College, if successful, resulted in an
autobiographical blank, a mind on which only a
water-mark had been stamped. (Adams, 1961, pp.
54-55)
Adams was more specific when he wrote of his return to the
College as a professor, and, "during some dreary hours of
62
faculty-meetings," looked up his undergraduate record in the
class-lists, finding himself graded precisely in the middle.
In the one branch he most needed — mathematics
barring the first few scholars, failure was so
nearly universal that no attempt at grading could
have had value, and whether he stood fortieth or
ninetieth must have been an accident or the
personal favor of the professor. Here his
education failed lametably. At best he could
never have been a mathematician; at worst he
would never have cared to be one; but he needed
to read mathematics, like any other universal
language, and he never reached the alphabet.
Beyond two or three Greek plays, the student got
nothing from the ancient languages. Beyond some
incoherent theories of free-trade and protection,
he got little from Political Economy. He could
not afterwards remember to have heard the name of
Karl Marx mentioned, or the title of "Capital."
He was equally ignorant of Auguste Comte. These
were the two writers of his time who most
influenced its thought. The bit of practical
teaching he afterwards reviewed with most
curiosity was the course in Chemistry, which
taught him a number of theories that befogged his
mind for a lifetime. The only teaching that
appealed to his imagination was a course of
lectures by Louis Aggasiz on the Glacial Period
and Palaeontology, which had more influence on
his curiosity than the rest of the college
instruction altogether. The entire work of the
four years could have been easily put into the
work of any four months in after life. (p. 60 )
Despite Adams’ perceptions, and undoubtedly the similar
perceptions of his classmates, and in spite of the criticisms of
such influential persons as Francis Wayland, President of Brown,
the traditional forms of educational thought and practices were
very much with us throughout the nineteenth century. Veysey
(1965) notes:
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y the end of the Civil War the traditional
philosophy of higher eduction, whose watchword
was the much repeated phrase "mental discipline,"
had already been under long and gathering attack.
. . . Yet in 1879 G. Stanley Hall noted that, of
the more than three hundred colleges then
existent in the United States, all but perhaps a
score were still in the hands of men who believed
in mental discipline.
. .
. great numbers of the
smaller institutions adhered to something like
the orthodox outlook even into the nineties, (n.
21 )
It should be repeated that the "furnishings" of the mind were
less important than the "disciplining" of it. Given the
nineteenth century view of the individual and his soul, it was
understandable that educators conceived of the curriculum and the
teaching process as the material and the process by which the
parts of the soul, or the "faculties" (e.g., will, emotion,
intellect) could best be developed. In 1868, in his inaugural
address as president of Princeton, James McCosh articulated this
position:
I do hold it to be the highest end of a
University to educate ; that is, draw out and
improve the faculties which God has given. Our
Creator, no doubt, means all things in our world
to be perfectin the end; but he has not made them
perfect; he has left room for growth and
progress; and it is a task laid on his
intelligent creatues to be fellow-workers with
him in finishing that work which he has left
incomplete, (cited in Veysey, 1965, p.23)
At the same time, particularly in the denominational
colleges that stressed orthodox views of man and God, care had to
be taken not to stimulate the intellect excessively. The problem
was reminiscent of that at Cambridge in Milton’s day: then it
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was essential to study Latin, and this could only be done by
reading such pagan authors as Ovid with their dangerously
exciting, even licentious subjects. It is difficult to imagine
an education in the sense we now use the term. Most of the
arguments between the traditionalists and the reformers deal with
the necessity of ancient languages in the curriculum. Greek, in
particular, became the symbol of the whole classical curriculum;
A wide variety of arguments was used to defend
the ancient languagues. Naturally their role in
disciplining the mental faculties received
primary attention. But grammar was also defended
as an intrinsically important item of knowledge.
It was even argued that words as such
comprehended the meaning of human life. Still,
neither as discipline nor as knowledge did the
classics offer indisputable advantages over the
threatening modern tongues. In order to counter
the thrusts of the modernists, the inherent value
of ancient history and literature, as revealed in
the study of language, had to be asserted.
(Veysey, 1965, p. 37)
It is fair to state that the methods of instruction did not
help. The "recitation" was the process commonly employed, and
this alone would discourage the appreciation of literature, or
the encouragement of liberal culture. This is the "daily
figuring" cited by Henry Adams in his Education ; it is not
unusual that Adams had been moved only by the lectures of
Aggassiz in his four years at Harvard.
While the traditionalists were holding off several factions
of critics, one of the most vocal groups was decrying the lack of
relevance of the disciplinary regime to the later work life of
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the student. In 1828, the Yale Report had dealt with this issue
in what was to prove a classic manner:
but why, it may be asked, should a student waste
his time upon studies which have no immediate
connection with his future profession? Will
chemistry enable him to plead at the bar, or
conic sanctions qualify him for preaching, or
astronomy aid him in the practice of physic? Why
should not his attention be confined to the
subject which is to occupy the labors of his
life? In answer to this, it may be observed,
that there is no science which does not
contribute its aid to professional skill. "Every
thing throws light upon every thing." The great
object of a collegiate education, preparatory to
the study of a profession, is to give that
expansion and balance of the mental powers
,
those
liberal and comprehensive views, and those fine
proportions of character, which are not to be
found in him whose ideas are always confined to
one particaiar channel. (Crane, 1963, p. 89-90)
It turned out that the institutions could remain aloof from
the concerns of the market place just so long, and that,
inevitably (it seemed), they would have to make some
accomodations. It is interesting to contrast Day’s statement in
1828, with a later president of Yale, Noah Porter. One goal of
the collegiate experience, and one that would result from the
classical curriculum, argued Porter, "was to increase the
student’s active power in ’a counting or sales-room,’ and hence
enable him to outstrip ’in business capacity’ his non-collegiate
rival. The ’educated recluse’ was considered . . . ’a
disparagement to a college education,’ and a ’morbid
result . ’’’(Veysey, 1965, p. 39)
And while the traditionalists had been defending the
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classical way, and in effect, disparaging those who demanded a
more frankly vocational model, they were blithely ignoring the
rather long tradition of preparation for the ministry associated
with collegiate education in America. To further confuse
matters, James McCosh of Princeton would use the vocational needs
of the clergy as a defense of required Greek.
Discipline and piety, as a force in higher education, was
fairly moribund by the turn of the twentieth century. It
represented a resistance to change that could not survive in a
nation committed, as Tocqueville noted, to tradition only as a
means to information. When that information ceased to be
relevant, the tradition was discarded.
Background for Change
While the traditionalists were defending the presence of
Greek in the curriculum of higher education, the country was
experiencing profound change. The nineteenth century began with
a population that could be classified as 85 percent "rur?!,” and
gathered along the eastern seaboard. Until 1780, there had been
only nine institutions in the country that could be labeled
colleges. By 1799, sixteen more institutions had been added. In
1830, if we count only the survivors, forty institutions of
higher education were serving Americans. Thirty-one years later,
the eve of the Civil War, 182 permanent colleges had been founded
in this country. In fact, 5l6 colleges were established in
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sixteen states of the Republic before the Civil War. Of those,
only 104 survived (Hofstader, 1955a),
An educator of the day, Philip Lindsley, identified the
problem. Colleges, he observed:
rise up like mushrooms on our luxuriant soil.
They are duly lauded and puffed for a day, and
then they sink to be heard of no more. ... Our
people, at first, oppose all distinctions
whatever as odious and aristocratical
;
and then,
presently
,
seek with avidity such as remain
accessbile. At first they denounce colleges;
and then choose to have a college in every
district or county
,
or for every sect and party
— and to boast of a college education, and to
sport with high sounding literary titles — as if
these imparted sense or wisdom or knowledge.
(Hofstadter, 1955a, p. 212)
Clearly denominational interests and local pride were two driving
forces in the development of most new institutions. And in the
vast majority of these discipline and piety would be the only
fare. Given the sectarian composition of the governing boards of
so many of the new (and the old) institutions, it is easy to
understand a reluctance to yield to pressures for change.
1 Hofstadter (1955a) identifies another issue that affected
j
the development of higher education:
I
I the rising spirit of political partisanship and
the social hostilities that raged in the United
;
States from about 1820 to the Civil War. The
i development of the democratic spirit in the years
j
before and during the Jackson administration had
complex results. It was attended by a vogue of
human! tarianism and reform as well as an
assertive mood of equal! tarianism. One of its
great contributions to American life was to make
! available to broader masses of people a free
I public education at the grammar-school level. In
1
I
J
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the field of collegiate education its
consequences were far less favorable. One of the
dominant popular motives was the passion for
equalizing opportunity, which manifested itself .
• • in economic life by the attempt to destroy
all kinds of monopolies and privileges, (p. 245)
The temper of the people included a widespread disdain for
experts, for excellence, or authority. The effect on education
was to deny the institutions of higher education the privilege of
being the sole avenue to the professions. Informal training of
doctors, lawyers, and ministers was encouraged through
apprenticeships, or proprietary schools not connected to
universities, or hospitals. If the well-to-do persisted in
conventional methods they were subject to slurs about their
aristocratic tendencies.
Utility . The proponents of the new curricula in higher education
used a variety of terms to describe their approach. "Utility,"
or "utilitarian," were popular, as was "practical," and "real
life." And many proclaimed their goal to be "service." All of
these were ambiguous, but they clearly shared a common bond with
the goals of Franklin and Jefferson.
In 1802, the United States Military Academy at West Point
was founded, the first technical institute in the United States.
Norwich Academy was founded in Vermont in 1819, and in 1824 the
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute was established, "to qualify
teachers for instructing the sons and daughters of farmers and
mechanics ... in the application of experimental chemistry.
I
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philosophy, and natural history to agriculture, domestic economy,
the arts, and manufactures" (Eddy, 1956, p. 10). The patron of
the Institute, Stephen VanRensselaer
,
anticipated the rationale
of the land-grant college, while bridging the chasm between the
anti-intellectualism and the democratic, egalitarian mood of the
age. Van Rensselaer desired "The diffusion of a very useful kind
of knowledge, with its application to the business of living"
(Rudolph, 1962 p. 230).
In l846, Yale established two professorships, one in
agricultural chemistry and animal and vegetable physiology, the
second in "practical chemistry." Three years later, the
Sheffield School was formed, with a "scientific" curriculum to
parallel the traditional Yale "arts" degree. In 1847, Abbott
Lawrence bequeathed a sum of money to Harvard to form the
Lawrence Scientific School. In both instances, these were
separate, parallel schools, and neither could award the
traditional Bachelor of Arts degree; rather, a Bachelor of
Science degree was proposed and approved.
There were sporadic attempts during this period to develop
specialized agricultural schools. The Gardner Lyceum was
established in Gardner, Maine in 1823, becoming the first devoted
exclusively to agriculture. It failed in ten years. It was
followed by a variety of societies and schemes that came and
went, ignoring the fact that, in the traditional sense, no
"discipline" of agriculture existed. People's College was
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conceived in 1850 in upstate New York, opening its doors in 1860
only to close them, forever, in l86l,
A more successful effort was made in Michigan: that state's
constitution in 1850 provided for the "establishment of an
agricultural school." Within five years a Bill had been passed
creating the first "State Agricultural College" in the nation, a
separate but not equal counterpart to the existing state
university.
Pennsylvania's Farmer's High School was set up in 1854, and
that too became an Agricultural College (in 1862)
. Massachusetts
had had a plan for a state agricultural college since 1825, but
it wasn't until 1856 that the Legislature created a Board of
Trustees (headed by Marshall Wilder). The institution didn't
emerge until after the Morrill Land Grant Act (1862). And
Maryland had established an agricultural college in 1856, opening
in 1859 . So it was on the eve of the Land Grant Act that
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Maryland formed a triad of
agricultural colleges, and three percent of the approximately
four hundred colleges and universities in American had
departments of "science and agriculture," or something analogous.
The land-grant proposal . Beginning in I 85O, Jonathan Baldwin
Turner delivered a series of speeches outlining a master plan for
a state industrial institution for Illinois. This was to be
supported, in part, by grants of federal land which would be
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managed or sold by the trustees. The Illinois legislature, in
1853, sent a revised version of this plan to Congress proposing
an endowment of $500,000 worth of federal lands be given to each
state to estabalish and maintain industrial universities "for the
more liberal and practical education of the industrial classes"
(Eddy, 1956, p. 25). This proposal incorporated a "common man's
educational Bill of Rights" (Eddy, 1956 p. 26), emphasizing
students (the working man)
,
curricular concerns (practical
pursuits and professions), extension (institutes and lyceums),
experimentation and research.
Eddy (1956) stresses in his history. Colleges for Oi^ Land
and Time
,
that Turner had turned away from using existing
institutions to absorb his proposed, new functions:
At the heart of the Turner plan lay a strong
dissatisfaction with the educational institutions
of the first half of the nineteenth century.
Turner is quoted as saying that the old colleges
"have hauled a canoe alongside their huge
professional steamship and invited the farmers
and mechanics to jump on board and sail with
them; but the difficulty is, they will not
embark, (p. 25)
Turner could not imagine a combination of the new with the old.
He dismissed it in scathing terms:
No wonder such educators have ever deemed the
liberal culture of the industrial classes an
impossibility; for they have never tried, nor
even conceived of any other way of educating
them, except that by which they are rendered
totally unfit for their several callings in after
life. How absurd would it seem to set a
clergyman to plowing and studying the
depredations of blights, insects, the growing of
I
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crops, etc., in order to give him habits of
thought and mental discipline for the pulpit; yet
this is not half as ridiculous, in reality, as
the reverse absurdity of attempting to educate
the man of work in unknown tongues, abstract
problems and theories, and metaphysical figments
and quibbles. (Eddy, 1956, p. 25)
Turner demonstrated a class-consciousness, coupled with a
seeming sense of the fitness of traditional, inherited roles —
or at least the opportunity for education in those roles — as
well as a pure, vocational view of higher education. In its own
way, it is as anti-intellectual a position as that of the
proponents of discipline and piety.
In any event. Congress was not moved by the plan or the
rhetoric.
On February 28, 1859, a Congressman from Vermont, Justin
Smith Morrill, introduced the following resolution in the House:
That the Committee on Agriculture be . . .
requested to inquire into the expediency of
establishing . . . one or more national
agricultural schools upon the basis of the U.S.
Naval and Military schools, in order that one
scholar from each congressional district and two
from each state at large, may receive a
scientific and practical education at public
expense. (Eddy, 1956, p. 30)
This resolution was promptly defeated, but the following year
Morrill came back with a reformed version, this being the first
Land-Grant College bill, "An act donating public lands to the
several States and Territories which may provide colleges for the
benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts” (Eddy, 1956, pp.
30-31). President Buchanan vetoed that bill in 1859.
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On December 16, l86l, a new bill was presented in the House
of Representatives. The significant changes in the second
Land-Grant proposal were: (1) the omission of the territories;
(2) the increase of the land grant for each member of Congress
from 20,000 to 30,000 acres; (3) the exclusion of benefits to
States while in the act of rebellion; and (4) the requirement to
teach military tactics. The last two changes obviously reflected
the condition of Civil War at that time. The wording on the
measure stipulated that
each State. . . take and claim the benefits of
this act, to the endowment, support, and
maintenance of at least one college where the
leading object shall be without excluding other
scientific and classical studies, and including
military tactics, to teach such branches of
learning as are related to agriculture and the
mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures
of the States may respectively prescribe, in
order to promote the liberal and practical
education of the industrial classes in the
several pursuits and professions in life. (Eddy,
1956, p. 33)
Lincoln signed the bill on July 2, 1862.
Alan Nevins (1962) has declared that "the most important
idea in the genesis of the land grant colleges and state
universities was that of democracy," and that "the central idea
behind the land-grant movement was that liberty and equality
could not survive unless all men had full opportunity to pursue
all occupations at the highest practicable level" (pp. 16-17).
Certainly the America of the mid-nineteenth century was one of
increasing mobility and transition, of rapid industrialization.
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of railroads and homesteading, and challenge to any and all
tradition: Scientific American began publishing in 1845,
Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Psychology was printed in 1855,
and Darwin's Origin of the Species came out the year that
Buchanan vetoed the first Land Grant Bill.
Morrill urged support for his proposal in the most eloquent
fashion:
Pass this measure and we shall have done
something to enable the farmer to raise two
blades of grass instead of one; something for
every owner of land; something for all who desire
to own land; something for cheap scientific
education; something for every man who loves
intelligence and not ignorance; something to
induce the fathers’ sons and daughters to settle
and cluster around the old homestead; something
to remove the last vestige of pauperism from our
land; something for peace, good order and better
support of Christian Churches and common schools;
something to enable sterile railroads to pay
dividends, something to enable people to bear the
enormous expenditures of the national government,
something to check the passion of individuals and
the nation for indefinite territorial expansion
and ultimate decrepitude; something to prevent
the dispersion of our population, and to
concentrate it among the best lands of our
country — places hallowed by church spires and
mellowed by the influence of time — where the
consumer will be placed at the door of the
producer; something to obtain higher prices for
all sorts of agricultural products, and something
to increase the loveliness of the American
landscape. (Florer, 1968, p. 467)
Those are not the encomiums one would apply to discipline
and piety, and — even allowing for rhetorical excesses -they
commit the institutions of higher education to a quite new and
different set of goals. Of course, one must overlook the
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complaint of the president of the University of Illinois,
Gregory, who stated in 1869 that "we have no science of
agriculture. Botany is a science ~ chemistry is a science —
but agriculture is not a science in any sense
. . . . It is
simply a mass of empiricism" (Nevins, 1962, p. 57).
In any event, Iowa was the first state to accept the Act’s
conditions, then Vermont and Connecticut, all in the first year
of its passage. Within the next eight years, 37 states had
agreed to establish the teaching of agriculture, mechanical arts
and military tactics.
What these early and subsequent land grant institutions
proclaimed, and what was subscribed to by increasing numbers of
other, non-land grant institutions, was a belief that:
"The throbbing life of to-day demands from our
colleges something besides learning and culture.
It cares not for pedants steeped in useless lore.
It calls for true men, who are earnest, and
practical, who know something of the problems of
real life and are fitted to grapple with them."
Learning, this writer added, must aid "the
fitting for real life in something besides
discipline and culture of the mind." (Veysey,
1965, p. 62)
This reality frequently involved "democracy," and it was always
vocational.
Democracy and vocatlonalism . The democracy applied to
fields of learning Ezra Cornell declared in 1868 that he would
found an institution "where any person can find instruction in
any study"; Charles W. Eliot, the newly appointed president of
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Harvard, declared in I869, "No object of human inquiry can be out
of place in the programme of a real university. It is only
necessary that every subject should be taught at the university
on a higher plane than elsewhere.
. . . It is impossible to be
too catholic in this matter" (Veysey, 1965, p. 90). It also
applied to the admission of students, to equality of treatment or
condition for students who were attending a university at any one
time. In its most radical sense, the democratic spirit meant a
responsiveness to the non-academic mass of citizens. (Today, we
talk about a kind of "accountability" that a tax-supported
institution "owes" the citizenry.)
The vocationalism served both individual ambition and
national need. As Morrill declared in I888, looking back at his
historic Bill:
By no means was it designed to curtail the usual
extent of a collegiate education, but to add
thereto such essential and practical sciences as
were then almost universally neglected by
literary colleges, although indispensable to the
advancement of the American people in their
industrial and diversified life. (Eddy, 1956, p.
32)
In the rapid change and expansion of the curriculum, new
disciplines appeared: Engineering expanded from Civil to include
Mechanical in I870, then Electrical appeared in the l880's; in
agriculture, where Gregory complained of a lack of science in
1869, by 1895 "there were chairs in horticulture, botany,
entomology, agricultural chemistry, dairy chemistry, agricultural
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physics, bacteriology, mycology, dairy husbandry, animal
husbandry, as well as other variations peculiar to individual
institutions" (Eddy, 1956, p. 88). The Laramie (Wyoming)
editorialized in 1866 that the colleges must turn out "a
class of students who, when they graduate, shall know how to do
something, something the world wants done" (Eddy, 1956, p. 89 ).
With the expansion of the curriculum, the elective system at
Harvard and elsewhere, and the growing feeling that there was no
hierarchy of disciplines (no "Queen of the Sciences," as in
Medieval values), the undergraduate had a new freedom.
Veysey (1965) describes the situation:
In his freedom the student was supposed to become
a trained expert in some special field. The
elevation of the younger professions, such as
engineering, schoolteaching, and academic
scholarship itself, comprised one of the
prominent themes of American "real life" in the
[
late nineteenth century. Professional schools of
i widely varying types were founded. The rise of
such training had a direct impact in turn upon
the undergraduate college. It had been an item
of faith among believers in mental discipline
1
(and would remain so among defenders of liberal
I
culture) that a rigid separation should be
j
maintained between courses with professional
I
relevance and those taken for the Bachelor’s
I degree. The elective system now made it possible
1 for young men who intended to become medical
' doctors to take directly preparatory courses in
' general science as undergraduates. . . . the
!
issues raised by the direct intrusion of
I
vocational training into the college curriculum
were never clearly settled, (p. 67-68)
This sense of vocationalism was not confined to the land
k
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grant or state universities. Andrew White at Cornell had
promoted as technical a field as pharmacy in 1884; Charles W.
Eliot at Harvard argued just as vigorously for the creation of a
business school. "There is no danger in any part of the
university," he said, "that too much attention will be paid to
the sciences ordinarily supposed to have useful applications.
The problem is to get enough attention paid to them" (Veysey,
1965, p. 90).
Finally
,
the concept of Utility had a much more direct
application. That is, it was more than just vocationalism, it
came to be explicitly involved in public service. Schools of
political science or public service came into being at Columbia,
Michigan and Wisconsin in the l880s and l890s. By this time, the
spirit of Progressivism was gestating, and higher education would
soon be called upon to solve a wide range of social, business and
labor problems. What became known as the "Wisconsin Idea," was
first proclaimed by Charles Kendall Adams in a baccalaureate
address at the University of Wisconsin in 1896: "The university
is not a party separate from the State. It is a part of the
State — as much a part of the State as the Capitol itself — as
much as the brain and the hand are part of the body" (Veysey,
1956, p. 104).
The rhetoric sounds appealing, but it is not without its
problems. With Adams, and others, the service to the state is
fitting and proper, a return for that state's generosity in
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funding. In the event of a conflict between the institution and
the state, in, say, a question of academic freedom, or in the
appointment of a controversial faculty member, or the offering of
a course or degree, who resolves?
Further, "social efficiency" increasingly began to crop up
in the speeches of college presidents. The first incident seems
to have been an address by Charles W. Eliot to the National
Education Association in 1888, entitled "Can School Programs be
Shortened and Enriched?" Certainly the very term smacks of
technology. However, the concerns we might feel today about
these issues were not evident at the conclusion of the nineteenth
century.
In 1908 Eliot wrote: "At bottom, most of the
American institutions of the higher education are
filled with the modern democratic spirit of
serviceableness. Teachers and students alike are
profoundly moved by the desire to serve the
democratic community. . . . All the colleges
boast of the serviceable men they have trained,
and regard the serviceable patriot as their ideal
product. This is a thoroughly democratic
conception of their function." (Veysey, 1956, p.
119)
Research . The serviceableness sought by Eliot tied in, at
various times, with the goals of Research. For example, Veysey
(1956) notes
the Progressive Era brought with it the
expectation of prominently displayed altruistic
motives in all lines of endeavor. As a result,
first-rate scientists began to produce numerous
statements linking their work to practical social
benefit, (p. 124)
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German example. But we must go back to George Ticknor's
Remarks (1825), and his lamentation, "Who, in this country, by
means here offered him, has been enabled to make himself a good
Greek Scholar?" The model for Research was in Germany, where
there was little if any consideration given to the utility or
application of its fruits. Lehrfreiheit
. as it crossed the
Atlantic
,
became part of an American campaign for academic
freedom. This culminated in the establishment, in 1876, of the
Johns Hopkins University at Baltimore.
Getting to that point was a slow process, but German higher
education was reverenced at virtually every juncture. For
example, in 1825, the same year of Ticknor's Remarks, Philip
Lindsley at the University of Tennessee called attention to the
"seminars" of Goettingen and Berlin: Lindsley' s objective was to
demonstrate the role of the German philological seminar as a
supplier of classical professors and teachers to Europe.
We have our Theological Seminaries . . . — our
Medical and our Law schools — which receive the
graduates of our colleges, and fit them for their
respective professions. And whenever the
profession of teaching shall be duly honoured and
appreciated, it is not doubted but that it will
receive similar attention, and be favoured with
equal advantages. (Storr, 1953, p. 24)
Both Ticknor and Lindsley were addressing the plight of the
professoriate in America, as well as the lack of facilities for
advanced study.
Harvard. In 1831, Harvard hired a German classicist named
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Charles Beck to teach Latin* Beck had received a doctorate at
Tubingen, and, once arrived in Cambridge, he began to plan a
philological seminary for Harvard, designed in part to train
teachers. In his formal recommendation, made to the Harvard
Corporation on June 23, I831, Beck said;
We should carefully distinguish between that
degree of information which may be sufficient for
an individual whose object is to develops &
cultivate the powers of his mind, & that
comprehensive knowledge necessary for
instructing, embracing the whole branch in which
instruction is to be given; these two kinds of
knowledge differ materially in their object,
extent & the manner of their acquisition. ... A
classical seminary . . . should be formed by
degrees but still the final object should be
fixed & well understood. Such a Seminary should
give 1) a complete instruction in classical
philology, comprising a thorough acquaintance
with the language, literature & history, in the
widest sense of the word of the Greeks & Romans,
2) a complete course in history & 3) in
mathematics. This wd (sic) constitute a
philosophical school as I shall call it,
corresponding to the philosophical faculty of
European universities, & in common with the
theological, law & medical schools complete the
structure of our university. (Storr, 1953, PP*
25-26 )
The Corporation accepted his recommendation for study, a
commmittee was established to prepare guidelines for such a
venture, and a report was submitted to President Josiah Quincy,
and Francis C. Gray of the Fellows, in October. The seminary did
eventually open with six resident graduates enrolling, but soon
withered and was forgotten, lacking financial assistance for
needy students, and sufficient reputation to attract the affluent
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in preference to study abroad.
In the following decade, the gift of $50,000 by Abbott
Lawrence for the support of scientific education at Harvard
allowed newly inaugurated President Edward Everett to speculate
that with the scientific school, plus the schools of medicine,
theology, and law, his institution might be considered to form,
"upon the bases of the ancient and venerable collegiate
foundation, an institution closely resembling the universities of
Europe, especially those of Germany" (Story, 1953, p. 53). At
the same time, he proposed that an "earned" Master of Arts degree
be established, one that
shall be conferred by anticiaption on every
graduate of this University or any other
respectable collegiate institution, who shall
have resided for a year and a half in Cambridge,
and pursued his studies as a member of either of
the Professional Colleges or of the Scientific
School. (Storr, 1953, p. 52)
The Board of Overseers rejected the proposal in 1848.
Yale . Meanwhile, in New Haven, Yale was still operating
under the philosophy of the precedence of mental discipline over
knowledge. In 1846, "the Corporation received an outline of a
school of science, the chief author of which was Benjamin
Silliman, Professor of Chemistry, Pharmacy, Mineralogy, and
Geology. . . . the scheme was broadened to provide advanced
insruction in nonscientific subjects" (Storr, 1953, P« 54). A
year later, a Department of Philosophy and the Arts was
recommended, and appeared in the catalogue for 1847-48. By 1856,
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the potential of this department so excited James D. Dana,
Professor of Natural History, that he was moved to exclaim:
Only a little wider expansion of the scheme,
. .
• and it will cover the highest branches of
literary as well as scientific education, adapted
to carry forward the graduate of the College,
through a full university system of classical or
other studies.
.
. Not till this is
accomplished, will the department of philosophy
and the arts projected, become a realized fact.
Not till then, can we hope to prevent our youth
from seeking in the atmosphere of Germany the
knowledge for which they yearn. (Storr, 1953, p.
57)
Within four years, Yale approved the Ph.D. "for high attainment
in mathematics, philology, or such other branches as might be
taught in the Department of Philosophy and the Arts” (Storr,
1953, p. 57) In l86l, Yale awarded the first Ph.D. from an
American university.
Johns Hopkins . The Johns Hopkins University was incorporated
in 1867, but it took seven more years for Hopkins's will to be
probated. Between 1874 and I876
,
when the University opened, the
trustees attempted to come to an agreement on what a great
American university ought to be. Daniel Coit Gilman, the first
Johns Hopkins President, had been on the Yale faculty in the
l860s, and had helped reorganize the Sheffield Scientific School
there. After meeting with the trustees, Gilman announced plans
for a research- oriented graduate school. In 1875 he wrote:
I incline more & more to the belief that what is
wanted in Baltimore is not a scientific school,
nor a classical college, nor both combined; but a
faculty of medicine, and a faculty of philosophy.
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• • : that the usual college machinery of
classes, commencements etc may be dispensed with:
that each head of a great department, with his
associates in that department, — say of
mathematics, or of Language or of Chemistry or of
History, etc. shall be as far as possible free
from the interference of other heads of
departments, & shall determine what scholars he
will recieve & how he will teach them; that
advanced special students be first provided for;
that degrees be given when scholars are ready to
be graduated, in one year or in ten years after
their admission. (Veysey, 1965, p. 160)
Under Gilman, Johns Hopkins became a symbol of an entirely new
force in American higher education; faculty-centered, not
student-oriented, "Gilman insisted that the faculty be given only
students who were sufficiently well prepared to provide the
faculty with challenging and rewarding stimulation” (Rudolph,
1962, p. 271).
Johns Hopkins was unabashed in its commitment to research,
no matter how remote its "utility" might seem to be. In 1885
Gilman would tell a skeptical audience:
If you persist . . .in taking the utilitarian
view and ask me what is the good of Mr.
Glaisher’s determination of the least factors of
the missing three out of the first nine million
numbers . .
.
,
I shall be forced to say I do not
know; if you press me harder I shall be obliged
to express my convictions that nobody knows; but
I know, and you know, and everybody may know, who
will take the pains to inquire, that the progress
of mathematics underlies and sustains all
progress in exact knowledge. (Rudolph, 1962, p.
273)
Finally, Gilman and Johns Hopkins were instrumental in developing
scoietal respect for the profession of university faculty.
I
I
I
i
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through salaries, facilities, and support. It was his publicly
stated thesis that the material progress of America and the world
rested on the fundamental research being conducted in the
laboratories of universities. These, said Gilman, "were the
creation not of industrial fabrics, not of mercantile operations,
not even of private enterprise, but of universities and the
motive which inspired their founders and directors was not the
acquisition of wealth, but the ascertainment of fundamental law"
(Rudolph, 1962, p. 273-4).
Other changes in American higher eduation were emerging as
well. An emphasis on research naturally and inevitably resulted
in an increasing specialization of knowledge. At the same time,
there was a willingness of the new American universities to
shelter these specialized departments of knowledge. And in many
cases, the specializations represented vocational aspirations,
signifying a sharing, if not a marrying, with the utilitarians.
Liberal Culture . There was a fourth educational perspective, one
that emerged in the late nineteenth century and was particularly
unfriendly toward the narrow and the practical. We’ve called
this "liberal culture." Somehow, the acquisition of liberal
culture provided one with aesthetic, moral, and social standards
that were both necessary for the good of humanity, and threatened
by the mindless pursuit of technology. And somehow, despite a
"liberal" tendency to advocate and support democracy, there was
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an undercurrent of disdain for the masses. Numbers, the mark of
democracy, dilute standards, the mark of culture.
Perhaps the best statement of this position is provided by
Matthew Arnold, who became something of a favorite in certain
ranks of higher education during' this period. Veysey (1965)
explains this:
Most American men of letters were ardent
Anglophiles, and an Englishman, Matthew Arnold,
was often allowed to speak rather automatically
for the concept of culture. . . . Although
English higher education then remained largely in
a state of torpor and ossification and thus
seemed an impossible model to emulate in America,
the close intellectual tie with England —
stretching in memory all the way back to the
first importation of "liberal education" from
Cambridge to Harvard in colonial times — still
indefinably commanded pre-eminent respect, (p.
196 )
During a tour of the United States in I883
,
Arnold delivered
a lecture that has become a classic statement of the role of
letters in the modern world, "Literature and Science."
The question is raised whether, to meet the needs
of our modern life, the predominance ought not
now to pass from letters to science; and
naturally the question is nowhere raised with
more energy than here in the United States. The
design of abasing what is called "mere literary
instruction and education," and of exalting what
is called "sound, extensive, and practical
scientific knowledge," is, in this intensely
modern world of the Untied States, even more
perhaps than in Europe, a very popular design,
and makes great and rapid progress. (Arnold,
1968, pp. 1139-1140)
Arnold goes on to argue that, no matter how interesting the
knowledge of things is, the reality of natural knowledge, as he
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calls it, will not overhwelra our "invincible desire to relate
this proposition to the sense in us for conduct, and to the sense
in us for beauty. But this the men of science will not do for
us, and will hardly even profess to do.. . . it will be knowledge
only which they give us; knoweldge not put for us into relation
with our sense for conduct, our sense for beauty.” (Arnold, 1968
p. 1139-1140).
As the twentieth century emerged. Harvard, which had played
such an important role in each of the rival conceptions of the
higher learning, elected Abbott Lawrence Lowell as successor to
President Eliot. When Eliot was named president in 1869, a new
era in American higher education was anticipated. Now, forty
years later, the choice of Lowell clearly stated that Harvard, at
least, was trying to capture the cause of liberal culture and to
move away from Eliot’s utilitarian determination. Two quite
different spokesman deserve to be quoted in the context of
Lowell’s assumption of the presidency of Harvard, and the fact
that, ”in the fall of 1909, Lowell revealed that he thought of
himself, Wilson (Princeton)
,
and Hadley of Yale as standing alone
in university circles in their effort to preserve undergraduate
emphasis on the liberal arts" (Veysey, 1965, p. 250). The first
is Kenyon Butterfield, then president of Massachusetts
Agricultural College in 1904 and destined to serve as president
of two more Land Grant Colleges:
(each Land Grant College) should develop as
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rapidly as possible a definite tripartite
organization that will reveal the college in its
three-fold function — as an organ of research as
an educator of students, and as a distributor ofinformation to those who cannot come to the
college. These are really coordinate functions
and should be so recognized. The colleges should
unify them into one comprehensive scheme. The
principle of such unity is perfectly clear: We
have in resarch, the quest for truth; in the
education of students, the incarnation of truth;
and in extension work, the democratization of
truth. (Eddy, 1956, p. ll6)
The second is Henry Adams, and the quote is from his quite
remarkable chapter, "The Dynamo and the Virgin,” in T^ Education
of Henry Adams . In that chapter, Adams visits the Paris
Exposition of 1900 and, with his friend Langley, tours the
exhibits:
At Langley's behest, the Exhibition dropped its
superflous rags and stripped itself to the skin,
for Langley knew what to study, and why, a and
how: . . . Adams had looked at most of the
accumulations of art in the storehouses called
Art Museums; . . . Langley, with the ease of a
great master of experiment, threw out of the
field every exhibit that did not reveal a new
application of force, and naturally threw out, to
begin with, almost the whole art exhibit. He led
his pupil directly to the forces. . . . Then he
showed his scholar the great hall of dynamos . .
. and thus it happened that, . . . (Adams) found
himself lying in the Gallery of Machines at the
Great Exposition of 1900, his historical neck
broken by the sudden irruption of forces totally
new. (Adams, 1961, pp. 379-380)
One cannot help but wonder what Arnold would say to Adams to
ease his entry into the twentieth century; or what Adams would
counsel Lowell with, as he assumed his presidency. The
juxtaposition of these declarations, Lowell's, Butterfields', and
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Adams* is rich with irony, and prophetic, as well, in that the
seventy-odd years following do not seem to have provided a nice
resolution for the dramatically divergent viewpoints.
Synthesis
It is a commentary not just on Harvard but also
on the modern American university that Eliot and
Lowell could look in opposite directions and the
same institution could follow them both and glory
in it. Universities have a unique capacity for
riding off in all directions and still staying in
the same place, as Harvard has so decisively
demonstrated. (Kerr, 1963, p. 17)
What I have identified as confusion within the university,
as to its purpose, its focus within society, can be seen, I hope,
to be an on-going situation. It is not something that is unique
to this decade, or even this century. We can clearly see
syntheses today of the major movements we have identified in the
past of American higher education. To use Harvard as an example,
one could state with fairness that Lowell’s counterrevolution to
Eliot’s leadership in the fields of Utility was successful;
however. Harvard did not disband its professional schools or raze
its research laboratories.
By all accounts, institutions of higher education have
always been involved in training, the preparation for various
professions such as medicine, law, theology. It also turns out
that much of what was transmitted became regarded as something of
a recapitulation of society’s culture. But the heightened
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tensions between the study of culture, or the pursuit of
new knowledge,” or the fine distinctions between an education
and various kinds of training, are recent phenomena. As higher
education became more self-conscious, and as the users of higher
education became more citical of the institutions and their
offerings while at the same time increasing their numbers at a
phenomenal rate, the demands from within and without the
institutions to declare their missions, their allegiances have
also increased.
Those critics who stipulate distinctions between education
and training are responding for the most part to the ingestion by
the institutions of a remarkable and diverse number of new
disciplines. The critics are demanding that the institutions
make a commitment to, at the least, a prioritizing of these
disciplines: to put it another way, does Hotel, Restaurant and
Travel Administration weigh the same, on the academic scales, as
Philosophy?
Another part of the critics’ response has to do with the
assumption of new roles by the University. "New,” in that the
justification for curricular changes or the reallocation of
resources is tied so closely and explicitly to the training needs
of the society at large.
When Theodore Hsi-En Chen surveyed liberal higher education
in the United States during the 1930s, he found the picture
"indeed a confusing and puzzling one” (Chen, 1940). He was able.
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however, to identify six different patterns of curricula which
seemed to be emerging from contemporary attempts to reorganize
the liberal arts. These included: (1) independent study
programs (including tutorials and honors systems); (2)
comprehensive examinations; (3) organization of the curriculum
along "divisional” lines, and development of interdepartmental
courses; (4) a revitalized "classical" curriculum as practiced by
St. John’s College, for example; (5) the so-called "broad-fields
curriculum," with subject matter reorganized to, for example,
address identified "life problems"; and finally (6) the
experimental colleges such as Black Mountain, Bennington, Bard,
or Sarah Lawrence, where the curriculum "translates into actual
practice the principle that education is essentially an
individual affair and must be based on the active interests and
abilities of the individual learner" (Chen, 1940, p. 138). The
raisons d’etre for the new curricula included student passivity,
fragmentary credits and disconnected courses, narrow
specialization, and reaction against a system of free electives
and a multiplicity of courses.
Chen suggested that his inquiry demonstrated some trends in
American higher education. I won’t include them all here (there
are twelve) (Chen, 1940, pp. 139-140), but I would like to quote
four that are important to our understanding of higher education
today:
The colleges are slowly moving away from the
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lock-step system of credits, points, courses, andlectures
.
Comprehensive examinations mark a shift of
emphasis from the accumulation of credits and the
passing of separate courses to organized
knowledge within a whole field.
Rigid departmentalization is avoided; the
divisional organization of departments and the
development of interdepartmental courses are
emong the efforts made to help the students see
the interrelationships between subjects and
between fields of study.
Liberal education is being redefined in terms of
the appreciation of contemporary culture and
intelligent adjustment to the problems of modern
life. (p. 138)
For Chen these trends demonstrated a movement toward a more
holistic education, both in terms of content and process, and an
education that would have more "relevance.” But that has been,
as we now recognize, an expressed concern of educational
philosophers and critics for centuries. The dilemma is
under-scored when the quest for relevance becomes something more
akin to specialization as adaptation to the job market.
For example, thirty years after Chen conluded his survey and
analysis, two other educational appraisers provided an update.
Paul Dressel and Frances DeLisle (1969) noted:
In expanding the curriculum and providing
intensive preparation for a wide variety of
vocations, neither the university nor the liberal
arts college abandoned concern for liberal
education. Yet vocationalisra and specialization
generated conflicts which have not yet been
resolved, (p. 4)
Dressel and Delisle agree with most observers of the pattern of
93
American higher education that there was a strong attempt to
provide a "counterbalance" to utility, or specialization, or
vocationalism, and that this resurgence of interest is marked
during the thirties (the period surveyed by Chen). After World
War II, the Harvard Report on general education was issued, and
this provided significant, additional impetus. However, in the
Dressel and DeLisle analysis, the issue had not been
satisfactorily resolved. They note that most programs were
experimental and easily attacked as superficial. Why this is so
is something not discussed by Dressel and DeLisle. The
conclusion of the authors, as we may have anticipated, is
inconclusive:
The appropriate place of liberal and general
education in relation to specialization has been,
and remains today, one of the sharpest issues.
Few disagree that both components are of great
value. All acknowledge that the problem lies in
finding a balance, properly articulated, between
the two emphases, (p.4)
The balance, obviously, rests upon some sort of agreement of
the relative "value" of each approach. I have implied, a little
bit earlier in this section, that the demonstration of rapid
institutional response to the training needs of society may mean
that the scales have already been weighed. Dressel and DeLisle,
from their particular historical and philosophical perspecitve,
provide support, although that was not their intent, for ray
thesis:
The primary factors affecting and precipitating
94
change tend to be of essentially the same
character throughout the history of higher
education in America. Only the more compelling
contemporary tempo has altered significantly.
The rapid growth of knowledge, the social and
economic pressures of the total society with its
technological needs for manpower, and the demands
of students continue to call for educational
experiences relevant to contemporary times, (p.
It is implicit in their observation that education reflects
needs, pressures and demands; a statement about the purpose or
purposes of higher education is missing, other than this passive
compliance with the current trends or fashions in the economy.
This is revealing, and while it may not have been what the
authors intended, it will be helpful as we press our criticjue of
the present state of American higher education.
CHAPTER III
THE PURPOSES OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
It may be that the problem is one without ageneral solution. Indeed, if we accept what
evidence we have
,
it would appear to be almostimpossibly difficult to be a good man without
first being a good doctor, lawyer, scholar, or
tradesman, not to mention a good husband or wife
and father or mother.
(Morison, 1967, xvi)
For some workers, their jobs can never be made
satisfying, but only bearable at best. Other
workers may be in relatively satisfying jobs, but
after many years on the same job, they may wish
to change their careers. Still others,
ill-prepared by their education, may want to
enlarge their choices through additional
education and training. ... we note that high
school vocational education has been
unsatisfactory in this country, and that for the
concept of career education to advance, it might
be worthwhile to view schools as a workplace, as
much in need of job redesign as other workplaces,
and to understand that the proper precursor bo
satisfying work is a satisfying education.
Special Task Force to the
Secretary of Health
,
Education
,
and Welfare 1973, p. xviii.).
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The Accumulation of Purpose
What we need to do, at this point, is to look very carefully
at what some of the leading spokespersons for American higher
education have to say about its present state. It is important
to note that most if not all of these individuals tend to address
the state of higher education from a "purposes and goals,"
position, with the content following. For example, the authors
of the Carnegie Commission Report, ^ Purposes and the
Performance of Higher Education in the United States (1973b),
point out:
Purposes have grown quantitatively and changed
substantially qualitatively in the course of
American history but have not been decisively
reordered since the period around 187O. At that
time higher education — reflecting new purposes
— greatly expanded its functions to include
research and service to society, and opened its
doors potentially to the mass entry of students.
(p. vii.)
They go on to define
purposes as being the intentions of higher
education, as constituting the general design of
higher education, as comprising the end objects
it pursues. We define functions as the specific
acts performed in the course of fulfilling the
purposes, (p. vii.)
It is traditional (at least since Kenyon Butterfield, President
of Massachusetts Agricultural College, 1904), to declare that
American higher education has three "purposes": teaching,
research, and service (Eddy, 1956). And we have seen how the
American institution of higher education actually developed those
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purposes through a process of accumulation. How that is
interpreted is what concerns us here.
The authors of the Carnegie Commission Report see that
process of accumulation beginning with Harvard’s curriculum
concerns of the Bible, European and classical culture, Greek and
Latin, and mathematics.
A broad general education was combined with a
deep concern for the moral and religious
development of youth . . . Thus an original
purpose of American higher education was
personal development through acculturation to the
classics and to moral principles. (Carnegie,
1973b, p. 59)
Personal development has continued, although in different forms.
Newer subjects (science, social science) have been added, as have
the precepts of American society, and our version of democracy.
^ loco parentis has largely disappeared, and this began in the
period between the Civil War and World War I while the German
university was the premier model for American institutions. The
’’student personnel movement” emerged in the twentieth century
with the integration of the campus and the classroom, a
tremendous rise in extracurricular activites, and the ascendancy
of athletics, student government and other areas. One could
state that currently the campus serves for many students as a
moment for self discovery "— an interlude between family
infuence and adult commitment to an occupation and to a way of
life” (Carnegie, 1973b, p. 60).
A second theme was economic; education was seen early in
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this country as an investment (Benjamin Franklin called it the
"best investment”). The blending of the streams of Research and
Utility late in the nineteenth century insured the continuing
importance of this theme.
This economic purpose increased its momentum
during and after World War II, with the emphasis
upon research and development, and upon preparing
highly trained "manpower.” (Carnegie, 1973b, p.
6l)
The Report stipulates a third theme, the political role.
This has three phases; mass education to promote effective
participation in a democracy; training of leaders; and assuring
"some equality of opportunity so that deprivations in one
generation need not necessarily be passed on to members of
succeeding generations” (p. 6l). Another political purpose has
recently emerged, according to the Report. This is the critical
or evaluative function played by faculty of institutions of
higher education. This role is played in and out of the
classroom and is a "source of self-renewal” for society,
complementing other sources such as the press or certain labor
unions.
The fourth theme is service to the surrounding society
,
which received national endorsement with the land-grant movement.
This has gone far beyond service to agriculture, and encompasses
relationships with industry and the professions, the federal
government, state and local governments, and can even be seen in
the inter-relationship between the campus and its resources and
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the surrouding communities: examples of this include the
cultural and entertainment opportunities provided by the college
or university, open lectures, radio and tv stations, and
athletics
.
The Carnegie Report describes this • as "the historical
process of proliferating purposes" (p. 63). And it adds another:
Pure scholarship has come along more as a
companion of these four historical purposes than
as a consciously chosen purpose by American
society. We believe, however, that it should now
be set forth formally as a central purpose . . .
(p. 64)
Beneath these purposes lie basic philosophical positions
that the Report deals with briefly. These may be summarized as:
1. Searching for Values: this is based on the premise that
there are eternal truths in the universe or ultimate
values which have been discovered or can be discovered.
2. Pursuing New Knowledge: here, truth is always being
pursued, discovered, tested and applied anew. In an
expanding and changing universe we can analyze current
experience and devise experiments to keep us abreast of
expanding and changing truth. The search is eternal in
a world in which all is flux.
3. Supporting a Designated Social Structure: education
should provide a blueprint of the desired future society
for us all. Political and social goals are, in this
view, more important than the library, the chapel, or
100
the laboratory.
-The good society Is not to be found so
much in the natural laws of the universe or In man's
individual sense of values or In constantly new
knowledge and higher skill, but In the determined will
of men of convictions about the best social structure."
(p. 85)
There are tremendous problems In trying to encapsulate
anything so complex as an educational philosophy In a few
paragraphs, and the authors of the Report are aware of that.
It should be quickly noted that there are great
tensions within each of these three points of
view, as well as among them, and that each is
really an axis of thought with terminal points
quite far apart, (p. 86)
But what they intend is to provide an overview and, having done
that, to move to some sort of synthesis as they make their
recommendations for the future. While such syntheses demonstrate
the mainstream, perhaps conservative focus of the Carnegie
Commission, they do not serve us well as perceptive
interpretations of the state of American higher education:
Earlier we set forth our convictions about the
five main purposes of higher education for the
present and for the period ahead. These
convictions were based on our views of the
changes now going on in society and on campus.
We also drew on each of the three philosophical
views we have set forth. Our emphasis, for
example, on the importance of "academic
socialization" and on general education draws on
values; our stress on "advancing human
capability" draws on the the approach of
evolutionary knowledge; and our concern for
effective "evalution of society" through
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individual study and comment draws on thephilosophical concept of helping to shape aetter future. Our main approach, however, hasbeen that of the evolution of knowledge and howIt can be advanced most successfully, of the
application of free and trained thought and
research to the great problems of the current
age. (pp. 91-92)
In other words, the Carnegie Commission supports the
position that the institutions of higher education are there in
order to deal with these social issues. Their success, then,
must be measured by how well they meet the e challenge of these
issues; this is an instrumental justification of those
institutions. We shall want to return to this.
The Carnegie Commission is not the only example of this
approach, of course. It is interesting to consider how some of
these other speakers express the instrumental view without the
carefully coded phrasing of the commission. For instance. Algo
D. Henderson (1970), also talks about a combination of individual
and social needs:
The function of higher education in a democracy
rests on certain premises concerning the
fulfillment of individual and societal needs. A
basic premise is that each individual, regardless
of his race, color, creed, or social class,
should have the opportunity to develop to the
, full extent of his potentialities, to learn how
to live as fully as possible. ... A second
premise is that every person should have the
opportunity to prepare himself to the best of his
ability to make a living. In a democracy each
individual has a free choice of vocation, be it
as home manager, factory worker, electrician,
doctor, or scientist. Democracy is characterized
by the absence of an idle or privileged class,
and therefore, everyone, ideally, derives his
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income from his work. (p. 4)
Without commenting on Henderson's view of democracy, or reality,
his vision of higher education is certainly linked to the
training provided to individuals, who subsequently leave the
college or university to get jobs commensurate with their
training, and thus improve society. In other words, we pursue an
education in order to get good jobs, and (ideally) we get good
jobs in order to improve our society. In Henderson's (1970)
words:
Now, because man has sufficient intellectual
tools to plan for the good society, the goals of
education should be to discover and cultivate our
human resources and to apply these resources to
the further advance of civilization. The
implications of this change in philosophy are far
reaching for the new theory involves the concept
of social investment in education, (p. 5)
This "change in philosophy" is leading us inexorably to a
consideration of higher education as a vocational preparation,
nothing more. The underlying belief is that we cannot be be
happy if we do not have the "good job." The "good life" follows
the "good job."
The Multiversity
Even if we accept these interesting explanations of the
evolution of the "multiversity," the problem remains: what is to
be taught and studied and done in the university will be
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determined by the "why" of It. If that answer Is to Insure that
graduates will obtain satisfying and rewarding jobs, then the
pluralism will Inevitably disapper.
Kerr (1972), in his "Postscript — 1972", in the re-issue of
Uses of the University compares his "multiversity" to
William James’ "multiverse." James was contrasting "pluralism"
with "monism," the latter being concerned with a single
"absolute." The pluralistic approach, by contrast, sees
everything in an indeterminate state, or "flux." James (1971)
talks about "that distributed and strung-along and flowing sort
of reality which we finite beings swim in. That is the sort of
reality given us, and that is the sort with which logic is so
incommensurable" (p. 223). Kerr (1972) takes this
as a good description of the multiversity with
its strung-along type of unity, with its lack of
devotion to any single faith and its lack of
concentration on any single function, with a
condition of cohesion at best or coexistence at
next best or contiguity at least (under internal
pressures in recent years, some campuses have
moved from a state of cohesion to mere contiguity
of the constituent elements), (pp. 138-139)
Kerr is using James to refute rather than to endorse in any
critical or substantive manner. James' pluralistic universe is
useful to reject the "absolutist" position of a single-purpose,
or rigidly hierarchical institution, and to allow Kerr to posit
his flowing, multi-functioned, multi-purposed university. Within
that multiversity, Kerr saw first three, later four great areas
of related adjustments: growth, shifting academic emphases.
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involvement in the life of society, and response to the new
federal involvement. All of these areas are brought together in
an overall vision of higher education as an investment:
"knowledge is exploding along with the population. There is
also an explosion in the need for certain skills. The university
is responding to all these explosions" (pp. 110-111).
We have a situation being described by Kerr where people
attend our institutions of higher learning in order to get good
jobs; disciplines emerge to provide training for those people in
our institutions; these institutions are increasingly more
closely involved in our nation’s daily life with the result being
a "knowledge industry" where the university is located at the
center of the knowledge production process, and business and
government are the consumers; and federal funding is provided
for research and programs that have been identified
pragmatically, in response to political goals or the urgings of
very powerful lobbies. Given this, Kerr’s multiversity will not
likely or long tolerate an approach to or philosophy of education
that does not contribute to those areas of adjustment. In that
most probable of events, the multiversity is certainly not James'
multiverse; we have merely substituted one form of absolutism for
another. Where in the past there were monistic universities
committed to one principle, Kerr is describing one committed to
no single principle, but depending for its survival, its social
evaluation on its ability to produce skilled labor.
.R" 'jP5
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If what we care most about be the synoptic
treatment of phenomena, the vision of the far and
the gathering of the scattered like, we must
follow the conceptual method. But if, as
metaphysicians, we are more curious about the
inner nature of reality or about what really
makes it go, we must turn our backs upon our
concepts altogether, and bury ourselves in
the thickness of those passing moments over the
surface of which they fly, and on particular
points of which they occasionally rest and perch.
(James, 1971, p. 24)
Let us be metaphysicians about the present state of higher
education: let us go back, as William James would have urged, to
bury ourselves in some of the historical thickness that Clark
Kerr has flown over.
The sons of . . . opulent citizens are become
merchants, lawyers, or physicians. . . . The
last trace of hereditary ranks is destroyed, —
the law of partition has reduced all to one
level
.
I do not mean that there is any deficiency of
wealthy individuals in the United States; I know
of no country, indeed, where the level of money
has taken stronger hold on the affections of men,
and where a profounder contempt is expressed for
the theory of the permanent equality of property.
(Tocqueville, 1961, Vol 1, p. 43)
Tocqueville was struck by the break up of traditional strata
and the rapid movement of wealth. But the traditional
professions dominated society and men of moderate means retained
positions of power. Henry Adams (1961) describes the situation:
Down to 1850, and even later. New England society
was still directed by the professions. Lawyers,
physicians, professors, merchants were classes,
and acted not as individuals, but as though they
were clergymen and each profession were a church.
In politics the system required competent
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expression; it was the old Ciceronian idea ofgovernment by the best that produced the long
line of New England statesmen, (p. 32)
But after the Civil War the situation changed dramatically.
America was building up and out: big cities were rapidly
developed, industrialization flourished, railroads were
constructed to support the growth, the corporation emerged as the
norm for private enterprise. The effect was to transform
American society and to rapidly alter the distribution of power
and prestige. Tocqueville had noted "heroism in their manner of
trading," and an "ardour with which the Anglo-Americans prosecute
commercial enterprise." These traits, and an atmosphere which
encouraged their fullest expression would allow Warren G. Harding
to declare in 1920 that "this is essentially a business country,"
and Calvin Coolidge to follow in 1923 with the statement that
"the business of America is business" (Hofstader, 1962). Before
and since the business of our lives has been business, and this
has had a significant effect on how we consider higher education
and how the institution of higher education has developed in this
country, particularly in this century.
For example, Thorstein Veblen identified a trend in 1916
that he found profoundly disturbing. Through the process of lay
appointments to the governing boards of American institutions of
higher education a pattern began to emerge: fewer clergy
(traditional members of such boards) were found, and the impact
was that "the discretionary control in matters of university
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policy now rests finally in the businessmen” (Veblen, 1948, p.
508). For Veblen, the reason for this perceived pattern is
perfectly clear:
The preference appears to be almost wholly
impulsive, and a matter of habitual bias. It is
due for the greater part to the high esteem
currently accorded to men of wealth at large, and
especially to wealthy men who have succeeded in
business, quite apart from any special capacity
shown by such success for the guardianship of any
institution of higher learning. Business success
is by common consent, and quite uncritically,
taken to be conclusive evidence of wisdom even in
matters that have no relation to business
affairs, (p. 513)
It strikes me that the high esteem identified by Veblen is a
cotmon and pervasive occurrence, from the founding of Harvard to
the present day. What is of more interest, and what Veblen
glosses over, is that the choice of "hero” has changed — the
clergy is out, the successful entrepreneur is in. If we
substituted "religion” for "business” we would have the situation
that prevailed one hundred years earlier. Veblen saw these newly
constituted lay boards, through the emerging class of academic
executives (or "captains of erudition”), exercising
a pecuniary discretion in the case mainly in the
way of deciding what the body of academic men
that constitutes the university may or may not do
with the means in hand; that is to say, their
pecuniary surveillance comes in the main to an
interference with the academic work. (pp.
509-510)
Now surely there were similar problems when the faculty of
Harvard wanted to introduce natural science to the curriculum in
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the seventeenth century. This is not a new or unusual
phenomenon. What is of more use, in this analysis, is that not
only do we have new heroes in powerful positions but we have
captains of erudition bringing new techniques to the running of
our institutions, and at the same time involving those
institutions in a wide array of new projects and areas.
In other words, as higher education entered the twentieth
century there occurred a conjunction of growth and development in
business ^ education. Between 1890 and 1925 enrollments in
institutions of higher education grew 4.7 times the rate of
growth of the general population. In this era of Progressivism
there was a
middle-class sense of obligation, a readiness to
bring American society to some new sense of its
problems and its promises. The simultaneous
spread of the Progressive spirit and of the
university idea would of course tend to reinforce
the service element of both. Both movements
would in a sense argue for stability in society,
for an equality of opportunity now challenged by
labor unionism and socialism from below and by
vast concentrations of wealth and power from
above; both would serve the idea of inevitable
material and moral progress and see the future
that would not only be bigger but also better.
(Rudolph, 1962, p. 357)
What we have is growth, directions for service to society,
and leadership that is predisposed to involve the institutions
with those elements of society that are going to sustain that
growth and contribute to "progress." In this period the
University of Chicago developed degree programs for careers in
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public service, and the University of Wisconsin set up an
alliance with the state whereby "... officers of the university
formed and administered legislation for the regulation of
corporations, staffed many of the new regulatory commissions, and
directed their researchers toward the solution of state problems"
(Rudolph, 1962, p. 362). By 1915, the president of Yale would
feel comfortable stating that
one test of a legitimate liberal arts subject was
that a public motive rather than a private . .
.
motive must constitute the dominant note in its
appeal. (Rudolph, 1962, p. 365)
In the same year, a professor at Columbia, Charles Homer
Haskins, explained the rationale of the social sciences which
were growing so rapidly:
They are ... practical, ... not in the narrower
sense as leading to a livelihood, but in the
larger sense of preparing for life. (Rudolph,
1962, p. 365)
The Corporate Connection
In other words, across a broad spectrum of higher education
was the perception that there should be some fairly direct
linkages between the educational process and society. Further,
to deal just with the instances cited, Chicago and Wisconsin (and
there were many others), there was a growing awareness within and
without the institutions of a need for "experts," something
Americans had, since the days of Jackson, mistrusted and
rejected.
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David F. Noble (1977) brings many of these threads together
in his case histories of corporate engineering. With the rapid
growth of the relatively new industries of electrical and
chemical engineering in the period we are concerned with, there
was a sudden and desperate shortage of trained professionals.
The initial response by the industries was traditional:
"With the growth of the technical industries,”
Frank Jewett recalled in 1924, ”the engineering
side of the business was the first to wake up to
the necessity of taking college, university and
technical school trained men into the business.
The engineers were the first ones to organize
college recruiting on a consistent bases, . . .
to create . . . smooth working machinery for
making contacts and getting in touch with the
right type of men." (p. 170)
But the process could not end with the recruitment and
hiring. It turned out that there was a tremendous gap between
the education of the newly minted engineer and the needs of
industry.
The college setting demanded that the engineering
schools adopt an academically respectable
approach to engineering, with an emphasis upon
scientific theory rather than industrial
practice. As a consequence, the schools remained
relatively independent of industry and produced
graduates who might be temperamentally ill-suited
for disciplined industrial work and poorly
trained in the practical application of their
theories. (Noble, 1977, p. l84)
At first, the only practical solution to this problem was the
establishment of corporation schools. While electrical,
railroad, gas, and machine industries had, for the last decade or
so of the nineteenth century, run schools concentrating on
Ill
commercial sales, office, and apprentice training,
AT&T (and Western Electric), GE, and Westinghouse
• .
. gave attention to another area important to
science-based industry — graduate education for
college-trained engineers. The corporation
graduate-training programs were designed to meet
the needs of industry: to guarantee the
technical proficiency of college-trained
employees, to ensure their proper habituation to
corporate life, and to prepare them for
managerial responsibility. (Noble, 1977, p. 171)
Given the state of engineering education then offered in the
colleges and universities this was a practical solution: not
only was there a paucity of equipment in the institutions
,
but
the industries — not the schools — were at the forefront of
theoretical knowledge in the field.
In 1913 the National Association of Corporation Schools
(NAGS) was created to coordinate the wide variety and large
number of such training programs (ten years later, with its
activites significantly expanded, it would become the American
Management Association). The electrical industry dominated NACS
from the beginning. While the NACS was conceived as a
clearinghouse for corporation school education, it rapidly went
far beyond that rscdest objective. At its First Annual Convention
it formulated three "Functions of the Organization:" "to develop
the efficiency of the individual employee;" "to increase
efficiency in industry;" "to influence courses of established
educational institutions more favorably toward industry" (Noble,
1977, p. 181 ).
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Noble points out that
the third function of the NAGS, to "influence"
the established' educational institutions
favorably toward industry, was essentially geared
to put the corporation schools out of business by
rendering the established educational
institutions outside the corporations capable of,
and disposed toward, providing the services for
which the corporation schools had been created.
Galloway (chairman of the organizing meeting) put
forth this purpose at the first organizational
meeting: "It is time that our educational system
was
^
brought into some correlation with the
business world." ... The NAGS thus undertook to
act as the agency for industry-education
cooperation.
. . . to integrate the vocational,
public, and higher educational institutions
within the industrial system. This work was
greatly facilitated by the steady flow of
high-ranking personnel back and forth between the
industries and the schools, with the NAGS serving
as the primary medium for such interaction, (p.
182)
NAGS members included Hopkins, Wickenden, Steinmetz, Aydelotte,
Scott, and Schneider: these gentlemen went on to become the
presidents of Dartmouth, Gase Institute, the Schenectady Board of
Education, Swarthmore, Northwestern, and the University of
Gincinnati, respectively. The "bridging of the gap" cited
earlier would now occur in the educational institutions.
Veblsn's concerns, it seems, were well founded. The
relationship between the institutions and vocations was not
restricted to large engineering schools: in 1921 the president
of Antioch Gollege wrote:
The small college, like the small factory, must
select an output that the larger institutions
either have neglected or cannot deal with
efficiently, and should fortify its position by
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selection of its materials in a manner which the
wholesale methods of its large competitors have
made impracticable. (Noble, 1977
,
p. 201 )
This was the Antioch Plan, designed to train students "primarily
for proprietorship and management, not for subordinate
employment" (Noble, 1977, p. 200).
This brief examination demonstrates how, rapidly and
pervasively, higher education moved into the camp of Utility. It
was clearly in the grip of individuals who believed in the
of education. The combination of Progressivism and the
mood of involvement, the genuine demand for specialists and
hitherto unknown expertise, and the American penchant for
respecting and rewarding business success produced institutions '
committed to service whether in the public or private sector, and
willing to adjust curricula, or to re-allocate resources in order
to efficiently meet the needs of the marketplace.
It is important to recognize that there were significant
pressures from another side, as well. Up to this point I have
addressed the "post-graduate" end of the educational process.
But what was happening in those institutions that were educating
the students who were going to attend the colleges and
universities? In 1893 the National Education Association set up
a "Committee of Ten" to make recommendations about the nation’s
high school curriculum and to, hopefully, make some sense out of
the chaos between the secondary school system and the colleges
and universities. The Committee recommended to the secondary
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schools four alternative courses:
a classical course, a Latin-scientific course, a
modern languages course, and an English course.
... all demanded, as a minimum, four years of
English, four years of a foreign language, three
years of history, three years of mathematics, and
three years of science. ...
The curricula
. . . show that they thought of the
secondary school as an agency for academic
training. But they did not make the mistake of
thinking that these schools were simply
collep-preparatory institutions. ... The main
function of high schools, said the committee, was
"to prepare for the duties of life, not for
college..." (Hofstadter, 1962, pp. 330-331)
Certainly
,
the Committee did not see it necessary to provide
specific courses or training that would directly apply to the
"duties of life." Yet, by 1911, a new committee of the N.E.A.,
the "Committee of Nine," had recommended a profound change. The
task of the high school was now seen as laying "the foundations
of good citizenship and (helping) in the wise choice of a
vocation" (Hofstadter, 1962, p. 333). The Committee went on to
charge that because of the traditional curricula the public high
schools were
responsible for leading tens of thousands of boys
and girls away from the pursuits for which they
are adapted and in which they are needed, to
other pursuits for which they are not adapted and
in which they are not needed. By means of
exclusively bookish curricula false ideals of
culture are developed. A chasm is created
between the producers of material wealth and the
distributors and consumers thereof. (Hofstadter,
1962, p. 334)
This rather astounding statement turns the whole concept of
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education right on its head. But the Committee was not through;
where in 1893 there had been four alternative courses, all
academic, in 1911 there is a significantly up-dated set of
alternatives:
The basis of differentiation should be, in the
broad sense of the term, vocational, thusjustifying the names commonly given, such as
agricultural, business, clerical, industrial,
,
and house-hold-arts curriculums.
Provision should be made also for those having
distinctively academic interests and needs.
(Hofstadter, 1962, p. 336) (emphasis mine)
Certainly higher education found itself caught in a rather
determined pinch: the nakedly vocational high schools and the
specifically vocational needs of industry. And, above all,
boards and administrations populated by captains of industry and
captains of erudition.
Once the academy had made its alliance with business and
industry, it was inevitable that the degrees awarded by higher
education would constitute certificates of entry. Not only did
they allow the bearer to get in, they could also work to keep the
nonbearer out. The former was the needed "expert," the latter,
being non-expert, took his chances. Increasingly, as we have
seen, society required the expert. Max Weber, in his classic
examination of bureacracy, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
,
points
out the necessity for narrowly trained experts in the
legal-rational organizations that result from mass democracy or
that occur in big, capitalist enterprises:
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Office holding is a "vocation.” This is shown,first, in the requirement of a firmly prescribed
course of training, which demands the entire
capacity for work for a long period of time, andin the generally prescribed and special
examinations which are prerequisites of
employment. (Gerth and Mills, 1946, p. 199 )
(Weber had toured the United States in the fall of 1904; he died
in 1920
,
and his work on bureaucracy was published posthumously.)
Of particular interest to our discussion are Weber's
observations on the "rationalization" of education and training
in a bureaucracy. For one thing, the "firmly prescribed course
of training" replaces the advantages of heredity that dominated
in the past. For another, it restricts the available supply of
qualified applicants for desirable positions and, in effect,
allows the certificate holders to monopolize these jobs. What is
most germane, however, is Weber's conclusion of the effect of a
bureaucratized society on the "end" of education. He expresses
this in terms of a struggle between the "cultivated man" and the
"specialist." The former has been
the basis of social esteem in such various
systems as the feudal, theocratic, and
patrimonial structures of dominion.... The term
"cultivated man" is used here in a completely
value-neutral sense; it is understood to mean
solely that the goal of education consists in the
quality of a man's bearing in life which was
considered "cultivated," rather than in a
specialized training for expertness. The
"cultivated" personality formed the educational
ideal, which was stamped by the structure of
domination and by the social condition for
membership in the ruling stratum. ... The
qualification of the ruling stratum as such
rested upon the possession of "more" cultural
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quality
. . . rather than upon "more'' export
knowledge.
...
Behind all the present discussions of the
foundations of the educational system, the
struggle of the "specialist type of man” against
the older type of "cultivated man" is hidden at
some decisive point. This fight is determined by
the irresistibly expanding bureaucratization of
all public and private relations of authority and
by the ever-increasing importance of expert and
specialized knowledge. This fight intrudes into
all intimate cultural questions. (Gerth and
Mills, 1946, p. 199)
It is difficult to add anything to that analysis. Given the
specific needs of industry and the general needs of an
increasingly bureaucratized society (remember that the
Universities of Chicago and Wisconsin were training specialists
in public administration at the turn of the century), the end was
in sight for any curriculum that proclaimed the "cultivated man"
as its ideal.
The realities of American economic and social life provide
ample and eloquent support for those institutions concerned with
providing students with the kinds of training that will result in
Jobs upon graduation rather than education in the less useful
liberal arts. This is not a local, recent or short-lived
phenomenon: Jacques Ellul (1964) provides a useful viewpoint:
The Napoleonic conception that the Lycees must
furnish administrators for the state and managers
for the economy, in conformity with social needs
and tendencies, has become world-wide in its
extent. According to this conception, education
no longer has a humanist end or any value in
itself; it has only one goal, to create
technicians. ...
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Education, even in France, ia becoming orientedtoward the specialized end of producing
technicians; and, as a consequence, toward the
creation of individuals useful only as members of
a technical group, on the basis of the current
criteria of utility
-individuals who conform to
the structure and the needs of the technical
group, (p. 3H9)
The Liberal Arts
Back ^ the multiversity . We must return to Clark Kerr's (1972)
defense of the multiversity, and his postscript, in which he
compared the modern university to William James' pluralistic
universe:
This may be taken also as a good descritpion of
the multiversity with its strung-along type of
unity
,
with its lack of devotion to any single
faith and its lack of concentration on any single
function, with a condition of cohesion at best or
coexistence at next best or contiguity at least
(under internal pressures in recent years, some
campuses have moved from a state of cohesion to
one of coexistence, or from coexistence to mere
contiguity of the constituent elements). The
multiversity can be compared, as James compared
the raultiverse, to a "federal republic" as
against a "kingdom," a federal republic where
attention should be paid to "each form" by
itself, rather than only to "all forms" together.
(p. 139)
He is asking for universities to be "a generating force for new
ideas, and for critical commentary on the status quo" (p. 139).
In contrast to the monistic universities, the multiversity "is
based more on conflict and on interaction" (p. 140). Kerr's use
of James is interesting because he is citing a self-confessed
"radical empiricist" to support an institution that is presently
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grounded in rationalism, in the scientific method, and in logic.
That grounding explains the way the institutions — through their
faculty, through their administrations, through their boards, and
through their relationships with the various publics — explain
themselves, perform their functions, measure their performances.
Yet, James (1971) would tell us that we face a "residual
dilemma:
"
Can we, on the one hand, give up the logic of
identity?
-can we, on the other, believe human
experience to be fundamentally irrational?
For my own part, I have found myself compelled to
HE the logic , fairly, squarely, and
irrevocably. It has an imperishable use in human
life, but that use is not to make us
theoretically acquainted with the essential
nature of reality — ... (p. 227)
I, frankly, seriously doubt that the "multiversity" envisioned by
Kerr has much of a chance to ever become, and certainly would
never square with James' intention for that multiplicity of
experience, for the flowing along, strung-along reality of his
multiverse, so long as the multiversity is peopled with
individuals steeped in and committed to the scientific method.
That "intellectualism" was attacked by James for "its ancient
platonizing role of claiming to be the most authentic, intimate,
and exhaustive definer of the nature of reality" (p. 225).
Both theoretically and practically this power of
framing abstract concepts is one of the sublimest
of our human prerogatives. We come back into the
concrete from our journey into these
abstractions, with an increase both of vision and
power. It is no wonder that earlier thinkers,
forgetting that concepts are only man-made
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extracts from the temporal flux, should have
ended by treating them as a superior type of
being, bright, changeless, true, divine, and
utterly opposed in nature to the turbid, restless
lower world. The latter then appears as but
their corruption and falsification, (pp. 225-226)
Some misuses of the power to conceptualize that James cites
include the establishment of hierarchies, the denial of
properties to concrete objects because logically the definition
of that object does not contain those properties, and, finally,
the disconnection of concepts
-that is, ’’once you have conceived
things as 'independent,' you must proceed to deny the possibility
of any connection whatever among them, because the notion of
connection i^ not contained in the definition of independence"
(pp. 225-226).
This, of course, is what we see when we look at institutions
of higher education: independent areas of thought, further
subdivided into disciplines, with little or no intercourse
occurring across disciplinary lines. In many cases this is the
result of language barriers; in most, because the practitioners
see no need, no purpose, no utility. We are like so many
incredibly specialized gardeners, tending miniature plots within
a larger field, not recognizing or even caring what is blooming
beside us, and raising species so specialized that hybridization
is virtually impossible should an errant breeze or inquisitive
insect dare to visit or dally too long at the honeyed cups of
vastly different flowers.
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The Msconnected curriculum
. In fact, if we look at the '’liberal
arts" in American colleges and universities we find a real
problem flourishing. Most efforts to even define a liberal
eduction degenerate into specifying encounters or experiences in
content areas that are called the "liberal arts." There seems
little agreement on just what experiences should be required,
even among liberal arts faculties. The humanities, for example,
fill the requirement for "liberal arts" at some institutions;
science and mathematics may or may not be "liberal" depending on
the institution and the whim of the faculty. And, where does a
major in fine arts fit? Does studio art or dance or theatre
performance have the theory and intellectual challenge
appropriate to a baccalaureate degree? To complicate matters,
the primary interest of most faculty is the major in their
respective disciplines (Dressel, 1979).
Since the fractionalizing of the classical education into an
increasing number of disciplines, the liberal arts experience has
been defined by courses or credit hours selected from that
increasing variety of disciplines. Attempts to create
interdisciplinary or "area" studies have met with limited success
largely because faculty members highly trained in specific
disciplines are not interested in broad, interdisciplinary
courses, or feel uncomfortable teaching them, or actually resent
the time lost in their basic disciplines.
In other words, the system does not encourage such efforts
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or adopt them into the mainstream.
One problem seems to lie in the sense of a "liberal arts"
degree as a aeries of experiences, rather than conceiving of a
"liberal education" that focuses on the outcome, the educated
person. As a consequence we have the dilemma of people
graduating with a degree who are not "educated," as well as some
individuals who clearly are educated, but who have never
matriculated in a liberal arts institution. The liberal
education then is mere knowledge of particular modes and writers
or formal study of traditional disciplines; it rarely goes beyond
the narrow straits of the "major" — traditionally defined — to
encompass modes of inquiry and values;
Modes of inquiry include concepts and principles,
techniques for selecting and collecting evidence,
and ways of validating truth. Values are
extensively interwoven with liberal education and
are interrelated into modes of inquiry. (Dressel,
1979, p. 317)
In the overwhelming majority of institutions of higher
education, the concentration is on content to the detriment of
discovering, in any sort of systematic manner, the mastery of a
mode of Inquiry. And instruction in courjea does not deal with
values. Ironically, several professional schools have sought to
compensate for this state of affairs by offering courses with
titles like "Ethics for Engineers." Dressel (1979) goes further;
Even in humanities courses a careful examination
ususally indicates that values are embedded in
content selections which are discussed largely in
terms of the facts and scholarly opinions rather
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than in terms of implications for any insightsinto personal and social values, (p, 317)
One need only examine the rationale behind distribution
requirements, or general education courses: inevitably, these
are seen as providing an introduction to various disciplines or
combination of disciplines, not to provide familiarity or
knowledge of patterns of thought or the logical connections
between thought and actions. This was demonstrated in a recent
university report:
Before students at UMA (University of
Massachusetts, Amherst) move toward
specialization in any area or career, they are
expected to have learned the fundamentals of a
broad range of disciplines in the physical and
natural sciences, social sciences, humanities and
fine arts. (Commission on Missions and Goals,
1976, p. 5)
Again, considering the college experience over a four-year
period the very format of courses, credit-loads, semester,
vacations, internships, and so on tends to reinforce the
bewildering sense of discrete units, areas of concentration,
major requirements, the separateness of the university's
components. Even within a major, the faculty, by virtue of their
intense specialization, support a view of disciplines within
discipline. There seems to be no correlative. And if faculty
find it difficult to synthesize other areas with their own, or
their areas with the contemporary world, how can students be
expected to do so? In sum, each discipline is presented as a
core for someone's life.
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The college experience, viewed this way, is wrong. Indeed
it ^ould be like James' multiverse. More, it should be but a
part of that multiverse, flowing into yet other forms of
educational experiences. This argues, merely, for an holistic
approach to one's formal curriculum as well as to one's education
throughout life. For it would be foolishness, given the approach
I have been positing, to assume that a liberal education begins
and ends in the undergraduate degree process.
It is equally foolhardy to propose a specific curriculum.
By focusing on the outcome apologists for the liberal arts have
to make their point -- a liberal education is a liberating
experience. And the results, short and long term, benefit the
individual qua individual, not as an employee. One critic, Riley
(1979), puts it this way:
Developing skills for lifelong learning, for
synthesizing the specialized knowledge of the
various disciplines, and for making informed
value judgments are the principal goals of
liberal education, (p. 443)
Professionalism . We should acknowledge that the problem goes
deeper than a misconstruction of the liberal arts as content vs.
outcome. Leon Botstein (1976), identified this:
The major reason for curricular dissatisfaction
at Amherst was uneasiness with a growing
atmosphere of professionalism among a faculty
absorbed in their discrete disciplines, and a
pre-professionalism among students competing for
academic records that would guarantee entry into
graduate or professional school at the expense of
intellectual risk-taking, (p. 25)
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This, of course, should not surprise us. Back in the 1960s,
studies not only pointed out the rush to professionalism among
undergraduates, but predicted curricular consequences. In the
introduction to Professions in America
. Kenneth S. Lynn
(1967) stated:
In 1962 ... 83 percent of the graduating class
at Harvard College planned to do graduate work of
some sort; 74 per cent of Yale's class of '62 had
similar plans, as did well over 60 per cent of
the seniors at Princeton, Dartmouth, Cornell,
Columbia and Pennsylvania. More than 80 per cent
of the students at Negro colleges are
profession-oriented, (p. ix)
Lynn was concerned about our national ignorance of the
professions, how their ranks could be swelled, and our lack of
consciousness of the crisis threatening the "whole course of our
national development" (p. x). The fact is, there were then (and,
I suspect, now) not enough professionals to go around. And, Lynn
felt, we were contributing to that crisis by treating the
training of more doctors, more lawyers, and more engineers the
same way we would attempt to produce more automobile mechanics or
welders. That is, we tended to ignore the difference in
intellectual rigor between professional and vocational training,
and assumed it was merely a question of more funds and
facilities.
What effect does this support for the professions have on
the liberal arts or on a liberal education? William J.
McGlothlin (1964) cited studies by Earl J. McGrath of Teachers
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College demonstrating that
the curriculum of the college of arts and
sciences has been deeply affected by increased
emphasis on preparation for the various
professions, particularly the newer ones.
Colleges of arts and sciences themselves now
offer some fifty professional and
pre-professional curricula. In 1900 they offered
only six. About two-thirds of the bachelors and
first degrees given in the United States are
awarded in professional fields. There is obvious
danger that the college of arts and sciences will
become more and more of a professional school.
Its offerings in the basic arts and sciences may
be so compressed that they become superficial and
cursory rather than penetrating and stimulating
to further studies, (p. 39)
Measuring the liberal arts . Lest we assume that all this homage
to the salutary effects of a liberal education is misplaced, a
study by Winter, Stewart, and McClelland (1978) provides some
qualifed support.
Four hundred and fourteen students, evenly divided among men
and women, were drawn from the first-year and last-year classes
of three colleges. The colleges represented three different
kinds of higher education:
1
. A traditional four-year liberal arts education at a
private, well-endowed and and prestigious eastern U.S.
institution. The curriculum, according to the authors,
emphasizes broad, interdisciplinary survey courses in the
sciences, humanities, and social sciences, and
individualized scholarship at all stages of the four
years.
2. A four-year undergraduate program "for training teachers
and other professionals," at a state-funded institution.
Students are drawn from a large metropolitan area and
pass moderately competitive admission standards.
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3. A two-year public community college with career programsin such fields as data processing, electronics, nursing,
secretarial skills, and business administration. Theinstitution accepts about seven of every ten applicants
and draws mostly suburban students to its urban location.
<,,^0 -!
controlled statistically for intelligence andsocial class and, by comparing first-year and last- year student
responses at each school, the researchers hoped to determine thedegree and nature of the changes wrought by the educationalprocess. Finally, by evaluating the three schools together, theyhoped to discover if the liberal arts school had a demonstrable,
unique impact on its students.
Winter, et al. concluded that those students who
participated in the liberal arts education far outdistanced their
the Other two institutions when it came to
organizing, and operating on facts. They were
to analyze arguments, criticize positions on
controversial issues and support their own stance with reasoned
argument. And, when required, were able to craft a limited,
qualified endorsement of a position they had opposed.
counterparts
marshalling,
better able
In the Thematic Apperception Test, a "projective” test that
clinicians have used for over 40 years to assess personality, the
liberal arts college produced students who scored highest in
"self-definition," acting effectively and constructively, often
in ways that went beyond ascribed roles. The liberal arts
students also: (1) saw authority in complex, versus simplistic
terms; (2) viewed other persons as unique individuals, rather
than people who could be manipulated to satisfy the students’
desires; (3) integrated both joy and sorrow into their moods; (4)
were able to work without falling victim to passivity.
self-doubt, or anxiety about failure.
Furthermore, the liberal arts college seemed to have
fostered a unique pattern of motivation in its students — a
strong concern for power and a weak concern for affiliation, and
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high self-control. One of the researchers, McClelland, calls
this the leadership or
-imperial” motive pattern. This pattern,
according to McClelland, is usually found in people considered to
be effective leaders --
Managers who have a talent for creating in their
subordinates such qualities as high morale, a
sense of responsibility, organizational clarity,
and
-team spirit.” (p. 4?)
There are obvious problems with the data. Such a limited
sampling cannot be definitive. And the authors are quick to
point out that these effects are not necessarily caused by the
college's course requirements.
It may be that the worth of an education at any
school is determined more by faculty quality,
library facilities, the size of the endowment, or
even by the self-fulfilling anticipation and
beliefs of faculty and students, (p. 106)
However, there were changes. In each institution there were
significant increases in scores from first-year to last-year
students. And the greatest changes and highest scores were those
of the last-year students of the liberal arts college. The
authors conclude;
(the) changes unique to, or enhanced by,
attendance at our liberal arts college do
establish at least a primafacie case for
education in the liberal arts. (p. 106)
What cannot be overlooked, however, and what must be
stressed is that while the study may have measured skills In
analysis, self-definition, and motivation, it did not deal with
the "informed value judgments” we seem to expect from the
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liberally educated, and it did not measure,
-indeed it could not
have measured the "right conduct” that should be the hallmark of
every educated person. The warnings of^ Socrates in the Gorgias
are the true measure here, and they were not dealt with.
Along that line. Derek C. Bok (1976a) has asked the
question. "Can Ethics Be Taught?" and has pointed out that
if other sources of ethical values have declined
in influence (church, government-,"-* : family)
.
educators have a responsibility to contribute in
any way they can to the moraM develdpment of
their students, (p. 26)
He suggests problem oriented courses to help students
"sharpen and refine their moral perception" (p. 38). But the
university must do more than offer courses,
it will have to demonstrate its own commitment to
principled behavior . .
. (through) investment
policies, its employment practices . . . (p. 28)
The questions that immediately leap to mind, in no
particular order, are
(1) Haven't we been told, all along, that ethical values
14 -*5
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follow from a liberal education?
(2) Why should educators - assumedly "educated"
individuals, themselves — have to be reminded of their
responsibility to contribute to anyone's moral
development?
(3) And why should institutions of higher learning have to
be chided to demonstrate an alleged commitment to
principled behavior?
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and of those Individuals who provide directions for Institutions
of higher education. Perhaps then we can better understand the
"failures" of liberal education.
Wellborn (1975) has cited some obvious trends that have
contributed to a decline in American education: the cost of
schooling is rising, budgets are falling, and so are enrollments.
He also talked about student attitudes:
Doubts about the usefulness of a college degree,
especially in terms of getting a good job, have
caused a fall-off in the percentage of high
school graduates going to college — from a peak
of 55 percent in 1968 to about 47 percent todav.
(p. 56)
It seems clear that the students Wellborn talked to have a
motive for going to college. Their baccalaureate
should get them a job, preferably a good job, and if it does not
then college will have been a waste of time and money. In fact,
a lower percentage of students are attending college. Wellborn
says, because the colleges are failing that requirement.
What about the educators?
To attract students and to create a better public
image, a number of eductors recommend two things:
a return to required courses in traditional
liberal arts, with less concentration on
electives; and a broadening out into new markets
and curricula, with particular stress on a
lifetime of learning, (p. 59)
This response is interesting and ambiguous. Are the
traditional liberal arts being reinstated to attract the
students, or to create a better public image. or to reduce the
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budget (since the concomitant is to reduce the electives)? And
what are the "new markets and curricula?" Since the students
want jobs at the end of college I assume that the markets and
curricula will be a significant part of an attempt to meet that
need. The changes, whatever they may be, will be made in order
"attract students and . . . create a better public image."
Schutz (1967), in defining the meaning of acts, stated that
there are two kinds of motives that must be understood:
"in-order-to motives," and "genuine because-motives." He begins
by describing how we understand our experiences:
The specific meaning of a lived experience, and
therefore, the particular mode of the act of
attention to it (i.e., the reflective glance back
at our lived experiences is the "act," which
raises the content of consciousness. from
prephenomenal to phenomenal status), consists in
the ordering of this lived experience within the
total context of experience that is
present-at-hand
. ... The intended meaning of a
lived experience is nothing more or less than a
self-interpretation of a lived experience from
the point of view of a new lived experience, (p.
78)
That is, we understand all that we have experienced from the
point of view of the present. Any lived experience that is to be
"classified" is put into a context of our total experience;
Schutz calls this the "synthesis of recognition" (p. 83).
If we push further, to discover why people act as they do —
in this case to understand better "why students attend
institutions of higher education" — Schutz defines a particular
means of investigation, and focus on the motives.
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For Schutz, ’'every action is carried out according to a
project and is oriented to an act phantasied in the future
perfect tense as already executed" (p. 8?).
To cite a homely case, suppose I wanted a cup of good
coffee (Sohuman. 1979). To do this I have to leave my desk, a
process involving all sorts of muscular tensions and relaxations;
I must go into the kitchen, over to the stove, the sink, the
refrigerator, and so on. As I am making all these preparations
if someone were to ask me about the "meaning" of my activity I
should answer that I am going to drink a cup of coffeee. The
"motive" of all these acts is the "project" of drinking that cup
of coffee. All the acts other than the drinking of the coffee
are intermediate aims oriented to the final one. Since I have
fancied, in the future perfect tense, the drinking of that
coffee, the intermediate acts exist within a meaning-context.
Interpreting the actor's "motive" as his
expectations
,
we can say that the motivational
context is by definition the meaning-context
within which a particular action stands in virtue
of its status as the project of an act for a
given actor. In other words, the act thus
projected in the future perfect tense and in
terms of which the action receives its
orientation is the "in-order-to motive" for the
actor. (Schutz, 1967, p. 88)
All I have to do is to project a picture of myself drinking
that coffee as "something I will have done in a few minutes" —
in short, project it in the future perfect tense — and then
proceed to boil water, grind beans, and so on.
134
We talked about assigning meaning to our experiences,
earlier, and I pointed out that Sohutz had established meaning of
lived experiences within the total context of experiences
present-at-hand. We can do the same thing in the project I have
described even though the actions which will serve as means have
not yet been established. We accomplish this by referring back
to past acts analogous to the projected one. The past acts are
reproduced in the consciousness of the person formulating a new
project.
In order to project an act, I must know how acts
of the same kind have been carried out in the
past. The more cases there are of such acta and
the better their rational principles understood,
the more are they "taken for granted." (Schutz,
1967, p. 90)
If we take this analysis and apply it to education we come
up with some very interesting results. A student who attends
college "In-order-to" get a Job (or "in-order-to" get a good
Job)
,
is going to be participating in the educational process in
ways that many educators do not want to consider. For example,
if
. . . liberally educated people are recognized as
such by the way in which they think and act and
by the values upon which their thinking and
actions are based . . . (Dressel, 1979, p. 322)
we must assume that unless the ways and values Paul Dressel is
describing are criteria for employment college students will not
waste their time acquiring them. Or, if they do, they will not
do so in a planned or conscious fashion. That student we have
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referred to (and, apparently, he or she is the one Wellborn was
writing about) may indeed take required liberal arts courses —
but they will be just that, requirements, and they will be taken
as intermediate acts leading to and oriented by the project: a
good job. Those liberal arts courses receive their meaning, as
Schutz has pointed out, because so many other, similar acts have
been carried out in the past. Other students took them and went
on to graduate and get jobs. Therefore, this particular student
will take the same or similar courses; the whole process taken
for granted unless some special circumstance forces the student
or the institution to take account of what is being done.
Interestingly, Schutz’ "genuine because-motive” differs from
the "in-order- to" motive in that
the in-order-to motive explains the act in terms
of the project, while the genuine because-motive
explains the project in terms of the actors past
experiences, (p. 91 )
That is, with the in-order-to relation, a project is the
motivating factor— what is to come, what will have have been
done is the reason for the intermediate actions. In the genuine
because relation, a prior experience of the individual, something
I have already lived through, motivates the project. Schutz
explains this relation as "thinking in the pluperfect tense." In
point of fact, all those possibilities that exist when a choice
is to be made, and all those variables which we appear to have
considered before making a decision can, in the selective
136
backward-looking glance, be seen as genuine because-motives.
^ey are only interpretations performed by thebackward-looking glance when it is directed uponthose conscious experiences which precede (in the
pluperfect tense) the actual project. And since
every interpretation in the pluperfect tense isdetermined by the Here and Now from which it is
made, the choice of which past experiences are tobe regarded as the genuine because-motive of the
project depends on the core of light which the
ego lets fall on its experiences preceding the
project, (p. 95)
Only when the project is complete can we say that I drank the
coffee ^cause I wanted to taste the hot brew of Peruvian,
antigua and mocha java beans. Until then, I drink in-order- to.
The ”because-ness" is the factor, here, not the "genuine.” It is
only a "genuine because ." not necessarily a genuine motive.
In other words, we may be able to understand and provide a
useful critique of the project (i.e., the pursuit of a dregree)
because of its in-order-to nature. But ^ that particular
project was selected is not only going beyond the scope of this
argument, it is so personal and varied that the motives are sui
generis .
The point has been made, however, that the institutions of
higher education are training men and women in-order-to produce
professionals of various sorts. And that those men and women are
attending colleges and universities in-order-to get jobs, good
jobs. They are, as well, acquiring specific skills, capable of
being measured.
In Schutz’ terms, the "interest" of the student and of the
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institution is "first from the point of view of an already
formulated problem.” (p. 96 )
The already existing project (e.g., to get
credentialled) is the motivating factor; it
motivates the action (e.g., the course of
studies) and is the reason why it is performed.
(p. 92)
And further,
the goal pictured in the project is detachable
from the "meaning” of the component action, which
can be treated as something quite distinct, (p.
94)
In other words, the various course and degree requirements
do not necessarily have any "meaning” in the sense of producing
the pictured goal. They can be — and obviously are — just
"requirements.” The emphasis placed on general education by
those of us who are apologists for the liberal arts, or for core
requirements, for example, is not necessarily well-placed.
We should keep this in mind as we turn to consider three
proposals for the reform of higher education.
Reform
The times call for the establishment of a new
college or for an evangelistic movement in some
old ones which shall have for its object the
conversion of individuals and finally of the
teaching profession to a true conception of
general education. Unless some such
demonstration or some such evangelistic movement
can take place, we shall remain in our confusion;
we shall have neither general education nor
universities; and we shall continue to disappoint
the hopes of our people. (Hutchins, 1936, p. 8?)
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Mohins* higher learning. When Robert Maynard Hutohlna ( 1936 )
wrote The Higher Learning in America
, it was
during the Great Depression, when Russia was abackward nation, when colonialism was in flower,
and when people in the advanced industrial
counties still believed that technology could
menace neither their livelihood nor their lives.
(p. ix)
In 1936, Hutchins, then president of the University of Chicago,
surveyed colleges and universities in America and found confusion
a confusion that began in the high school and continued
through graduate school. In the college of liberal arts, for
example, he saw a hybrid
— partly high school, partly
university, partly general and partly special.
In order to clarify the higher learning, Hutchin’s book
examines the causes of its confusion: the love of money, a
confused notion of democracy, and an erroneous notion of progress
that leads to anti-intellectualism. The money that must meet the
income requirements of the institution comes from students,
donors, and legislatures. And the sources from which money comes
tend to dictate the ends ^ which the money will be directed.
In other words, financial constraints determine educational
policy, rather than the institutions establishing an educational
policy and then trying to finance it.
Undoubtedly the love of money and that
sensitivity to public demands that it creates has
a good deal to do with the service-station
conception of a university, (p. 6)
The service-station conception driven by love of money produces
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extension programs, attractive programs to house, feed, and amuse
the young (i.e., freshmen and sophomores), large numbers of
students, and the American system of educational measurement,
that is, a measurement of intellectual progress determined by
attendance, class hours, and ability to repeat information on
examinations given by the teachers who told it to them.
The confused notion of democracy reinforces the
service-station concept by telling us that education should be
responsive to public opinion. It leads to the view that
everybody is entitled to the same kind and amount of education.
It produces confusion about control, not just among the public
and the legislatures, but among alumni and trustees as well.
Educational problems (e.g., the content of courses, the content
of the curriculum, or the qualifications of the faculty) as
opposed to determining the amount of money to be spent on
education, or the intelligent management of the institution, are
beyond the competence of these groups. "The attempt to take
these (educational) matters into their own hands can only
confound confusion." (p. 24).
The erroneous nature of progress includes the assumption
that everything is getting better, indeed, must be getting better
with each succeeding age. To the explosion of information and
technology Hutchins says we add an evolutionary twist: we must
adapt to our new, increasingly complex environment. This is
anti-intellectual
:
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The idea that his education should consist of the
cultivation of his intellect is, of course,
ridiculous. What it must consist of is surveys
more or less detailed, of the modern industrial,
technological, financial, political, and social
situation so that he can fit into it with a
minimum of discomfort to himself and to his
fellow men. (p. 2?)
In spite of his critique of the state of higher education,
Hutchins is convinced that the health of our nation can only be
improved through education. And it will require some strong and
purposeful institutions to demonstrate what the true higher
learning is:
As education it is the single-minded pursuit of
the intellectual virtues. As scholarship it is
the single-minded devotion to the advancement of
knowledge, (p. 32)
Having described the external conditions that affect the
institutions of higher learning, Hutchins turns to the internal
dilemmas: the conflict between two kinds of education, the
pursuit of truth for its own sake, and the preparation of men and
women for their life work. In virtually every department
professional training is a major concern: on the other hand, he
notes that pursuing truth for its own sake is occasionally
practiced in a professional school.
Hutchins points out that the very atmosphere of departments
of arts, literature, and science is highly professional.
Students do graduate work in organic chemistry or English because
industry is hiring Ph.D.s or because advanced degrees are
required to secure positions in secondary schools.
The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is
eing rapidly obscured in universities and may
soon be extinguished. Every group in the
community that is well enough organized to have
an audible voice wants the university to spare it
the necessity of training its own recruits ....
The effect ... on the universities will be that
soon everybody
. . . will be there for the
purpose of being trained for something, (p. 37)
Vocationalizing the universities is bad for the
universities, bad for the professions, and bad for the students.
The content of courses, for example, is determined by vocational
pressures, confined to those subjects which experience,
tradition, or examining and licensing boards have sanctified.
And there is the temptation to trivialize; first, by justifying
anything on the ground that it may be helpful to the student in
his chosen profession; later, by justifying any course of study
merely because it will lead to employment in a trade. Further,
the more frankly professional schools isolate themselves from
other departments, schools, and colleges on the campus,
developing their own faculty for, e.g., ’Law and Economics,"
"Ethics for Lawyers,: "History of Jurisprudence," and so on.
This is not to say that professional schools do not belong in the
university; rather, turning professional schools into vocational
schools degrades both universities and professions. Hutchins'
contention, furthermore,
is that the tricks of the trade cannot be learned
in a university, and that if they can be they
should not be. . . . because they get out of date
and new tricks take their place, because the
teachers get out of date . . . and because tricks
can be learned only in the actual situation in
which they can be employed, (p. 4?)
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Students who have spent their university careers in specific
vocational preparation and then don't go into these vocations
have wasted their university careers. And even if these students
do go into those vocations, their university period has, by
necessity, been narrow and focused:
The vocational atmosphere is ruinous to attempts
to lead the student to understand the subject.
By hypothesis he is learning to practice the
profession. You must, therefore, make clear to
him at every step that the questions you are
discussing have a direct bearing on his future
experiences and on his success in meeting them.
( 38 )
Hutchins, of course, has a solution to share with us. It
begins with "general education," education for everybody, whether
he or she goes to the university or not. It is not "useful," it
is not designed to help the individual make money, but it will
cultivate the "intellectual virtues." Hutchins outlines
the kind (of education) that everybody should
have, . . . that we should find out how to give
... to those whom we do not know how to teach
at present.
That is, not only those who can learn from books, but those
who cannot; Hutchins states, we should continue research to find
out how
to give a general education to the hand-minded
and the functionally illiterate, (p. 6l)
Hutchins' proposal focuses on content, not method. It is a
four-year unit of study for everybody who can learn from books,
143
beginning at about the junior year in high school, ending at
about the end of the sophomore year in college. In other words,
from about age 16 to about age 20. Further, the conclusion of
these studies may mark the end of formal instruction for the
large majority of the students.
His curriculum will be composed
principally of the permanent studies. We propose
the permanent studies because these studies draw
out the elements of our common human nature,
because they connect man with man, because they
connect us with the best that man has thought,
because they are basic to any futher study and to
any understanding of the world, (p. 77)
Hutchins defines the permanent studies to include the classics.
"A classic is a book that is contemporary in every age” (p. 78).
He cites Republic of Plato, the Physics of Aristotle,
Newton’s Principia
.
Cicero, Milton, Galileo, and Adam Smith. The
originals, not excerpts out of context, or second-hand versions
of textbooks.
He goes on: grammar, or the rules of reading; rhetoric and
logic, the rules of writing, speaking, and reasoning;
mathematics. In the last case, mathematics is taught not because
of its obvious practical value, but for the "correctness in
thinking that may be more directly and impressively taught
through mathematics than in any other way" (p. 84). From this
course of study Hutchins frames for his student body
the elements of our common human nature, . . .
they will have learned what has been done in the
past, and what the greatest men have thought.
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They will have learned how to think themselves.
If we wish to lay a basis for advanced study,
that basis is provided, (p. 85)
Having identified those external and internal forces that
have mis-shaped the higher learning, and having provided general
education as the first step in any plant to properly re-shape the
university, Hutchins turns to "discover what, given general
education, the higher learning should be" (p. 89 ).
He begins by caustically describing its present state, a
chaotic one with no principle of unity. An "encyclopedia of
truths" with neither students nor faculty knowing what is the
relation of one departmental or disciplinary truth to another.
Hutchins reminds us that the medieval university had theology as
its principle of unity; acknowledging the impracticality of
imposing theology on today's university, with its context that
denies faith or belief in revelation, he suggests that, like the
Greeks, we should adopt metaphysics as
the ordering and proportioning descipline. It is
in the light of metaphysics that the social
sciences, dealing with man and man, and the
physical sciences dealing with man and nature
take shape and illuminate one another, (p. 97)
Metaphysics will be the key to Hutchins' unified university.
Metaphysics provides in his scheme a higher meaning, preventing,
for example, the degeneration of morals into mores, the
devaluation of the truths of ethics into common-sense practices
for getting along in this world. Without metaphysics there is no
meaning, all data is equivalent and the faculty gather it
145
indiscriminately. But with metaphysics in place, the science of
first princples, Hutchins then turns to the social sciences and
the natural sciences. Taken together, the three categories form
the proper subject matter of the higher learning. He details the
subject matter within the categories (ethics, politics,
economics, for example) and demonstrates both the practical
applications (law, medicine, engineering), and how they all loop
back to the study of metaphysics. The historical and empirical
material of the "disciplines" that have emerged from the social
and natural sciences would cease to be the primary focus and
concern of one’s study but would be subordinated to an
understanding of the principles.
Hutchins rather breathlessly races through a reorganization
of the university after establishing his broad curriculum.
Research institutes, and technical institutes will be attached to
the university but in both cases would have no voice in the
formulation of university policy. The university is an
appropriate location; the university can benefit from the
information collected, and it can provide a refuge for
researchers to work in a detached, objective, and impartial
manner. It is perhaps the only institution capable of conducting
or financing research; it can provide the training for future
researchers, and those learned professions that cannot be trusted
to communicate their practices to the young will have their ranks
replenished from the graduates of the university-based technical
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institutes.
As for departments, they will disappear: members
or existing departments who are exclusively
concerned either with data collecting or
vocational training will be transferred to
research or technical institutes. Only those who
are working on fundamental problems in the fields
of the three faculties will remain as professors
in the university, (p. m)
Professional schools, 3e, would also disappear.
Students aspiring to medicine, law, or engineering would study in
the three faculties of metaphysics, social science, and natural
science. A future doctor, having finished his general education,
would study metaphysics and the philosophy of nature, the
physical and biological sciences, and some social sciences.
The necessary experience that he must have before
he could be trusted with a patient should be
secured in an institute attached to the
university and to a hospital, (p. 113)
Lawyers, teachers, and others would have parallel programs,
concluding in a technical institute.
Those professional schools which have no
intellectual content in their own right would
disappear altogether, except as their activities
might be thought worthy of preservation in
research or technical institutes. (Hutchins,
1935, p. 112)
In this fashion, Hutchins proposes to remove the distinction
between professional and non-professional disciplines, allowing
the university, through the three faculties, to concentrate on
teaching and the pursuit of truth. Graduates from the university
will have completed a general education, as well, and since they
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will all have studied under all the faculties, will have a
unified and broad education. Specialization, vocational
pursuits, and professional undertaking come after in the separate
technical and research institutes.
In the process of re-ordering the academic universe Hutchins
has returned to the middle ages: in place of the trivium and
quadrivium he has "general education." The higher faculties of
Theology, Canon and Civil Law, and Medicine have been replaced
with metaphysics, social sciences, and natural sciences. And to
correct the abuses to which the medieval universities fell
victim, he has placed all directly professional training outside
the university proper, in institutes.
Yet, during his tenure as president of the University of
Chicago, he continued to preside over graduation ceremonies in
which he handed out diplomas to journalism and library science
majors. His idealized program of study insists on the unifying
principle of metaphysics and the higher meaning it provides to
life. Yet, during his tenure as president, black students in the
university’s medical school could not intern at the university
hospital. (Weinberg, 1980) It is kind to say that in the former
instance he was unable to effect the kind of change he describes
in his book; in the latter instance it may well be that such
moral issues were not contemplated when he urged the pure,
perhaps morally-neutral pursuit of truth.
This is not just an interesting historical anecdote, for it
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relates directly to the thesis of this paper, that the truly
educated person demonstrates, acts out his education. Indeed, it
is a form of existentialism that states, in effect, that mere
study of one's humanity — mere exposure to or knowledge of the
humanities does not constitute the essence of the individual;
rather, how one transforms that "essence" into one's existence is
the test, how one draws that essence into the activity of a life.
We expect more of an educated person, and we should do so. That
is part of what Bok (1976a) meant when he stated that the
university "will have to demonstrate its own commitment to
principled behavior" (p. 29). And that is why Hutchins has
failed in translating his stated ideals into institutional
actions.
As a treatise, however, the Higher Learning in America
captures the contradiction inherent in a single institution's
attempt to both educate and train. He has clearly recognized and
identified the tensions created by the introduction of vocational
preparation, and the eventual and inevitable domination of the
institution by vocationalism. His remedy is simple — remove the
offending limbs, return to the medieval studia generale and
higher faculties, and — in deference to contemporary societal
needs — establish institutes on the periphery. Through this
last device, Hutchins maintains the purity of the university per
se, and provides for the vocational training he has criticized so
effectively.
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The "in-order-to" motive described by Schutz is worked out
in Hutchins’ proposal: everybody is able to participate in a
general education without regard for their ultimate occupation.
Those who have completed a general education and wish to enter
one of the learned professions go on to the higher faculties in
the university. Here, patterns of study are established by the
faculty with a career goal in mind for the student. The student
enters the course of study in-order-to, ultimately, complete the
practical training of the third phase, the institute, and enter
practice as a doctor, lawyer, or teacher.
Wolff ’ 3 ideal . When Robert Paul Wolff (1969) wrote T^ Ideal of
University he was working out some general reflections on the
nature of a university while making some particular observations
about universities and the education they provided in the United
States. Having experienced the student protests at Columbia in
the sixties he decided
to develop a program of practical reform of
present-day institutions of higher education in
America,, and only incidentally to sketch the
ground plan for a utopian university in the ideal
society . . . (p. xii)
In his ’’Introduction,” Wolff admits that, confronted with
the muchpublicized student uprising on the campus of Columbia
University during the Spring of 1968, he was initially confused
by the conflicting demands of the situation — his sympathy for
the students’ protest was counterbalanced by his identification
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with the authority represented by the faculty. He sought to sort
out this confusion by rethinking his concepts of what a
university is, and ought to be. Therefore, while the crisis that
forced his articulation was different from that of Hutchins, it
was as real, and the product as individual and informative.
He begins by sketching four models of a university. These
are abstract models, rather than actual cases, that will allow
Wolff to make connections between the ideals and their
organizations, to show how conflicting ideals have been married
to produce awkward and contradictory institutions, and, finally,
to consider which of the ideals should dominate American higher
education.
The four ideals posit the university as
(a) a sanctuary of scholarship,
(b) a training camp for the professions,
(c) a social service station, and
(d) an assembly line for establishment man.
As a sanctuary of scholarship, the university is both a
cloister for the Gelehrten
,
as well as a place where the student
can be initiated into a dialogue with and about the great
cultural tradition. The object of this scholarship will be the
Humanities; the spirit of the theoretical or experimental
sciences does not flourish here.
Though the tradition may contain pregnant,
emotionally powerful commentaries upon life and
men’s affairs, the scholar's concern is with the
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textual world, not with the world about which thetext speaks. At its best, scholarship develops a
refined sensibility and a wise appreciation of
the complexities and ironies of the ways of God
and man; at its worst, scholarship hardens into a
stultifying pedantry which lacks the art and
creative genius of those who wrote the great
texts, (p.5)
We must remember that Wolff is describing an ideal, an
intentionally exaggerated institution. He acknowledges,
willingly, that he can't claim with any certainty that one is
inevitably spiritually crippled by a lack of familiarity with the
"great tradition." On the other hand, he much prefers the
company of men and women who are "cultivated," and capable of
that special sort of irony which comes from the
awareness that one's most precious thoughts have
been anticipated, (p. 8)
Wolff doesn't expand on this, and it is rather faint praise, but
he has certainly alluded to a special sense of connection one
achieves, through reading the classics, with a common core of
intuitions and concepts, to use Kant's terms, in the expressed
thoughts of humanity. And that can be a humbling, humanizing,
and provocative experience. That, of course, is the very point
Wolff stops short of — the acts that must flow from that
recognition.
The sanctuary concept is a very traditional one; a more
recent conception is that of the training camp for the
professions. In Chapter Two and in the first section of this
chapter, and in the critique of Hutchins' book, we have seen the
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joining of the institutions of higher education with professional
training. Brickman (1970), in his review of Wolff’s book, saw it
this way:
With colleges and universities on the front pages
• . . it is hardly surprising that academicians
and others have begun to examine and re-examine
the nature, organization, aims and program of
American higher education.
. . . Specifically,
Wolff’s theme is the weakening and eventual
destruction of ’’the unity of the academic
community” by the conflict between graduate
(including professional) and undergraduate
instruction, (p. l80)
Wolff points out that we can and have rationalized the
recent phenomenon of transforming so many occupational roles into
professions by considering the increasingly technical
requirements of those roles and the consequent specialization of
tasks and bureaucratizing of skills and knowledge. He goes on,
however, to state that
it is surely obvious that a number of the most
recently established ’’professions” are merely
ordinary jobs putting on airs. But there is no
argument save historical accident for the
practice of locating these professions
institutionally in universities. The advantage
to the new profession is obvious, (p. 11)
Wolff eschews the route of criticizing whatever is new
merely because it is so, and therefore vulgar; the fundamental
question must be asked, ’’whether a university is an appropriate
place for professional schools at all?”
As Hutchins before him, he quickly establishes the divisive
and destructive characteristics of professional programs when
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inserted in an academic community: a divided loyalty - Wolff
(1969) uses the Columbia crisis as an example - wherein faculty
and students, alike, are torn between their commitments to a
profession and their responsibilities as members of an academic
community; the effect of competition (to be accepted at the most
prestigious graduate or professional schools) on undergraduate
education, particularly grading; the curious dilemma of providing
certification in the academic profession — minting new Ph.D.'s
to meet the market demand with little regard for the available
pool of truly brilliant students, professing that a dissertation
is an original contribution to knowledge," while counseling
doctoral candidates in such a way as to lower both sights and
standards. Wolff targets, in this last instance, one of the more
familiar tensions in higher education:
Two distinct activities guided by two entirely
separate sets of standards, namely, the training
and certification of college teachers on the one
hand, and the initiation of promising acolytes
into intellectual creativity on the other, (p.
27)
Wolff's third ideal is that of the social service station,
based on the model articulated by Clark Kerr. Wolff's critique
of this ideal is purposeful and pungent. A multiversity cannot
have the unity of place, purpose, and political organization
found in older, classical universities — there are too many
professional schools, research institutes, training programs,
hospitals, extension or field sites, and so on. Further, there
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are too many
"Interpenetratlons” between multlverelty and
government (local, state, and federal), and multiversity and
private industry, to pretend that policy is not dramatically
affected or determined by these non university agencies. The
result of the funded projects or directed research la not
"profitability in the economic sense but profitability in the
social sense." (p. 31)
It is not a new venture for the university: these
institutions, as we have seen, have always devoted themselves to
purposes directly or indirectly defined by the societies outside
their ivy-covered walls. But Wolff strikes hardest at Kerr's
(and others')
complete failure to draw a sharp distinction
between the concepts of effective or market
demand and human or social need , (p. 36)
The latter is the absence of something, material dr social, that
could contribute to human welfare j the former is merely a
consumer driven force, an expression of willingness to buy.
Wolff's position is that Kerr, and many others, have
developed a
covert ideological rationalization for whatever
human or social desires happen to be backed by
enough money or power to translate them into
effective demands, (p. 39)
He readily identifies human needs that cannot get themselves
expressed as market demands (e.g., well-designed,
well-constructed, low-cost housing; equal education for all;
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adequate health care; pollution control)
,
and the disparity
between these and the demands to which the university readily
accedes is obvious. In this market-place vision of the
university the institution accepts those goals and values that
are backed by ready and sufficient cash. The most serious
indictment of this view of the university is that, in hiring out
to the high bidders, the institution has compromised its ability
to critically examine and define goals and values. It becomes an
instrument of the government, or of the corporation, and as such
can no longer effectively function as an independent center of
intellectual, educational activity. In Wolff’s terms, this ideal
raises a significant question:
is there a greater social need for full-scale
integration of the resources and activities of
the universities into existing domestic and
foreign programs, or for a sustained critique of
those programs from an independent position of
authority and influences? (p. 42)
Wolff’s belief is that critique, not cooperation, is necessary,
and he rejects this ideal of the multiversity.
The fourth and last ideal of the university is as an
assembly line for Establishment Man. This vision of the
university is an anti-model, and as such proposes no ideal but
rather an attack on American higher education. The starting
point is a feeling, a subjective position held by many of the
brightest, most enthusiastic students who are dissatisfied with
the education they are receiving in the universities. Having
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passed through the elaborate screens and filters that stand guard
at the entrances to the top schools they find an experience that
does not measure up to their expectations - the testing and
grading that rules over genuine education, the lack of
"relevance," the excessive specialization or professionalization,
the lack of connection between courses, and disciplines.
Further, says Wolff, they are profoundly disappointed in the
—
-
haVIor of the institution: contracts for war-related research;
ROTC; training programs for industry, and so on. The students
see themselves as the raw material in a process that is producing
Establishment Man, The customers are corporations, government
agencies, and universities, and these in turn perpetuate the
production by their destructive, anti-social activities and
growth. The concealed goal of America’s colleges and
universities is to provoke creative thinking and action, which
will lead (hopefully) in profitable paths, while obscuring the
evils and injustices of the very system Establishment Man is
being encouraged to enter.
The system really begins in the elementary grades, with
competitive processes and indoctrination about the "good life"
that obtains from success. The winners, the successful, have
wealth, honor, leisure, the challenging and interesting jobs.
The indoctrination, the critique argues, is so successful that we
accept the wrongs of the system as "necessary," and besides we
want those rewards.
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The university’s role is particularly pernicious. It
co-opts the critics — it hires the radicals, puts their books on
the required reading list, awards tenure, and then claims that it
is value-neutral.
In doing all this the university, of course, is a perfect
mirror of society. This is accomplished by the financing
mechanism; federal and state governments, foundations, and
industry all have a vested interest in the status quo. As long
as they are underwriting the higher education of America the
programs of the universities will reflect their values.
Wolff sympathizes with much of this critique but identifies
several errors: first, it is clear that, in spite of the
pressures to conform, to bend to the pressures of grades and
admission to graduate school, our campuses continue to be forums
for free, open, and significant debate — a certain sign of the
liberating effect of university life; second, and again in spite
of the obvious linkages between the institutions and American
society, the universities continue, in Wolff’s view, to be the
only viable centers of protest and informed opposition to the
dominant values and policies of our society. He cites the
opposition to the war in Vietnam as a case in point.
Wolff concludes:
Those of us who can still sustain a concern for
the partial amelioration of social evils must
rely upon the actual institutions which offer us
the most asistance. In America today, the
university clearly heads that list. (p. 57)
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Having sketched these four models and their Institutional
arrangements, Wolff turns to the Issue of grading, a social evil,
as he labels it, that
product of a social virtue
, namely, the
effective implementation of the principle of
equality of opportunity, (p. 68)
He spends considerable time on grading but his conclusion is,
essentially, that there are three quite separate functions in
education of criticism, evaluation, and ranking. The first is at
the heart of education, the second is external to it (but quite
essential to the professions), and the last serves neither an
educational, nor a professional but an economic function by
ranking we can fairly allocate scarce resources —
— a shortage of
first rate colleges or graduate schools requires a rank-ordering
of applicants.
Wolff also deals with "Practical Proposals for Utopian
Reform." His proposals are "practical" in that they are not
revolutionary, but they are "utopian" in their rootedness in the
ideal university Wolff would like to see evolve.
There are four stages in this reform:
The transition from secondary school to college;
the undergraduate experience; the sorting out of
college graduates into professional or graduate
programs; and the two, three, four, or more years
devoted to professional training and
certification, (p. 139)
If we reconsider Schutz' analysis of motive, his definition of
the in-order-to motive, and the discussion that centered on that
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significant point, it is apparent that Wolff must, in order to
reform American higher education, properly deal with a lengthy
and consistent pattern of preparation and 2.re-requisites
. a
coherent plan of ^ferring gratification (and education) in the
present for the promised rewards of the future. Thus, most of
the high school curriculum is bent toward admissions requirements
at the better colleges; the undergraduate curriculum is focused
on the prerequisites of graduate school; once in graduate school,
one’s education is past (!), and specialized training takes over.
In reality, we are subjected to specialized training all along,
in-order-to achieve the highest forms of certification in the
most specialized and prestigious professions.
Wolff does, in fact, address this lock-step pattern. He
proposes eliminating the connection between the stages:
admission to college will be based on random selection by
computer from among pools of applicants who have achieved a
minimum standard in order to be considered. The ’’best” schools
form consortia, as will the second-rate ones, and common
minimum standards established, with common pools of applicants.
Thus, the outstanding high school senior in the nation will have
exactly the same ’’chance” for admission to Harvard as the senior
who barely squeaked into the established ’’admit” category.
Once admitted.
college itself ought to be totally divorced from
pre-professional training. Students should be
offered rigorous, challenging science courses.
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but no pre-med» program
. . . There should be no
undergraduate "majors" covertly designed to lock
students into a doctoral track. The purpose ofthe undergraduate years should be intellectual
exploration, (p. 145)
ii i
By shortening the undergraduate program from four to three years,
a student who desires to go on to graduate work may use the
fourth year to take the requisite math or science courses for,
say, engineering or medical school, without compromising the
exploratory and Independent nature of his or her undergraduate
study. Other students may opt for some sort of professional or
vocational training directly out of high school, thus by-passing
the college stage. Wolff suggests various internships as
appropriate. It seems Implicit, as well, that the nature of the
professional schools will change to accomodate this sort of
student.
The central point is that the "undergraduate"
years, either in school or out, should be devoted
to the successful completion of a critical stage
of Intellectual maturation, not to the
accumulation of precisely one hundred and twenty
points of credit, (p. 150)
This proposal for the undergraduate stage also means the
elimination oT the bachelor’s degree. After all, it will no
longer have a function. It will not aid in the sorting of
students for the next stage in the higher education process —
Wolff proposes competitive, nationwide examinations for graduate
and professional school admissions. The college career,
ungraded and unstandardized, will have no influence. The
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three-year program allows a fourth year for concentrated
preparation and specialized course work. Further, the
elimination of the baccalaureate degree may lead to a lessening
of class consciousness. Wolff points out that
the B.A. stamps a man as a candidate in good
standing for the middle class. It is the great
social divider that distinguishes the working
class from the middle class, (p. 151)
Eliminate this and you erase the mark that separates those who
went to work straight out of high school from those who spent
several further years in study. The only degrees (and there
would be plenty) would be professional degrees attesting to
occupation competence.
In the last stage, the professional and graduate schools,
Wolff advances two reforms: First
, to sever the institutional
connections between professional schools and universities; and
Second
,
to abolish the Ph.D., replacing it with a three year
professional degree certifying competence to teach at the college
or graduate level.
For reasons detailed in the university ideal as a training
camp fur the professions — divided loyalties, the certifying
function — Wolff, as Hutchins, proposes a separation of the
professional and undergraduate functions. How this separation
should be effected, he acknowledges, is an enormously
complicated task. At least, he suggests, we should adopt as a
working principle that new or emerging professional programs
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ought to be separate, and that our goal should be separation of
the established schools when possible.
The Ph.D., discussed in the same ideal, is currently a
victim of the oontradlotion Inherent in the attempt to combine
professional training and certification with the initiation of
scholars into the aotivites of intellectual creation.
Time, energy, and enthusiasm are squandered on
pseudotasks which accomplish nothing and fool no
one. (p. 153)
Again, the solution is to not only recognize, but to acknowledge
the obvious. Since the Ph.D. has become a certificate of
(alleged) competence in the professional role of college teacher,
or competence in other areas, and only rarely does it honestly
signify the successful completion of an original contribution of
scholarship to a body of knowledge, Wolff suggests we concentrate
on the former and reserve the latter for those happy occasions
where interest, time, money, and resources meet. By abolishing
the Ph.D. and replacing it with a three year professional degree
we would enable both students and faculty to concentrate, as law
and medical students, and faculty do, on the preparation for a
professional career, college teaching.
Wolff’s proposals, in his own words, fall short of the
ideal. He acknowledges the unavoidable fact of certification in
America.
But by making high school performance irrelevant
to college admission, by making college
performance irrelevent to graduate admission, and
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by removing professional training from the
curriculum, we can transform
competition and certification from a way of lifeinto a limited activity directly related to the
student’s self-interest, (p. 155)
Wolff’s analysis of the state of higher education, like
Hutchins’, provides strong support for my thesis. While Wolff
stops far short of an historical analysis (it is not necessary to
his critique), he clearly identifies the perversion of the
process of higher education by the connection of the
institutions, faculties, disciplines, and majors to the job
market. Like Hutchins, he sees a dramatic separation of the
undergraduate career as a solution. Hutchins opted for the
classical university form, retaining the ’’learned professions,”
but Wolff goes further — all professional training should stand
apart. He foregoes a specific curriculum (Hutchins proposed the
’’great books”) for a three year undergraduate program of
intellectual exploration. Finally, Wolff clearly sees the
connectedness of all the institutions of education and how that
has warped our opportunities for the sort of education I have
been exploring.
Yet, the whole issue of values, and of publicly
demonstrating them is side-stepped. In his chapter on governance
Wolff proposes ’’All Power to the Faculty and Students.” He
assumes that the faculty and students will act in a fashion that
is as or more responsible to the ’’values” of the Ideal
University. But what he’s talking about is power, who has it.
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and the process of using it. The ends for which it is used are
not addressed. We cannot assume, given the state of education
that we have discovered, that it will be used nobly.
^ Ki^» innovation. Both Hutchins and Wolff proposed
significant and fundamental changes in the structure and content
of higher education. Robert L. Belknap and Richard Kuhns (1977)
provide an analysis of the current attempt by Columbia to address
the very concerns expressed by Wolff and Hutchins. Tradition and
Innovation : General Education and the Reintegration of the
University
,
reiterates the now-familiar themes of criticism:
"American universities have changed aimlessly in
response to a series of crises since World War
II."
"The current financial crisis has fragmented the
universities and restricted the choices open to
them .
"
"Universities and schools have lost their common
sense of what kind of ignorance is unacceptable."
"Our educational system isolates training from
education and gives training place of honor."
"We also isolate the disciplines from one
another."
"This educational disintegration works together
with other social and intellectual trends to
produce a widespread mindlessness." (p. vii)
Belknap and Kuhns detail the corrective efforts of a major
American institution through a general education program. It is
important to remember that this is a contemporary solution, or
attempt at a solution, and is not a proposal for reform. Their
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introduction sounds grand and full of promise. They intend to
show that many professionals in America and others in responsible
positions have very litle real education. They intend, as well,
to offer a version of general education as an antidote to both
the failure to educate, and the lack of attention and will that
contributed to that failure.
We define general education as — education. Its
opposite, in this context, is training. We train
doctors, lawyers, historians, or physicists, but
we educate human beings. We can even train
animals, but we educate only human beings.
• . . this book argues that education without
training is impossible, but that but that
training without education is disastrous, (p. 3)
The actual means of accomplishing this objective are
disappointing. In fact, there is no fundamental change in the
undergraduate life of Columbia. There has been at Columbia,
since 1894 under Dean John Van Amringe, an active commitment to
the job of "making men." This phrase did not concern the
development of specialist-scholars or professional men, but, as
Lionel Trilling phrased it;
it aimed to teach them to look before and after,
an in general to use their minds in ways which
are appropriate to civil existence. In all his
annual reports Van Amringe asserted his belief
that this aim was forwarded by liberal
undergraduate education, and he resisted all
efforts to curtail its scope, (cited in Belknap
and Kunhs, 1977, p. 46)
In 1919 a course called Contemporary Civilization was
designed to provide Columbia freshman with the cultural and
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intellectual background to intelligently participate in the
political and ideological debates surrounding World War I. All
undergraduates had to take the course which met four times a week
as a discussion group dealing with a fixed reading list. The
three guiding questions for the discussions were:
"How have men made a living?"
"How have they lived together?"
"How have they interpreted the world they lived in?" (p. 48)
In the 1930s another general course, Humanities
,
was added.
In the upper classes, there was the junior-senior Colloquium, a
two-year sequence of seminars led by humanities faculty, and
populated by a small number of students carefully screened and
selected.
After World War II there was a general expansion of
Contemporary Civilization and Humanities into a two-year sequence
of general education. The science departments, although efforts
were made, never produced a common course.
After the sophomore year, except for the junior-senior
Colloquium, general education at Columbia existed only at the
post-doctoral level, in the University seminars. In 1975 there
were more than sixty such seminars dealing with topics like
"Content and Methods of the Social Sciences," "Genetics and the
Evolution of Man," and "Drugs and Society." The seminars are
voluntary groups of Columbia faculty and off-campus specialists
from academic and non-academic institutions, alike. The intent
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here is to continue one’s "education" at the point where even
training has ended.
My criticism of Columbia’s program is not that it continues,
but that it is, essentially, a marginal program that has to
constantly struggle to remain in existence even though it truly
affects, on the junior and senior levels for example, a very
small number of undergraduates.
The realities of higher education in general, and providing
a general education program in particular, are clear: Peter Gay,
then a history professor at Yale, describes it this way:
with the early 1960s things began to change. We
became more professional, which is to say, more
self-centered. The senior faculty dropped away;
most of the junior faculty wished that it, too,
could drop away. Word got around that promotion,
let alone tenure, depended on performance in
departmental courses, and above all in
publication, both of them impeded by
concentration on general education. Generalists
became rare; they were, by and large, potential
failures or real suckers. Prestige attached, not
to getting into general education, but to getting
out of it. (cited in Belknap and Kuhns, 1977, p.
62 )
Belknap and Kuhns recognize the problem. The Humanities and
Contemporary Civilization courses have no staff of their own but
still "must go begging among chairmen of departments every year"
(p. 62). And the administration exploits general education by
staffing it with graduate students.
The authors claim a remedy, though. In the Fall of 1973 a
series of seminars was initiated to discuss the nature, goals.
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and techniques of general education. In the next year the
Thursday Seminars, as they were called, explored examples of
particular courses and programs which had proved or might prove
effective in general education. The next two years were devoted
to: the professions and professionalism, and the teaching of
science to both scientists and nonsolentlsts; and liberalism and
liberal education.
In order to advance general education in the graduate
schools Columbia established seminars whose staff and students
come from the professional schools and the arts and sciences
faculties, particularly the humanities. And there are other
efforts by Columbia, as well, e.g., interdisciplinary institutes.
The sum of all of this effort, however, is that Belknap and
Kuhns, and the faculty and administration
are anxious not to threaten the existing
disciplines and we realize, as we have already
said, that any outside activity costs professors
and students time and energy which their chief
disciplines desperately need. We see general
education as a complement to traditional
scholarly disciplines, (p. 88)
Because of that it is peripheral to the real business of Columbia
which is the preparation of students for graduate school, or
other vocations. It is clear, from all that we have seen to this
point, that graduate schools, by increasing entrance requirements
(in order to winnow the expanding numbers of applicants) have
dramatically altered the course of undergraduate study. At one
time, admission to graduate study in English Literature required
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no more than a B.A. from a reputable institution. Now, specific
courses, or a B.A. English Literature is required for
entrance. Colleges seeking to get their students into good
graduate departments have to comply or they will no longer get
good students.
The colleges, then, increase their emphasis on the "major",
and force a focus in the disciplines. This is done at the
necessary expense of general education. In the process, the
overall education, not to mention the courses in the major,
becomes less liberal.
Finally, we must recognize that this effort, outlined by
Belknap and Kuhns, modest though it is, is confined to a kind of
an institution (Columbia) that represents less than one percent
of American higher education. And that provides no encouragement
or comfort at all. We can be thankful that the authors
appreciate the problem (v. their impressive opening remarks), but
we should be critical of their conclusions.
The Pursuit of the Pigskin
In one of my favorite malaprop stories, a
colleague told me of a piece of advice he
received from an old family friend, as he was
about to embark on his college career:
"You’ve gotta get that pigskin, Billy," he was
told. "You’ll never get a good job, you’ll never
get paid what you’re worth, without that
pigskin."
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While the connection between jobs and higher education is a
source of concern for some critics, and has been shown to have a
definite and pejorative effect on liberal learning, very little
has been done to attack the notion that the connection is
necessary. In fact, apologists for the liberal arts often try to
justify their curriculum preference on the grounds of utility.
An interesting question, however, has to do with that
perceived utility. In providing skilled technicians, has
American higher education really become more closely aligned with
the needs of the American economy?
Roger L. Geiger (1980) suggests that there are three basic
configurations in the proposed relationship between an
instrumental education and the intended occupation (p. 23):
1 . If an instrumental education makes a worker sufficiently
more productive in his job to cover the wage premium
paid for that education, then it would obviously be
economically justified.
2. If an instrumental graduate merely displaces another
graduate by receiving priority in the labor queue for a
training opportunity, then the situation is equivalent
to a zero-sum game.
3. If an instrumental graduate displaces someone with less
education without becoming more effective in the
workplace, then the result is the inflation of the
credential associated with that position.
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Geiger goes on to state that "Credential inflation
necessarily involves social costs, even though individuals with
credentials may prove to be beneficiaries" (p. 23). The
traditional professions are not imbued with self-doubt. They
have a base of theoretical knowlege that is taught effectivly in
the classroom (although we know that the teaching only recently
moved into the classroom, for some). Where there is an
amorphous, or nontechnical, or recently emerging profession, the
nexus between theory and application, however, becomes tenuous or
suspect. This can be overcome with time, but generally, the
desire for formalized, "professional" training precedes the
existence of the body of knowlege. Geiger cites the teaching of
business courses in higher education as an example.
Business schools have made some progress in
developing a theoretical and recondite curriculum
by incorporating organizational analysis,
quantitative techniques, game theory, and the
case method; however, the real significance of
most business education continues to be as a
normative control. Moreover, for most
nontechnical professional programs the
relationship between course work and real work
remains uncertain, (p. 53)
That the requirements for the degree are not releveant to
the actual requirements of the profession does not deter students
from enrolling. What they know, and what the faculty in those
disciplines constantly reinforce, in the quest for those
enrollments, in the justification of the discipline, is that
those majors receive priority in the labor queue. Or, for those
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who continue their education, direct rewards in the form of
promotion or salary increments for completing advanced degrees or
courses — in the right fields.
The consequences are predictable; in order to compete more
effectively for students, colleges and universities must shape
their curricula to meet instrumental ends. Their success will be
determined by enrollments, which in turn will be shaped by the
hiring end of the labor queue. The more narrowly trained will
move to the front of the line.
But, which line? What happens when high technology fades,
and a new industry emerges, demanding trained workers? Can
institutions of higher education afford to chase employment
cycles?
And what about education?
For more than three hundred years, higher education in
America has grown at a rate that, generally, exceeded the growth
rate of the overall population (Carnegie Commission on Higher
education, 1971). Table 1, Undergraduate degree-credit
enrollment, 1870-2000, shows actual and projected enrollments
collected and developed by the Carnegie Commission staff:
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TABLE 1
UNDERGRADUATE DEGREE - CREDIT ENROLLMENT
1870 - 2000 (N = thousands)
YEAR N Percentage change
1870 52
1880 116 122
1890 154 33
1900 232 50
1910 346 49
1029 582 68
1930 1,053 81
1940 1,388 32
1950 2,422* 74
1960 3,227 33
1970 6,840 112
1980 10,080 48
1990 9,660 -4
2000 12,700 31
^Includes 898,000 veterans of World War II.
The figures used by the Commission were actual to 1970, and
profected, 1980 to 200. The average rate of change for each
decade is 56 percent. One could conclude that higher education
constitutes a growth segment of the United States economy.
Certainly, that rate of growth is going to slow as the pool of
young adults diminishes.
An important underpinning of that growth has been the
confidence of the American public that education represents a
means to a better life through a "good" job, prestige, and buying
power. In the period 1970-1976, for example, the percentage
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changes in enrollments wer 4.3, 3.0, 4.3, 6.5, 9.4 and
-0.7
respectively (Magarell, 1980). This growth was in spite of a
declining birth rate and declining numbers of live births for the
years 1962-1967
,
when those incoming students would have been
born, as seen in Table 2;
TABLE 2
BIRTH RATE AND LIVE BIRTHS (IN THOUSANDS)
UNITED STATES, 1962 -1967
YEAR BIRTH RATE* LIVE BIRTHS
1962 22.4 4,167
1963 21
.7 4,098
1964 21 .0 4,027
1965 19.4 3,760
1966 18.4 3,606
1967 17.8 3,521
*Live births per 1,000 population.
(Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1971)
The 1976 enrollment decline was the first since 1951, which
(see Table 1) was the first year after an enrollment of over 2.4
million, including 898,000 veterans. In 1977, enrollments rose
2.6 percent, dropped again by 0.2 percent in 1978, increased 2.8
percent in 1979, and showed an overall increase of 3.8 percent in
the fall of 1980 (Magarell, 1980). According to the National
Center for Education Statistics the estimated total enrollment in
institutions of higher education for fall, 1980, was 12,087,200.
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While their estimates of actual enrollments differed
significantly from those projected in 1971 by the Carnegie
Commission (13,500,000), and while Magarell's survey of
enrollment trends differed from the 3.2 percent increase shown by
the National Center, the overall picture of the decade of the
1970s shows enrollments rising while the pool of 18 year olds
/
falls. The ten-year average percentage change was 3.5.
In his analysis of the 1980 enrollment data Magarell (1980)
reported that the economic recession and a concomitant lack of
part-time job opportunities appeared to have encouraged more
people to enroll full-time, and the same conditions apparently
operated to encourage enrollments overall. The last time that
happened was in 1975, when the enrollment change of 9.4 was
thought by some to reflect the similar recession conditions of
that period (Magarell, 1980).
This confidence in the vocational training provided by
higher education is viewed with dismay by some. The Special Task
Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (1973)
observed
:
The very fact that we think about "career
education" and talk about the value of schooling
in terras of an investment that will yield future
earnings indicates not only how important work
has become in our thinking, but how other
motivating forces have been de-emphasized.
Formal education, for example, was once conceived
of much more as "preparation for life," whether
or not it led to a specific job. (pp. 136-137)
Yet, data such as that in Table 3, Unemployment Rates by
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Educational Level (Fact File, 1981) reinforce the belief in the
nexus between the academy and the workplace.
But, is this belief well founded? We know from the
historical review of the development of higher education in
Chapter II of the intrusion of Utility, and, from earlier
sections of this chapter how higher education was coopted by
industry in search for engineering training. In Chapter IV it
will be demonstrated how important job placement records are to
campus administrators. The employer, therefore, is an important
factor in the development of higher education, because the
employer’s use of educational requirements to control the hiring
queue has consequences in enrollments, majors, faculty hiring and
tenure decisions, and, ultimately, the very nature of the
institution of higher education.
There are critics of this relationship who say that the
explosion of highly credentialled graduates has outstripped the
number of jobs actually requiring such credentials. I’ve already
cited the Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare (1973). One of their conclusions bears
repeating: ’’The market value of education has driven out its
other values. One consequence of this has been to require,
needlessly, ever-higher credentials for the same work” (p. 13^).
Ivar Berg (1971) came to the same conclusion:
these data imply that we may be able to absorb
more highly educated people by redefining the
requirements for employment, if not the job
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itself, and thus, in the fashion of Humpty
Dumpty, make the content of work what we say it
is. (p. 68)
What Berg found out, in his research and the research of others,
is that executives responsible for hiring practices made several
unexamined assumptions about college graduates. The "unifying
theme" was that having completed a four year college program
demonstrated one's self-discipline and stability.
To a man, the respondents assured us that
diplomas and degrees were a good thing, that they
were used as screening devices by which
undesirable employment applicants could be
identified, and that the credentials sought were
indicators of personal commitment to "good
middle-class values," industriousness, and
seriousness of purpose, as well as salutary
personal habits and styles, (p. 78)
According to Berg, none of the companies had analyzed the
educational achievements of its personnel in order to correlate
factors like turnover, absenteeism, productivity, grievance
patterns, job satisfaction, supervisor's evaluations, or any
other performance factors that might justify the continued use of
background and educational credentials for hiring purposes.
Because of the lack of critical self-examination by the
hiring firms Berg was unimpressed with arguments about rapidly
changing job requirements or the "quality" that college graduates
provide. Given this, the data in Table 3 seem merely a
self-fulfilling prophecy. There appears no genuine or necessary
correlation between all that education and employment. In fact,
it is clear that a significant and negative result of this
180
inflation of requirements is to isolate that group of Americans
with modest educational requirements. They are placed in the
position of having to play catch-up ball, or settling for
temporary employment or permanent welfare. Needlessly.
Berg cites research conducted by the Opinion Research
Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey, into the attitudes of
engineers and scientists. These professional personnel,
approximately 620, were employed in the six largest manufacturers
of heavy electrical equipment and appliances. The data showed
that income in each company was tied to educational level,
although more so in some companies than others. The mean income
for Ph.D.s was uniformly much higher than the mean income for
other educational groupings. The standard .-deviation of incomes
was smaller between M.A.s and Ph.D.s than among individuals with
less education, which would indicate that income for the latter
group was determined by factors other than education (e.g.,
performance), while the former educational groups were paid
primarily on the basis of their degrees.
men with master’s degrees who were designated by
management as among 20 percent of their
scientists who were "relatively most valuable in
terms of present performance and potential" were
paid an average salary which was $1, 000 less than
that paid to Ph.D.'s, who were reportedly less
valuable. Other data show that Ph.D.'s are paid
substantially more even when they are younger and
less experienced.
Berg's conclusion, then, is that we have set up a situation
where a new elite may emerge. In the past, the Liberal Culture
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was seen as elitist. Now, it is the Ph.D. in engineering or
business. Or, those individuals who have completed two-year or
four-year training programs that result in a credential, a
credential that provides entry into one of the desired jobs.
In Chapter IV, we will look closely at one institution, the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst, to see how it responds to
the external pressures of politics, funding, and enrollments,
among others, in the shaping of its academic programs.
CHAPTER IV
PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION
IN MASSACHUSETTS; AN EXEMPLARY CASE
In other words, ... even if we sacrifice the
letter of the old Bachelor of Arts degree, we
should strive to preserve its spirit. This
spirit is threatened at present in manifold ways
-- by the upward push of utilitarianism and
kindergarten methods
,
by the downward push of
professionalism and specialization, by the almost
irresistable pressure of commercial and
industrial influences. If we sacrifice both the
letter and the spirit of the degree, we should at
least do so deliberately, and not be betrayed
through mere carelessness into some educational
scheme that does not distinguish sufficiently
between man and an electric dynamo.
(Babbitt, 1908, pp. 115-116)
In 1839
,
the legislature of Massachusetts appropriated money
for the state’s first publicly supported institutions of higher
learning. These were "normal" schools, or institutions for
teacher training, located in Framingham, a suburb of Boston, and
Westfield, in the western half of the state.
In 1863
,
under the federal Land-Grant provision, the
Massachusetts Agricultural School was incorporated and located in
Amherst. It became Massachusetts State College in 1931, and in
1947 it was chartered as the University of Massachusetts.
Between 1839 and 1980, the Commonwealth developed 28
four-year and two-year public colleges, with the overwhelming
percentage of intitiation and growth in the last twenty years.
There are now ten state colleges, including eight that emerged.
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like Framingham State and Westfield State, from normal schools,
and two that have traditional and narrow career focuses, the
Massachusetts Maritime Academy, and the Massachusetts College of
Art
.
The 15 community colleges were begun in the 1950s; these and
Southeastern Massachusetts University and the University of
Lowell (both the result of mergers of smaller institutions the
University of Lowell, for example, is the product of a marriage
of Lowell State College and Lowell Institute of Technology)
provide a very local perspective on higher education.
It is the University of Massachusetts, however, that best
demonstrates the tensions and trends of American higher education
smong these institutions. By studying the growth and development
of this institution, from a delimited and purposeful agricultural
college through its attempts to be the multiversity celebrated in
the 1970s, to its present state, I will show the trends and
consequences I have identified in the preceding chapters.
The University of Massachusetts ; 1862 - 1970
The history of the University of Massachusetts is rooted in
the agricultural and land-grant movement. Eddy (1956) notes that
the first mention of the necessity of studying agriculture in the
college curriculum was in a prospectus for King’s College (later
Columbia University) about 175^. By 1792, the state legislature
had granted funds to Columbia for a professorship in agriculture.
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In the first half of the nineteenth century, Harvard
received a bequest from Benjamin Bussey for
a course of instruction in practical agriculture,
in useful and ornamental gardening in botany, and
in such other branches of science as may be tried
to promote a knowledge of practical agriculture
and the various subservient arts thereto. (Eddy,
1956, p. 13)
Nothing came of it.
In 1825, Edward Hitchcock recommended state support for the
establishment of a four year Massachusetts Agricultural College.
In 1856, the legislature finally acted, creating the "Trustees of
the Massachusetts School of Agriculture," and gave it the
commission of "holding, maintaining, and conducting an
experimental farm and school . . . with all needful buildings,
library, apparatus, and appurtenances, for the promotion of
agricultural and horticulture art within this Commonwealth"
(Eddy, 1956, p. 20). As we have seen, however, the Morrill Act
was necessary to bring this institution into being.
The first president of the Massachusetts Agricultural
College (M.A.C.), was Henry F. French of Exeter, New Hampshire.
He was not an educator, but a lawyer and gentleman farmer. A
Dartmouth graduate, he had secured a reputation for his
experiments in soil improvement. He had also written several
articles for the New England Farmer , and in 1859 he published
Farm Drainage . His leadership was short-lived, and in 1865 he
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resigned in the midst of squabbles over campus design and
building architecture: the first class had not yet arrived.
Paul A Chadbourne, professor of chemistry and natural history at
Williams College was his successor. it was Chadbourne who
provided leadership for the first curriculum of the college.
"The day has gone for robbing the earth, the
hills and valleys of the old Bay State, and then
deserting her for the West," wrote Chadbourne.
"We think the day is coming when she will
understand her own interest, now so much
neglected. In that college we shall find the
sons of many professional men who have learned
the blessings of a farmer's life. ... If
agriculture can be brought to that standard where
it ought ever to be found ... it will certainly
equal the learned professions as a field of
intellectual enjoyment." (Cary, 1962, p. 34)
When the College opened its doors on October 2, 1867, it was
focusing on the practical application of the arts and sciences to
the business of agriculture. The fifty-six students that
comprised the pioneer freshman class spent their mornings in
lectures and recitations, and their afternoons in the fields.
For the duration of his four years, the "Aggie"
student followed a curriculum which included the
fundamentals in the fields of mathematics and
civil engineering, chemistry, botany and zoology,
English grammar, rhetoric and literature. Some
breadth was added to his education by requiring
him to study the French and German languages
(twenty weeks of study for each), and by giving
him introductions to history, government,
economics, logic, and philosophy. (Cary, 1962, p.
41)
By the end of the 1893-94 academic year. President Henry
Hill Goodell was completing his eighth year in office, was a
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member of the Executive Committee of the Association of American
Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations, and had two
agricultural experiment stations under his Jurisdiction. Thirty
three seniors graduated that year, and senior year electives had
been implemented. And in a survey conducted in 1888, 123 of 278
living graduates of the College were active in agricultural
pursuits (Rand, 1933, pp. 84-85; 206).
Under the presidency of Kenyon L. Butterfield (1906-1924),
the College became a leader in agricultural education in the
United States. By 1916, the four-year enrollment was 668, and
there were 275 course offerings. There was a winter school and a
two-year program. Seventy two instructors taught full time.
Moreover (Butterfield) has established the
primacy of agriculture throughout the whole
institution. He glories in the fact that M.A.C.
is the only college in the United States devoted
exclusively to agriculture. He has stamped the
trademark of ruralism upon every department, upon
every employee, upon every course. His chemistry
is "agricultural chemistry;" his economics is
"agricultural economics;" his journalism is
"rural Journalism;" . . . there is even a course
in "rural literature." (Rand, 1933, P* 139)
By the time Butterfield left, his replacement, acting
President Edward Lewis, could refute those critics who felt the
College had strayed from its original purpose. The curriculum
contained no Latin, less English, less foreign language, only one
faculty member to teach economics and government, "and only
one-tenth of a student’s total time required in other than
agricultural subjects" (Cary, 1962, p. 145). But there were
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critics in other corners, and Lewis and his successor, Roscoe
Thatcher, had to respond to those who wanted broader admission
and curriculum policies. The critics Included students, alumni,
and industrial centers. What they wanted was a university, or at
least a state college that would award the Bachelor of Arts
degree.
The name was changed in 1931 to Massachusetts State College,
but it took five years of lobbying within and without to effect
any changes in the curriculum. By 1935 a faculty committee
submitted a report recommending the liberalization of the
College’s program.. This included combining the divisions of
agriculture and horticulture, establishing a division of physical
science and mathematics, and another division of biological
science, and strengthening the division of humanities and the
division of social sciences. While few of these recommendations
were ever implemented, a department of engineering was set up in
1936, incorporating the rural engineering that had been developed
in 1914, and the civil engineering thathad been offered since
1867 by the mathematics department. One can only say that the
committee’s report, while not received with ardor, was at least
prophetic.
Following World War II, there were sufficient conditions in
conjunction to favor the establishment of a university. The
increase in numbers of potential students — both in terms of
population and of desire for college training — the emphasis on
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education for professional needs, and the support of the State
Grange, the Farm Bureau Federation, American Legion, Veterans of
Foreign Wars, and various union organizations combined to force
passage of a bill on May 6, 19^17, creating the University of
Massachusetts.
The fifteenth president of the institution, and the man who
guided the University through the 1960s, was John W. Lederle. In
his inaugural address, he pledged to keep the University's pace
at a par with the national growth in higher education:
I have come to feel that what we have here is
potentially a giant. I do not mean merely a
bricks and mortar giant, but a great public
center for excellence in higher education in this
region. (Cary, 1962, p. 198)
In i960 the University was no giant but it had grown considerably
from the days of French, Chadbourne, Goodell, and Butterfield.
There were 6,500 students, and 580 faculty. The College of Arts
and Sciences was surrounded by six other colleges and schools
offering vocational curricula. And there was a strong faculty
commitment to growth.
In 1962, the Long Range Planning Committee issued its
Report . They noted that the enrollment for that year was 7,^50:
6,600 undergraduates, and 850 graduate students. Their
projections for the fall of 1976 were: total enrollment —
21,400; undergraduate enrollment — 17,415 (8lJ); graduate
enrollment — 3,985 (19$).
They also listed four major objectives for the University:
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1. High quality university education at low cost;
2. Establish the University as the graduate training center
of public higher education in the Commonwealth; serve as
the primary center for research, and as a major center
for professional training;
3* Develop public service;
4. Serve as the capstone of publicly supported institutions
of higher education in Massachusetts (Long Range
Academic Planning Committee, 1962, pp. 10-12).
These are not modest goals, and it is to the credit of the
University, its faculty and administrators, that most of them
have been met. The real questions, however, have to do with the
cost of realizing those objectives. With this rapid progress
through the first 110 years of the University’s history we can
now consider the decade of of the 1970s with more care and more
understanding.
The University of Massachusetts : 1970 - 1980
The Board of Trustees of the University of Massachusetts,
having opened a campus in 1965 in Boston with a liberal arts
focus, established a central office with a new president and an
extensive staff in 1970. The new president of the University
system was Dr. Robert C. Wood, a political scientist and
urbanologist
,
former undersecretary of Housing and Urban
Development under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and former MIT
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professor.
Under Wood, the University continued the rapid growth
initiated by Lederle in the late 1960s: a new, main Boston
campus was established, on the harbor, the Kennedy family decided
to locate the John F. Kennedy Library on the grounds of the
harbor campus, a medical school that was established in Worcester
in 1962, and opened in 1965 (over the protests of the highly
influential private universities in Massachusetts) expanded, and
the legislature appropriated budgets to accomodate that growth,
even when, as the economy slowed, the governor recommended cuts.
future university report . At his inauguration as President,
Wood announced the appointment of a Committee on the Future
University "to advise him and the Trustees on the nature and
direction of the future University of Masssachusetts" (Report of
the President’s Committee on the Future University of
Massachusetts, 1971). The committee was asked to examine a
university that had quadrupled its enrollments in the 1960s —
total 1970 enrollment at Amherst was 20,732, at Boston, 4,241,
and at the fledgling Medical School in Worcester there were 16
students — and anticipated doubling again in size in the 1970s:
The questions we seek to anwer, briefly, are who
will attend, what they will be taught, where they
will study, when in their lives they will
participate, and how the institution will serve
the Commonwealth beyond its students, (p. 51)
The committee acknowledged the public role of the state’s
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University, as well as the debate that was going on, even then,
of the proper role of universities, in general: the committee
decided that
universities should be responsive rather
disengaged, appliers as well as creators of
knowlege, questioners as well as conservers of
values, (p. 52)
Their recommendations embraced five key concepts: accessibility,
diversity of academic programs, undergraduate teaching as a
special priority, service to the public, and productivity in the
use of resources.
Much of the language in the report clearly established
directions for the University’s academic program. For example,
while decrying the credentialing role that higher education had
assumed, the committee pointed out the responsibility of higher
education to provide ’’upward mobility and job attainment.”
the learning process in the seventies must
reflect the complexity of society, its technology
and its problems. In the public university
especially, this means creating a somewhat more
professional and more problem-solving orientation
to learning, stressing that learning is a process
as much as it is a matter of acquiring specific
knowledge, (p. 7)
In the process of gathering data for the report, the
committee surveyed the faculty at the Amherst campus, and
received replies from ’’nearly half of them, an excellent
cross-section of departments and schools, of age, rank, and sex,
and of tenured and non-tenured appointees." One of the questions
provides an interesting clue to the interests of the faculty:
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Agree or Disagree or Not
ASf'ee Disagree Ascer-
Somewhat Neutral Somewhat tained
Undergraduate education
at the university should
concentrate on the liberal
arts. Professional and 24% 7% 68% 1 %
technical training should
be offered at specialized
institutions and/or
graduate programs, (p. 49 )
Given the overwhelming faculty sentiment away from the
liberal arts, it is not surprising that the committee recommended
de facto confinement of general education to a revised freshman
year program:
The academic center of the freshman year is the
core curriculum... a quarter to a third of the
freshman’s course time would be prescribed for
him in the form of three basic units, ... the
social sciences, the natural sciences, and the
humanities and arts. The rest of his time would
be spent in pursuing a number of optional
offshoots from the basic courses, with the
possibility of self-design of some of the
offshoots, (pp. 53~54)
Key to this recommendation was the establishment of "a cadre of
professors whose mission at UMass will be to excel in teaching,"
(p. 55 ) and a strong advising system.
The immediate problem with such a proposal is that the
faculty had clearly indicated that they were not interested in
the liberal arts, per se, as evidenced by the survey results,
above. Further, in the same survey, 42% surveyed thought that
funding for research was a "Serious" problem, 34% rated it a
"Moderate" problem, and only 21% felt it "minor" (p. 50). In
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other vrords, a program confining general education to the
freshman year would probably receive a great deal of lip service
from faculty but very few would volunteer to teach in such a
program. Conversely, confining general education to the freshman
year leads directly to the devotion of three undergraduate years
to a single discipline or professional/instrumental degree. The
"Minority Report" that was appended called attention to this:
The report emphasized the committee’s belief in
the principle that the liberal arts are central
to a university’s functions. But it does not
consider adequately the effect on a liberal arts
education of its recommended social service and
practical curriculum. The adoption of many of
the proposals . . . would have the effect of
limiting the time and attention a student could
give to any learning that was not immediate and
practical, (p. 125)
However, the trend toward the immediate and practical was already
well underway, as we have noted in earlier chapters.
The classification of institutions of higher education . In 1970,
the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (1973a) developed a
classification system of institutions of higher education in
America. Through this system they
sought to identify categories of colleges and
universities that would be relatively homogeneous
with respect to the functions of the institutions
as well as with respect to characteristics of
students and faculty members, (p. v)
In the system there were five main categories and a number
of sub-categories: i.e., under "1. Doctoral-Granting
Institutions" were:
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1 . 1 Research Universities I
1.2 Research Universities li
1.3 Doctoral-Granting Universities
1.4 Doctoral-Granting Universities II.
The second category, "Comprehensive Universities and Colleges,"
had two sub-categories: the third, "Liberal Arts Colleges," had
two; categories four and five were "Two-Year colleges and
Institutes," and "Professional Schools and Other Specialized
Institutions," respectively.
Table 4 is reproduced from that report, and provides a
comparison of enrollments and the number of institutions in each
category.
The University of Massachusetts at Amherst was included in
category 1.2 as a Research University II. Its enrollment in 1970
was 20,732. Six years later, parallelling national growth, the
enrollments at UM/A had increased to 23,500. Table 5 illustrates
how the patterns of enrollments had shifted nationally within the
categories of institutions.
Table 5 - Enrollment in institutions of higher education by type
of institution. United States, 1976*
Enrollment
(thousands) Percentage
Research Universities I
Research Universities II
Doctorate-Granting Universities I
Doctorate-Granting Universities!!
Comprehensive Universities and
1,144.0 16.5
802.7 11.6
804.8 11.6
304.6 4.4
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Colleges I: Public
Comprehensive Universities and
Colleges I: Private
Comprehensive Universities and
Colleges II
Liberal ArtsI
Liberal Arts II
Specialized Institutions
( undergraduate
)
Total
2,055.8 29.6
571.6 8.2
542.1 7.8
153.5 2.2
377.7 5.4
182.8 2.6
6.939.6 100.0
*Not including two-year colleges, predominately graduate or
nondegree specialized institutions, and institutions of
nontraditional study.
SOURCE: Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education,
A Classification of Institutions of Higher Education, Revised,
Berkely, California: 1976.
If we confine our data to categories 1, 2, and 3 a
comparison of enrollments in this brief period would look like
this: (Table 6.)
In category 1
,
the largest gain in this period was made by
Research Universities II, with Research Universities I retaining
the largest share of the enrollments. Doctoral Granting
Universities lost enrollments. Overall, category 1 remained
virtually constant in terms of its share of enrollments.
Category 2 has become the dominant type of institution in
terms of enrollments with significant gains in all
sub-categories. The public and private institutions in category
2.1 are separated to show the huge percentage of enrollments in
the public sector.
Category 3 is fading in both absolute and relative terms.
Table
6
.
Comparison
of
enrollments
by
type
of
institution
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Looking at Massachusetts, institutions were categorized and
identified as follows (A Classification of Institutions, pp.
9-56):
1.1 Research Universities I;
Harvard University
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1.2 Research Universities II:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Boston University
Brandeis University
Tufts University
1.3 Doctoral-Granting Universities I:
Boston College
Northeastern University
1.4 Doctoral-Granting Universities II:
Clark University
2.1 Comprehensive Universities and Colleges I
Fitchburg State College
Framingham State College
Lowell State College
North Adams State College
Salem State College
Southeastern Massachusetts University
•American International College
•Merrimack College
•Simmons College
•Suffolk University
•Western New England College
2.2 Comprehensive Universities and Colleges II:
Boston State College
Bridgewater State College
Westfield State College
Worcester State College
•Emerson College
•Springfield College
(• = private institutions)
3.1 Liberal Arts Colleges I:
Amherst College
College of the Holy Cross
Emmanuel College
Mount Holyoke College
Newton College of the Sacred Heart
Regis College
Smith College
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Wellesley College
Wheaton College
Williams College
3.2 Liberal Arts Colleges II:
University of Massachusetts, BostonAnna Maria College for Women
Assumption College
Atlantic Union College
Cardinal Cushing College
College of our Lady of the Elms
Curry College
Eastern Nazarene College
Gordon College
Hampshire College
Hellenic College
Lesley College
Mount Alvernia College
Saint Hyacinth College-Seminary
Stonehill College
In Massachusetts, then, using the Carnegie classifications,
we find two of the nation’s 50 leading universities in terms of
federal financial support of academic science, and which awarded
at least 50 Ph.D.'s in 1960-70 in category 1.1. In category 1.2,
one public and three private institutions were in the top 100
which met the above criteria.
Categories 1.3 and 1.4 awarded between 10 and 40 Ph.D's in
1969-70, and category 1.3 received at least $3 million in federal
support in academic years 1969-70 or 1970-71.
Category 2.1, in Massachusetts, includes institutions that
offered a "liberal arts program as well as several other
programs, such as engineering and business administration. ...
all lacked a doctoral program or had an extremely limited
doctoral program. All . . . had at least two professional or
occupational programs and enrolled at least 2,000 students in
200
1970 (p. 2), Six of the eleven insitutions are public, and five
of these are former teachers colleges that had only recently
broadened their programs to include a liberal arts curriculum.
Category 2.2 continues that relationship of public to
private: the majority of the institutions are public, with a
mission expanded beyond the teacher training or "normal" school,
although all retain at least one professional or occupational
program.
Liberal Arts colleges I, category 3.1, are those colleges
that "scored 5 or above on Astin's selectivity index (see below)
or they were included among the 200 leading
baccalaureate-granting institutions in terms of numbers of their
graduates receiving Ph.D*s at 40 leading doctoral-granting
institutions from 1920 to 1966 ..." (p. 3)
The commission acknowledged that the distinction between
liberal arts institutions and comprehensive ones was not
clear-cut. Some of the former had modest occupational programs,
but all had a strong liberal arts tradition.
Category 3.2 included all the liberal arts colleges that
did not meet the criteria for 3.1.
Because the distinctions between liberal arts and
comprehensive institutions were necessarily partly a matter of
judgement, it would be misleading to see the decline between 1970
and 1976 in the liberal arts category as an unmitigated disaster.
Further, some of the liberal arts institutions listed in the 1973
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Report were marginal, at best, in terms of quality, enrollments,
and financial status. The 1976 data reveal, in this case, not
only a decline in absolute enrollments and percentage of
enrollments, but the disappearance of many of those marginal
colleges. For example, in Massachusetts, Cardinal Cushing
College has disappeared.
Further, Harvard College, Princeton College, Columbia, and
other "liberal arts" bastions are included (with the other
colleges and schools of their institutions) under "Research
Universities I." This leaves the misleading impression that (in
Massachusetts) there are only 10 colleges in the top rank of
Liberal Arts Colleges I.
What is indisputable, however, is the gain in the
comprehensive institutions and the overall decline of the liberal
arts colleges.
This trend is underscored if we examine the shift in
baccalarureate degrees for the period in question. In Table 7,
developed by Geiger (1980) (based on Digest of Educational
Statistics data) we can clearly see a move away from degrees in
(’Astin's selectivity index is based on National Merit
Scholarship Qualifying Test Scores for all students who took the
NMSQT in 1964 classified according to the college of their first
choice. From these distributions of scores, it was possible to
estimate both the mean and the standard deviation of the scores
of students actually entering each college by making certain
adjustments in the data. For additional details, see Appendix C
of A. W. Astin, Predicting Academic Performance in College (The
Free Press, New York, 1971*")
Table
7.
Bachelor's
Degrees
Awarded
by
American
Colleges
and
Universities
by
Subject
(N
=
thousands)
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what Geiger labels "disciplinary” majors and toward those degrees
he calls "instrumental."
The growth and direction of public higher education in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, including the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, was being determined in this critical
period.
inissions and goals report . In April, 1976, the Commission on
Missions and Goals of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst
issued its report, "Public Service Through Academic Excellence."
The Commission, in its Foreword, pointed out that the Amherst
campus was "the only state institutuion providing both liberal
arts and professional programs from the freshman year to the
doctoral level" (p. 2). The Commission had been established to
clarify the nature of the service mission of the state’s
University. In so doing, it demonstrated the increasing
murkiness of academic life. That is, the feeling that higher
education had always accomodated, and could always accomodate,
the broad and broadening spectrum of disciplines, programs, and
professional training that they found in their review of the
University and other institutions in the state.
Looking at the nearly 25,000 students and 2,500 faculty and
professional staff, the Commission saw "a complex division of
labor where seemingly conflicting elements become complementary
and reinforcing" (p. 4). The undergraduate program was seen as
204
particularly significant in this complementary world;
All areas of undergraduate education share the
common goal of providing a liberal education to
equip students for intelligent, mature lives in
the community. A graduate of UMA should have a
broad sense of the world of knowledge, along with
sufficient scholarly skills, intellectual
discipline, and self-awareness to pursue a
lifetimeof continued learning. . . . Before
students . . . move towards specialization in any
area or career, they are expected to have learned
the fundamentals of a broad range of disciplines
in the physical and natural sciences, social
sciences, humanities and fine arts. Their
awareness will have been sharpened by the
discipline of scientific method, and by
acquaintance with the various forms of ideas and
imagination manifest through philosophy, history,
the arts, and literature. They will also have
been exposed to a range of values important to
developing an awareness of their roles as
individuals, as career specialists, and as
members of society, (p. 5)
The report went on to point out that students are concerned
with employment opportunities when they graduate, and that
individual departments should be prepared to advise majors on the
best methods for integrating their disciplinary work with career
options. It sounded as if the future university that had been
sketched out in 1971 had been realized. Yet, while the Commission
saw UMA as a "flexible, adaptable, and open academic community,"
(p. 9) at no point did they analyze enrollment trends, either in
Amherst, or nationally, nor did they seem concerned with the
clear and loud and insistent voices in the trade journals of
higher education proclaiming the decaying state of the liberal
arts. This was never mentioned in the report. Indeed, in terms
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of critical recorarnandations
,
the report seemed most concerned
with preserving the campus’ perceived role as the "flagship" of
the University system, and the fiscal automomy of public higher
education. They cited the need, the responsibility of
maintaining a major research library; they implied the necessity
of expanding the graduate program, of admitting more out-of-state
students (there had been a trend of some years standing that the
better students tended to come from out-of-state), and reducing
the student faculty ratio from 18:1 back to 15:1. Simply put,
the report read like a pastiche of opinions made from the
security and sanctity of a wide variety of disciplines. Which it
was. The sum of those opinions had been shaped into a
non-threatening and not very insightful document. It said, "Let
us continue to do what we want to do. Someone else can take care
of the big picture."
The Puryear report . In his September, 1977 convocation speech to
the Amherst campus. Chancellor Randolph W. Bromery addressed the
future of public higher education in Massachusetts:
It's often been said that the only thing that’s
absolutely certain in this world is that there
will always be change with time. This is
especially true in higher education, and it is
even more true this year for the University of
Massachusetts. The school year of 1977-78 will
be a critical one of transition for this
University. (Bromery, 1977, p» 1)
In a little more than a year since the platitudes of the
Commission on Missions and Goals report, the Chancellor was
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referring to the resignation of the President, Robert C. Wood,
who had commissioned the Future of the University Report; he was
referring to the process of collective bargaining that was going
on for the first time at the University; and he was also
referring to the rumblings in the legislature of a total
reorganization of public higher education.
The Chancellor urged unity in this period of change:
During this period in our history, with all its
ambiguities and opportunities, its uncertainties
and its potential, every unit and individual in
the University community is going to have to join
hands with every other. We are going to have to
pull together this year to improve ourselves and
our prospects
,
indeed to safeguard our very
existence as an institution of higher learning.
(Bromery, 1977, p. 5)
The Chancellor did -not directly address the most immediate
and divisive issue, however, the "Long-Range Plan" that was being
directed by Provost Paul L. Puryear.
Puryear took office in October, 1976, and one of his
immediate tasks was to put together a long-range plan for the
Amherst campus. Puryear stated, "It was made clear to me that
the new Provost would be expected to move in two or three
directions" (Puryear, 1981). Puryear had been told by the
President’s office that a planning process had to be initiated,
that previous attempts hadn’t been "serious" (the Missions and
Goals Report seems to bear that out), and the campus must be made
to take a hard look at the future, which was going to be a move
away from the arts and sciences and toward the professional
I
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schools
.
"The way I saw it," Puryear later said, "the shift was not
only to the professional schools, but, in a secondary sense,
toward the Humanities, (toward) those departments that were
underfunded and student pressures were there."
So, it would not simply be a matter of reallocation from one
sector of the campus to the other. A further complication was
the changing complexion of the Board of Trustees. Up until 1974,
the board had been wholly supportive of President Wood. It
agreed with Wood that the University should move into a "planning
mode," and map out the next five or ten years of the University.
This meant, initially, planning a decade of expansion. The
language and tone of both the Future of the University Report
(1971) and the Missions and Goals Report (1976) reflect that
confidence in growth. But with the election of Governor Michael
Dukakis in 1974, and the subsequent appointment of new Trustees,
the mood on the Board began to shift, and by 1976, when Puryear
arrived in Amherst, the Board was not anti-planning, but
anti-Wood, and therefore, anti-expansion. This meant, said
Puryear, a "change to the momentum of the planning process."
In mid-December, 1976, Puryear was summoned to the
President's office in Boston and told that the timetable had been
speeded up. The Board of Trustees wanted long-range plans
submitted around the first of February. "We then had to go to a
crash mode," said Puryear, "and put together a document under
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new constraints.” The new Provost used planning documents
submitted by the Deans of the various schools and colleges (Arts
and Sciences, which included the faculties of Humanities and Fine
Arts, Natural Sciences and Mathematics, and Social and Behavioral
Sciences; Education; Engineering; Physical Education; Business
Administration; Health Sciences; Food and Natural Resources;
there was also a Dean (Acting) for the Graduate School) in
response to the previous Provost’s request. Using those, and his
own analysis based on his understanding of trends on campus and
nationally
,
Puryear came up with a proposal that would
r'6“3llocate about 45 faculty positions (out of approximately
1,200 full time faculty positions) over a five year period, with
the majority going to the professional schools, and a few to the
Humanities.
Rationale for change . The first stage of what was characterized
as the "Puryear Report" or "Puryear Plan" was published in early
1977. In it, the Provost cited stabilized or declining
enrollments, significant shifts in course demand, nontradtional
constituencies, and a rise in "variegated demand for research
and service from the University" (Puryear, 1977, p. 1). He
stressed the fiscal uncertainty that clouded any planning, but
offered a panacea:
Long-range planning is a management technique
which has only recently come into vogue in
adademe. While the process is still little
understood, extraordinarily favorable conditions
now exist for sound and creative planning for the
I
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University's long term future. Projective
techniques have now been refined to the point
where it is possible to determine the economic
and demographic factors that will shape the
University for years to come. We can now forsake
our faith in unbridled growth and chart our
destiny on the basis of futuristic parameters
which are largely known. Given our continuing
fiscal predicament, the preservation of a
University of quality now requires that critical
academic decisions be made within a clear
analytical framework supported by rational
assumptions about the future, (p. 1)
In brief, the University must decide how it will reduce its
work force. But, more to the point, the factors that were
acknowledged as the shapers of the University were "economic and
demographic." According to Puryear (1981), at no time was he
able to sit down with the President, or any other top level
administrator of the University, and reach an understanding of
what sort of university they thought should serve the people of
Massachusetts. Clearly, the process was reactive: given certain
enrollment trends and projections, given assumptions about levels
of funding, then . . . Puryear identified the crucial variables
in the decision-making process:
student demand
enrollment trends
faculty-student ratios
faculty work load distributions
student FTE's (full time equivalents)
quality of program
quality of faculty
potentional for research. (Puryear, 1977, pp. 3-4)
According to Puryear, his plan recognized that there had
been changes in the economic structure. The economy had shifted
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from goods-producing to service-producing; the 1950s industrial
growth had turned around. As a result, the Provost felt he "had
to begin putting more resources in the 'high demand’ sectors of
the University" (Puryear, 1981). in this process the Arts and
Sciences could have qualified as "high demand," according to
Puryear. For example, the development or expansion of programs
in social policy studies by the Sociology Department; public
administration in Political Science; and links between
traditional liberal arts (e.g., languages) and some professional
schools (e.g., business).
The second point Puryear stressed involved the changed state
revenue structure. By that he meant the consistently smaller
allocations to higher education, the diminishing tendency to give
as much state revenue as had been given over the past 20 years.
This was not just a case of competing demands, but a reaction by
the legislature to the downturn in enrollments.
Puryear cited a third factor: he felt he must provide some
flexibility in the institution to handle a crisis that might loom
if the University continued to devote as much of the budget to
personnel costs. He felt that it was a mistake to make permanent
commitments (i.e., tenure) as a hedge against the day that might
require a "payback."
The provosts for the three campuses submitted their plans to
the President’s office as requested. After review at that level,
Puryear *s plan was accepted, the plan for the Medical School was
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accepted, and the plan for the Boston campus was Judged
inadequate. That meant that the Boston campus got several more
months to work on their long-range document. As Puryear said
later, the provost for the Boston campus probably did the
politically correct thing.
Puryear next released his plan to the Deans to "circulate
for discussion and to provide feedback to me” (Puryear, 1981).
What he got was a lot of opposition from the faculty, and the
particular focus was "on procedures and process" (Puryear, I981).
Much of the resentment seemed to be a feeling that this was
another case of the President’s office shoving something down the
throats of the faculty.
"But," said Puryear, "I felt the faculty had passed the ball
to Boston. I dealt with the material that had been sent from the
departments to the Deans. The responsibility for planning was
vested in the President's office, and that had been delegated to
me" (Puryear, 1981).
Applications . Turning to the document itself, we can see how
Puryear applied the variables he'd identified. The following are
selected programs in the Humanities and Fine Arts as described in
the Long-Range Plan ;
Aslan Studies
A better than average department, its focus is narrow
(language and literature) and our ability to develop it into
a truly distinguished comprehensive department probably very
limited. Moreover, its student-faculty ratios have been
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considered below campus averages. Its future in the
University, therefore, is very problematic (p. 5).
English and Journalism
This department presents a number of difficulties. The
English component is much too large and seriously
underutilized. Enrollments have dropped by 23$ over the
last year and the student-faculty ratio now stands at 9.9/1.
This compares with a campus ratio of 17.4/1. At the present
ratio, the English Department would support a faculty of
about 56 FTE, yet the tenured faculty alone numbers 77.
• • . the Journalism program is thriving. Enrollments
have increased by 20$ since 1975 and this upward trend is
expected to continue . . . However, because of its
association with the much larger English component, the
program has been seriously understaffed. The reallocative
process will rectify this situation (p. 6).
Linguistics
This is a very strong department of national and
international reputation. It probably ranks first or second
among similar departments around the country. While its
student-faculty ratios are low (9.40), its position of
national leadership in the discipline warrants the
maintenance of this program as one of the outstanding
manifestations of quality on the Amherst campus (p. 6).
Philosophy
This is a program of high equality, but the faculty is
seriously over tenured (93$)
•
Moreover, there has been a
drop in enrollments since 1975 of 24$. With the market
glutted for new Ph.D.s in the discipline, some reduction in
the scope of the department is in order . . . (p. 7)
These are brief rationalizations for actions the
administration thought necessary in order to adjust the campus'
expenditures to the money it thought the state would appropriate,
while at the same time reallocating positions to those areas
where it thought the greatest student interest and need, as
expressed by enrollments, would be.
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This reallocation was presented "in tentative form" in the
first stage document. When the dust cleared, the Provost
proposed overall reductions of 28.1, 16, and three FTE faculty in
the faculties of the Humanities and Fine Arts, Natural Sciences
and Mathematics, and Social and Behavioral Sciences,
respectively. He proposed an increase of five faculty in the
School of Engineering, 10.8 faculty in the College of Food and
Natural Resources, seven in the School of Physical Education, 15
in the School of Business Administration, and 8.6 in the School
of Health Sciences. In sum, a reduction of 47.1 FTE faculty for
the Arts and Sciences, and a gain of 46.4 FTE faculty for the
profesional schools. This reallocation was to occur between
fiscal year 1977 (the year the document was submitted) and fiscal
year 1982. By FY 82 the Provost had projected a total of 1,243
FTE faculty. Therefore, the reallocation was concerned with less
than four percent of the total faculty.
Campus reaction. The campus reaction to the document
,
and to
Puryear, was shrill and harsh. Throughout the spring. 1977
semester
,
there were emotional meetings of the faculty. and
Puryear, when asked to appear, did so and defended his document.
At a special meeting of the general faculty of the Amherst campus
on May 3» Puryear said:
We are at a critical juncture, as is all of
higher education. To this point we have been the
wards of a benevolent society, with constantly
increasing funding, and enrollments keeping pace.
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The 1960s were truly the Golden Age of higher
education. (Puryear, 1981)
Puryear went on to point out that the Golden Age was now
behind us, and that new forces were at work in society. The
forces he stressed were:
1) Changes in the occupational structure; the problem here
is to maintain the strength of the liberal arts while
attempting to meet societal demands for more specialized
training.
2) A decline in the revenue base of the institution; that
is, not just a trend of dimishing revenues
(appropriations), but a pattern of rising inflation.
(Puryear, 1981)
Puryear asserted his commitment, and his assumption that the
faculty shared that commitment, to making the critical decisions
on the campus, for the good of this campus, and not having those
decisions made elsewhere.
He concluded by saying that he was attempting to provide
leadership in this crisis. He acknowledged the need for
continuous and vigorous dialogue, but said that, "at some point,
we must reach closure, and decisions must be made."
What the Provost was saying, in no uncertain terms, was that
the campus had to produce a unified response to enrollment
pressures in the professional schools. There could no longer be
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individual department, school or college plans. Further, he was
to say later, "the Deans had lost credibility — any action had
to be the Provost's and the Board of Trustees’ — the Deans had
abdicated." Upon reflection, he added that the problem was, "The
central office probably moved a year too late" (Puryear, 198l).
At any rate, the reallocations proposed by Puryear follow
the trends described in Table 7. The overall view, supplied by
the Provost, was intended to counter what he called "departmental
imperialism," that was in control on the campus. By that he
meant what Robert Arns, Vice President of Academic Affairs,
University of Vermont, has cited as a consequence of the division
of the institution into schools, colleges, departments, and
disciplines. Arns called attention to commitment by faculty to
departmental or disciplinary interests, rather than to the
programs or functions of the larger institutions. This is
reinforced by the rewards for faculty that are controlled by the
disciplinary community (Arns, 1978). I may disagree with the
reallocations proposed by Puryear, I cannot disagree with his
(and Arns’) description of the faculty view.
When the Provost concluded his defense of his plan at the
May 3 meeting. Professor Robert Paul Wolff, whose Philosophy
Department was slated for reductions, alleged that the very
collegiality of the university was being assaulted. The
university
,
which resulted from a joining of the professional
the liberal arts in the 12th century, said Wolff,schools with
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was being torn apart by this plan.
Letters were written to the campus newspaper, more meetings
were held, and special sessions of the Board of Trustees were
scheduled with representatives of the Faculty Senate articulating
the concern of the faculty. One of the Trustees, Paul Parks,
told the faculty they had been derelict, that there had been no
plan for the campus since 1974, and that he was not going to
censure the Provost because he had provided one. But the Board
did not press the issue to a conclusion. It was too
controversial with faculty dissension, the wrangling between the
President (Wood) and the Governor (Dukakis), and between their
factions on the Board, and finally, the fact that — according to
Puryear — there really was not a clear understanding by the
Board of what was being planned.
Finally, the Board announced that any long range planning
would require more Board "input," thus removing the plan from the
fray, at least in this highly divisive form.
That summer. President Wood resigned, and with the
Chancellor of the Amherst campus sensing that he might be a
candidate for Wood’s position the mood of the campus — faculty,
students, administration — was schizophrenic. By January 1978,
Puryear had been removed as Provost. I don't intend to analyze
here the reasons given for his dismissal, but it was not a proud
chapter for the University. At the very bottom of it there was a
virulent dose of racism (Puryear is black) that surprised many on
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the campus. If this were a test of educated men and women
demonstrating thir education through right action, there were
wholesale failures.
Despite his demotion, Puryear did not change his mind about
the reallocations he felt the University had to make. In an
interview with a local newspaper shortly after his removal from
the position of Provost he described the changes that had to be
made;
First, . . .it’s clear that the occupational
structure in this nation is changing. It's
fairly clear that many so-called professional
disciplines are very much in demand. The
university must meet this demand not only in the
reallocation of fiscal resources but also in the
academic complexion of the institution. We have
to figure out what new ways of training are
appropriate. Second, I had to meet the
challenge caused by the changing fiscal base of
the University. The era of explanding fiscal
resources is over and will not return in the
foreseeable future. . . .
The third challenge is the shifting complexion of
the student body. The baby boom is over, and the
size of the 18- to 22-year old age group is
declining. . . . You have to start thinking in
terms of ... older age groups . . . Universities
must learn how to provide training for these new
students, and that requires a substantial
response from the faculty. (Lipman, 1978, p. 9)
The "Puryear Report" never appeared again on the campus after
that semester of histrionics and racist acts. But the challenges
to the shape of the University did not go away. The same month
that Puryear was relieved of his position (and a year after
Puryear released his report), the acting president of the
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University, Franklin Patterson, addressed the Board of Trustees.
While couched in polite academic language, Patterson was asking
the Board to clarify
What it sees now as the proper role and mission
of this University as a whole in the period
ahead
.
In the 1960s the University went through massive
growth and diversification. By the end of the
seventies, growth has come to an end, or so it
appears, many new constraints have developed, and
a complicated period lies ahead in the eighties.
It is a time when the Board of Trustees should
look again at the major purposes of the
institution and the institution’s best
configuration. (Patterson, 1978)
This "best configuration" is the same as Puryear’s "academic
complexion." In other words, the faculty may not have
appreciated the Provost’s message, or his delivery of it, but the
issues remained. This is the practical side of the ideal of the
university.
Reorganizing Public Higher Education
Higher education and high technology . On April 15, 1980, the day
Massachusetts’ state taxes were due, a piece of legislation was
filed to create a quasi-public agency called Bay State Skills
Corporation (Mohl, 1980). The Secretary of Economic Affairs,
George S. Kariotis, cited statistics complied by the state Board
of Higher Education that showed roughly 4l percent of the jobs
projected in Massachusetts’ high technology industries through
1982 would go unfilled, despite increases in the numbers of high
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school graduates going into the science and technology fields.
Kariotis warned that if those Jobs continued to go unfilled
the industry would move or expand elsewhere. "A large number of
jobs have already left our Commonwealth,” he said (Mohl, 1980).
Bay State Skills, Corp. was intended to head off that possibility
by coordinating start-up grants to educational institutions
moving into training programs to meet the job-need areas.
Specific programs proposed included:
- Technical career grants to students enrolling in
engineering, computer science and mathematics;
- Tax credits for industry and private investors who provide
money, equipment, or facilities to educational
institutions for such training programs;
- start-up grants for off-campus video instruction,
summer programs, technician training, and retraining
programs (Mohl, 1980).
This led to the development of a "social contract" between
the governor’s administration and an informal collection of the
so-called "high technology" industries, the Massachusetts High
Technology Council, predominantly computer hardware and software
corporations. The contract was for these industries to create
65,000 to 120,000 "quality" jobs within five years; the state
was to create a favorable tax structure, and to promote linkages
between higher education and the training needs of industry.
Three months later, the legislation to create the Skills
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Agency died, along with a lot of other bills, as the General
court rushed to adjournment in early July.
A spokesman for Secretary Kariotis said that "the
administration of Governor Edward J. King hopes to accomplish
many of the goals without benefit of the bill until a duplicate
of it is taken up by next year’s legislature." Paul Schutz, the
Secretary’s aide, "noted that the reorganization of the state’s
higher education system with a centralized administration vested
in a board of regents . . . could set up a framework for
launching more high technology training programs at public
colleges" (Brunelle, 1980).
That reorganization of the public higher education system
brought an end to the decade of the 1970s, and may have signalled
the total control of the higher learning by the forces of
vocationalism.
Proposals for reorganizing
. Proposals for the reorganization of
public higher education in Massachusetts had been virtually
annual items since 1976, but none every came to fruition because
of the inability of the various factions to reach an agreement.
An example of one of the proposals, however, may be instructive:
this one, prepared by faculty from the various universities,
state, and community colleges for Senate President Kevin
Harrington, and released March 23, 1976, proposed a three-tier
system:
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1. The University Centers: instruction in the liberal
arts, teacher education, the sciences (theoretical and applied),
engineering, fine, applied and performing arts, and primary
jurisdiction over training for the professions requiring
post-baccalaureate degrees; the University Centers may award
doctor’s degrees, and would be the primary agencies for research;
2. The State Colleges: four year programs in liberal arts
and sciences; teacher education; fine, applied and performing
arts; Master’s degrees; joint doctor’s degrees in collaboration
with University Centers; research encouraged;
3» The Community Colleges: associate degrees in
vocational-technical fields, or liberal arts; other certificate
programs. (Faculty Committee on Reorganization, 1976)
In addition, while there would be a state University System
Board of Trustees, local automony would prevail in matters of
faculty status, academic matters, and fiscal matters. The state
board would submit an annual budget based on the recommendations
of the various campuses. Implementation and development of
specific programs would be the responsibility of the local Boards
of each institution.
Legislating change . In the spring of 1980, there was growing
impatience in both the legislature and the governor’s
administration with the pace of the third such group to work on
reorganization, the Special Legislative Commission on the
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Reorganization of Higher Education. Governor Edward J. King, at
one point, »'told members of the Special Commission . . . that if
they didn't move more quickly, the legislature would reorganize
without them" (Scully, 1980). Then, in the process of putting
together the budget for fiscal year 1981 in the final days of the
legislative year. the Chairman of the House Ways and Means
Committe, John J. Finnegan, added a Reorganization Plan that
would merge the state and community colleges over two years
(Rosenberg, 1980). This was accepted on the House floor
,
but
the Senate Ways and Means, next to receive the budget package,
stated that it was "unacceptable" to deal with reorganization in
that way. However, the Senate budget had no response. The next
phase of legislative process called for a conference committee of
House and Senate members to bring the two budgets into line.
On the day the conference committee met, two members of the
Special Commission submitted two pieces of legislation dealing
with reorganization, a majority and a minority report. Senator
Atkins, chair of the Senate Ways and Means Committe, recognized
the disarray and "differences of opinion on higher education,"
and formally requested the House "recede" on their reorganization
plan to allow full legislative action on the plans submitted that
morning by the Special Commission.
But by now, the fate of higher ecuation was caught up in
Massachusetts politics: Rep. Finnegan of the House Ways and
Means said there was no time to read those plans (it was now 11
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P«ni.), it looks like 95$ of the loaf, and the way I negotiate,
that’s a good deal." Chairman Finnegan, Speaker of the House
McGee, and Governor King all wanted reorganization before
adjournment, and eventually Senator Boverini, who chaired the
Special Commission, joined them. The result was a compromise
hammered out in the early morning hours between the minority
report of the Special Commisssion and the "outside section" that
had been added to the House budget.
Until reorganization, there had been six governing boards
for public higher education: the University of Massachusetts,
the University of Lowell, Southeastern Massachusetts University,
a board for the 10 state colleges, a board for the 15 community
colleges, and a Board of Higher Education. Under reorganization,
the Board of Higher Education is eliminated, and smaller,
nine-member local boards for each of the 28 intitutions report to
a Board of Regents.
In the past, each separate institution developed its own
budget and forwarded it to the appropriate board. In turn, those
budgets were reviewed by the Board of Higher Education, which had
no authority to cut or increase, only to recommend, before being
submitted to the legislature for a vote. Now, local budgets are
to be funneled to the Board of Regents, which will request and
receive a lump sum in the form of a single line item in the state
budget. The Board of Regents, then, will determine how those
dollars are to be allocated among institutions.
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The intentions of the legislature in the shaping of
reorganization are quite clear in the language of the amendments
to Chapter 15 of the General Laws. In Section 1 of Chapter 15A,
"Board of Regents of Higher Education," they state;
This comprehensive system will enable the
citizens of Massachusetts to continue to choose
among and have access to a broad spectrum of
educational programs and services at all levels
of instruction while incorporating a capability
to respond to changing economic and social needs
of the Commonwealth.
In Section 5, the Board of Regents was empowered to
define and authorize new functions or new
programs; or consolidate, discontinue or
transfer existing functions, educational
activities and programs: and may, after a public
hearing and submission of a written report to the
clerks of the house of representatives and the
senate, by a two-thirds vote of the full
membership of the board, consolidate,
discontinue, or transfer divisions, schools,
stations, colleges, branches or institutions as
it deems advisable; . . .
Reaction . Reactions among educators in Massachusetts were mixed.
The president of Southeastern Massachusetts University, Donald E.
Walker, said, "There is some feeling that reorganization was
being pushed for the wrong reasons, that it would be an easy fix
for the fiscal problems of public higher education in
Massachusetts." Walker identified the real problems as coming
from "underfunding, and no tidy arrangment or rearrangement of
the pieces and players is going to redress that problem." Walker
also felt that proponents of reorganization had not been able to
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Identify what was "duplicative and inefficient" about the old
system of governance (Scully, 1980).
Almost unnoticed in the reorganization was the elimination
of the cabinet level office of secretary of education. The
incumbent, Charles Johnson, had argued against reorganization in
a detailed memorandum to the governor, before passage of the
budget. Johnson attempted to convince Governor King that the
proposed legislation would not accomplish any real financial
savings, and had very little to justify it on educational
grounds. Finally, he wrote, the reorganization would "cut the
governor off from education" (Scully, 1980).
At the University of Massachusetts, many felt that the
resignation of Robert C. Wood, and the lengthy interim period
while a search for a new president was being conducted, created a
sense of drift and vacuum that contributed to the legislative
haste to reorganize. The new president, David C. Knapp, was
brought in in 1979, and was not a unanimous pick by the Board of
Trustees. Because of his highly academic, private university
background (he was a provost at Cornell before taking the UMass
position)
,
some observers felt he would be chewed up in the
highly political arena of public education in Massachuetts.
Apparently they were right. Within a year, he had been
reorganized into a minor and perhaps temporary job. The budget
for his office in the first fiscal year of the reorganization
legislation was cut from $900,000 (fiscal year 1980) to $500,000
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(in fiscal year 1979, it had been $1.1 million.)
Knapp reacted to the reorganization by stating
I believe, as many do, that the plan has serious
defects. Many aspects are ambiguous, especially
the division of authority between the board of
regents and the institutional boards
. . . How,
and whether, distinctions can and will be made
between the functions and operations of a
research university and those of other kinds of
institutions remain open questions. I believe
that changes can and must be made in the
legislation if the public’s interest in quality
education is to be maintained. (The Alumnus,
1980)
One who tried to see the positive side of reorganization was
Senator John Olver, whose district includes the Amherst campus
(Rosenberg, 1980). Olver was on the Senate Ways and Means
Committee, and the House-Senate conference committee that
negotiated the final reorganization legislation. In this
precarious role, he had the choice of staying on the conference
committee and going along with the final budget (which included
the reorganization amendment), thus insuring a position of power
on Ways and Means, or opposing the reorganization amendment and,
therefore, the budget, thus losing his seat on Ways and Means
because he defied the majority. Olver opted for the ’’long" view,
stuck with the budget, retained his seat, and hoped that in the
future he would be able to play an influential role in providing
healthy budgets for the University through the higher education
appropriation. Olver stated, later, that with good appointments
to the Regents, the University and all of public higher education
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should see more money, and that quality programs could result.
The key would be the appointments to the Board.
Board ^ Regents. Section 2 of the reorganization legislation
provided for 15 members of the Board of Regents, appointed by the
governor, and an office of the Board, consisting of a chancellor
and staff appointed by the Board.
The first appointment to the new board was made July 2, 1980
by Governor Edward King. James R. Martin, chairman of the
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance company, immediately promised
to bring a businesslike approach to the coordination of the
public universities and colleges.
"I look upon this as an attempt to solve a problem that is a
management problem more than an education problem," he said. "My
experience as an educator is limited. But managing large
enterprises — that’s my baby" (Briere, 1980). In his first
interview as chairman of the board, Martin allowed that he wanted
the Regents to take a close look at eliminating superfluous
programs in the system. "The educational community is guilty of
the same things the business community is. Too often we do
things well that we ought not to be doing at all," he said
(Briere, 1980).
As further appointments were made, it was very clear that
both Governor King and chairman Martin were going to insure that
businesslike approach through the experience of the members. In
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a July 29 article, The Morning Union (Springfield,
Massachusetts), noted that the appointments of An Wang, president
of Wang Laboratories, and David Beaubien, vice president of EG &
G, Inc., both "executives of Massachusetts-based high-technology
companies that have expanded rapidly in recent years, indicates
the governor's concern that the state recognize what he considers
the need for greater cooperation between the industry and the
public colleges and universities."
In late August, the governor swore the full board to their
terms. The members were Martin, Wang, Beaubien, George W. Hazzard
(president emeritus of Worcester Polytechnic Institute, and a
member of the Special Legislative Commission on the
Reorganization of Higher Education), Dr. Charles A. Sanders
(general director of Massachusetts General Hospital), Elizabeth
B. Rawlins (associate dean at Simmons College), Arnold S.
Friedman (editor of the Springfield Morning Union
,
and former
member of the Special Commission), Rev. Francis J. Nicholson
(professor at Boston College law school), Foster Furcolo (former
Democratic governor of Massachusetts), Sister Janet Eisner, S.
N. D. (president of Emmanuel College), David S. Paresky
(president of Crimson Travel Service, Cambridge), George H.
Ellison (founder of a Boston insurance firm), Robert Cushman
(chairman of the board of the Norton Company, one of the major
industries of Worcester) , Normal Zalkind (coordinator of Fall
River's Economic Development Office), and Ray Stata (president
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and chairman of the board of Analog Devices, Inc., and founder
and first president of the Massachusetts High Technology
Council). It is clear that these appointments are consistent
with the major thrust of the governor's administration: to marry
the manpower needs of Massachusetts industry with the training
potential of public higher education.
The first official act of the Board, in September 1980, was
to appoint a chief administrator to guide the Regents through the
transition period (the complete phasing out of the old boards and
complete takeover by the Regents was scheduled for March 1
,
1981 ). Paul Guzzi
,
a former school teacher, a former secretary
of state, an unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic nomination
for a U.S. Senate seat, and, .-most recently, chief secretary to
Governor Edward J. King, was named to the job. Guzzi had helped
the Governor draft his position on reorganization and had worked
with the legislature on the final bill that created the
superboard. Not many were surprised when Guzzi announced, in
early February, 1981, that as soon as the yet-to-be-named
chancellor assumed the position as top administrator of public
higher education, he (Guzzi) would become vice president of
education and government relations for Wang Laboratories.
Final comments . Some final comments on this particular superboard
may be appropriate. Despite the language of the legislation, the
Joint Committee on Education is certainly not going to give
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complete authority to the Regents, at least not in the first
year. On Februrary 25, 1981, members of that Committee
questioned the accountability of the Regents, since they were
appointees of the governor. And the House Ways and Means
Committee decided the same day to submit a bill that would
effectively delay implementation of the new Board of Regents
system until the position of Chancellor was filled. The House
Committee was particularly upset because the Regents came to them
with a lump sum budget (as was provided in the legislation),
instead of one that clearly stipulated funds for each campus, and
identified the distribution of funds among campus segments. By
March 2, the chairman of the new board told Rep. John J.
Finnegan, chairman of the Ways and Means Committees, that the
Regents would "allocate funds exactly as they come to us from the
General Court," instead of shifting them from one institution to
another as they deemed fit. This was seen sufficiently
conciliatory to keep the Committee’s bill of delay from moving
onto the floor of the House.
Another point of contention is the avowed linking of the
institutions with high technology. Senator Gerard D'Amico
(1981), of the Joint Committee on Education, sees that as "one of
the battles between the legislature and the Board of Regents.
They have their constituency and we have ours. And ours is a
much broader constituency. How that battle is played out will
will be interesting. Just two weeks earlier, the Boston Globe
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reported a Federal Reserve Bank study of the New England economy
by economists Lynn E. Browne and John S. Heckman, and quoted
Browne as stating that "closer working arrangements bewteen the
high technology industry and New England colleges and
universities are essential for both if they are to solve their
problems" (Anson, 1981),
Finally
,
it must not forgotten that this reorganization was
jammed through the legislature at the last minute, with no public
hearings, without the benefit of full debate in either the House
or Senate, and in such a way that no amendments were allowed. It
was made part of the state’s budget, so to vote against
reorganization meant voting against the entire appropriation
package for fiscal year I 981 . State Rep. James Collins
(D-Amherst) said, "The administration of public higher education
in Massachusetts deserves better than being put together like a
jigsaw puzzle behind closed doors in the middle of the night"
(The Alumnus, 1980). It is inevitable that a series of
amendments will be filed to clarify or curtail the various
authorities and duties of the Regents, local trustees, and
Chancellor. It is just as inevitable that the politicization of
public higher education in Massachusetts has been raised to new
levels.
The Shift to Instrumental Degrees
Despite its image as a front line educator
,
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Massachusetts is 48th in the nation in the amount
it spends on public higher education. The
reorganization promises no added spending for the
120,000 full time students and 5,000 faculty
spread among its 28 institutions. (Cohen, 1980,
p. 38)
What are the likely effects of reorganization to be on
public higher education, and particularly on the University of
Massachusetts? The same year the Future of the University Report
was released (1971), the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare released its Report on Higher Education . This is best
known as the Newman Report, after Frank Newman, the chairman of
the commission that wrote it. One of the many phenomena of
American higher education they examined and criticqued was the
multicampus system.
These evolved, the commission agreed, in part because of the
desire to effectively allocate resources and to achieve an
economy of scale. It was an attempt to accomodate and control
growth. That is, to eliminate the duplication of effort,
program, and people that often results when organizations and
institutions respond to sudden surges in demand. There's no
denying that a single law school or medical school can be more
efficient than two small law schools or medical schools. And, as
the commission pointed out, centralized purchasing of many
supplies and services can save funds. (In 1980, Henry Koffler,
Chancellor of the University of Massachusetts' Amherst campus
pointed out, "Our efforts in this direction have already saved
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the Commonwealth thousands of dollars through our development of
a statewide purchasing consortium" (The Alumnus, 1980.)
But, the Report went on, a centralized system tends to get
carried away with its systematic, rational pursuit of
coordination and planning. It "is often pursued in areas where
its benefits are illusory." What, after all, are the strengths
of systematization? The Report pointed out that
rather than innovation, the skill of the large
system lies in more of the same. Entrepreneurs
rarely thrive in a climate of detailed budget
review, pressures for equal treatment, statewide
interest groups, flagship campus dominance, or
concern for political expediency.
Today, there is still considerable
flexibility within higher education. We still
expect that college means a different experience
for different students. But steadily, the
flexibility, differentiation, and individual
responsiveness are slipping away. Only a
determined effort can reverse this trend, (p. 27)
Clearly, the experience in Massachusetts indicates that such
determined efforts have not been made. Furthermore, the impact
of interest groups, particularly the high technology industry, is
currently being felt most strongly. One can only wonder about
future claimants on the direction of the higher learning.
If we go back to Table 7, there are two conclusions we must
now make: the first is the obvious one — the unmistakable shift
in undergraduate degrees toward those that are frankly
instrumental. Indeed, Table 8, Bachelor’s degrees awarded by
subject, 1979, shows that the shift is continuing. The second
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Table 8. Bachelor's Degrees Awarded by Subject, 1979 .
Subject N %
Academic Disciplines 375,878 40.4
Biological Sciences
^9,576 5,3
4,5Letters 42,368
Fine and Appl ied Arts 51,012 4.4
Foreign Languages 12,034 1,3
Mathemat i cs 11,901 1.3
Physical Sciences 2-3,363 2.5
Psychology 43,012 4.6
Social Sciences 109,362 11.7
Theology 6,074 0.6
Area Studies 2,602 0.3
1 nterd i sc ip 1 inary 34,574 3.7
1 nstrumenta
1
555,428 59.6
Agriculture’, Natural Resources
Architecture, Environmental
7-3, H7 2.5
Des
i
gn 9,297 1.0
Bus i ness 175,420 18.8
Commun i cat ions 26,470 2.8
Computer and Information Sciences 8,769 0.9
Educat i on 127,853 13.7
Eng i neer i ng 62,800 6.7
Health Professions 62,723 6.7
Home Economics 18,457 2.0
Law 678 —
Library Science 558 —
Military Sc i ences 347 —
Public Affairs and Services 38,799 4.2
TOTALS 931,296 100.0
^Adapted from "Fact File," The Chronicle of Higher Education , November 17,
1980.
SOURCE: National Center for Educational Statistics.
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one is not so obvious. The degrees that are being left behind,
the "disciplinary" ones, in Geiger’s terms, themselves have
become instrumental. As we noted in Chapter III, those
disciplines that fall under the rubric of the Liberal Arts, are
concerned with the Liberal Arts, per se, but with meeting the
imperatives of the disciplines, per se. Where the undergraduate
concerns of the School of Engineering are to prepare the budding
engineer according to the profession’s requirements, the concerns
of the Department of English are just as narrow: preparation of
the undergraduate for admission into a good graduate Department
of English, and from there into the professoriate. If we doubt
this, we need only go back to the rationale for reallocation of
faculty at the University Of Massachusetts in the "Long-Range
Plan," or the conclusions of Wolff, or Belknap and Kuhns.
But, as erstwhile instrumental majors, the disciplines have
forsaken their participation in the general education ideal while
placing themselves in an extremely vulnerable position in the
academy:
The notion that an educated person ought to be
acquainted with certain particular subjects was
obviously done in by the enormous expansion and
specialization of disciplinary knowledge together
with the organizational imperatives of
disciplinary departments. Its disappearance,
however, has left the disciplines naked in the
marketplace. ...(The) prevalence of the notion
that all subjects are inherently equal with
respect to a bachelor’s degree has brought all
disciplines and instrumental subjects into
corapletition for student enrollments. (Geiger,
1980, p. 23)
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That departmental imperialism also makes it difficult if not
impossible to discuss regenerating general education. At the
University of Massachusetts the Faculty Senate Rules Committee
recently sponsored a series of forums on general education and
curriculum review for the Amherst campus. A summary of the
discussions (Forman, 1980) indicates a number of areas where
problems were identified as well as some considerable confusion
about what "general education" is.
Some of the problem areas were as follows;
1 . Distrust or lack of integration between the College of
Arts and Sciences and the professional schools in
curricular and enrollment areas;
2. Criticism of the present core requirement structure as
inadequate for the integration of materials understood
as neccessary for general education;
3. Survey courses that are more oriented to faculty
interests or disciplinary organization than to liberal
arts needs of students.
Much of the discussion seemed to equate general education
with "basic skills education," when the question of "What is
meant by general education?" was raised. The responses to this
question, and the forms or models of general education that were
proposed, tended to set general education to the front end of
one’s undergraduate experience. That is, general education is
something one does in the freshman and sophomore years, getting
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ready for the real meat of higher education, the major.
In January 1981, the campus sponsored a "Microcollege,” to
deal with the recreating of General Education, and this general
response from the faculty was reiterated, time and again.
Weinberg (1981) pointed out two analogies to keep in mind when
general education, or any other program is proposed:
1. General Education as ghetto;
2. General Education as separate-but-equal;
I have added a third: General Education as special program
.
In the first, we isolate the general education experience as
something the student must escape from; that is, after the
oreinting, sensitizing, and remediating have been accomplished,
the substantive work can be done in specialized courses.
Implicit in this is the lesser worth of the general education
component, and both students and faculty recognize this.
In the second instance, we prevent the bridging of general
courses and specialized course work and contribute to
fractionalizing the academic experience even further. This
becomes more evident when a separate faculty is provided to teach
in the General Education Department. We wind up with two
faculties, two orientations, and competition that will prove
unhealthy.
In the third, we essentially isolate the general education
experience on the fringes of the academy , label it openly or
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covertly as "experimental" and not essential, and iraplicity
encourage students to see it as something to dabble in, if
they’re serious students, to dally in, if they're not.
In all three instances (I'm sure there are other variations
on the theme), the real power of the campus is located in the
departments, and the schools and colleges that are tied to
national and international associations, that garner awards, that
are funded for research, that have enrollments, and can claim
placement of their majors.
In other words, to be serious about general education, the
institution must institutionalize it. That doesn't seem likely.
Even so, faculty at the University of Massachusetts, in
overwhelming numbers, don't consider general education a
priority. And legislators, public officials, and Regents are
intensely interested in seeing more utility in higher education.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Although the value of a college education is not
solely measurable in terms of its usefulness in
the marketplace, the dominant interest,
constantly reinforced in America, is in its
marketability. Indeed, the decline in the market
value of higher education may endanger the
American commitment to education, precisely
because its non-market aspects have been ignored
or grossly undervalued.
Special Task Force to
the Secretary of
Health, Education, and
Welfare, 1973.
A fundamental characteristic of modern life is
not the existence of social problems but the
effort to seek the aid of scientific inquiry in
solving them. Basic to scientific inquiry is a
habit of seeking the factual core of a subject.
Indeed, modern industrial culture disciplines us
to what Veblen long ago called the matter-of-fact
mode of thought. We tend to take things as they
are, without such aids as superstition and the
supernatural. Nature and society tend to be seen
as matters of fact rather than as parts of a
sacred order.
Meyer Weinberg, 1977
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Paradise Lost
Our present-day confusion about our schools and
the role of an education does not occur, I
believe, because we have resolved this tension.
It occurs because we have lost the tension. We
have allowed the utilitarian view of school to
displace the larger educational perspective. In
losing it, we have lost touch with our past, with
the fructifying energy that the older tension,
fully embraced, could inspire. We have lost the
will to keep a civil ideal and a utilitarian
entity in balance, and thus we have ensured the
success of neither one nor the other. (Giamatti,
1981)
The expectations we have, as a public, of our institutions
of higher education create a critical tension. We want good jobs
to come to college graduates, we want those graduates to be well
and properly trained to assume those good jobs, and we also
expect those graduates to act — to behave — and to think in a
manner that has something to do with elevated aesthetic and moral
standards. To act and think in a fashion appropriate to
liberated and free men and women.
The tension is lost when, due to constraints of time, money,
or the shifting needs of our economy, the institutions emphasize
the training at the expense of the aesthetic and moral
development. Higher education then becomes a credentialling
process, fitting graduates to job slots, and allowing the
education of students to assume a lesser position in the
hierarchy, or to vanish altogether.
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How did this dilemma come about? Has it always been present
in the debate over the aims and ends of education? Can it be
resolved — either within our present institutions or in
alternative ones? To answer this, the development of our higher
education establishment has been reviewed, going back to Plato,
through the medieval period, our colonial institutions and those
of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and down to the
present. My conclusions are that institutions of higher
education have always been involved in career preparation.
However, as the possibilities for "careers" have expanded, as
societies have moved from agrarian or feudal — where careers are
limited to theology, medicine, canon or civil law, or warfare —
to one in which being a chef is seen as a professional calling,
so has the provision of career training within higher education
expanded. This has resulted in an incredible specialization
within these institutions, mirroring the specialization without.
American higher education’s purposes have grown and changed in
the past three hundred years, higher education in the United
States has consistently demonstrated a trend to the practical, to
gauging its success by how weir it — through its placement of
graduates and other quantitative measures — responds and deals
with economic or social or political problems. It
presently
seems to require an instrumental justification for its existence.
Indeed, that is about the only thing binding all the
elements
university together; Kerr’s "multiversity"that comprise today’s
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is strung along in a unity of utility.
Proposals for reform of this condition of higher education
consistently state that things have gone too far in the direction
of utility. They recommend that the institutions diminish the
emphasis on career preparation, and reinstate or reinforce the
liberal arts or a liberal education. Invariably, however, they
opt for some sort of accommodation. In actual practice there is
precious little reform, and what exists is frequently done on an
experimental or optional basis. Discussion and debate over the
place or the role of general education, or liberal education, or
core requirements or distribution requirements leaves a
participant in confusion and with a feeling of hopelessness.
There is little consensus about its purpose or meaning, and in
many instances the different interpretations tend to cancel each
other out. What is consistent, however, is the tendency toward
accomodation: fitting in the liberal or liberating pieces
between the larger and openly or tacitly acknowledged important
parts of the schooling process. Today, higher education consists
of a major, electives, and some sort of "common core." In the
hurly-burly of public higher education, particularly, there is an
acceleration toward expanded and improved linkages between the
academy and the marketplace. Even the belief that our very
liberty depends on the free pursuit of occupations is controlled
by the availability of training and educational opportunities
that are geared to specific, dominant job categories. The
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employer, the industry, the marketplace is controlling the
curriculum.
The whole idea of a critical nexus between the amount of
formal schooling and jobs is questionable. What we truly have is
a combination of processes: credentialling and credential
inflation. In many cases there seems no true connection between
the content of one's higher education and the actual requirements
of the job.
The costs of this practice to higher education and to
society are many, great, and ignored. We continue to expand
majors, contract disciplines, and to expect an educated,
sophisticated, and employable graduate to emerge from four years
of exposure to the system.
The consequences for higher education, under these
circumstances, are disturbing. By fostering and forging new and
more alliances with the employing sectors of society, the academy
must align the curriculum ever more closely with those sectors'
training needs. This process, obviously, will further erode the
concept of a university, creating additonal "academic" fields in
its wake. One need not fantasize ads like this:
Diesel Engine Technolop.
Instructor/Chairperson. Anticipated full-time
teaching position Fall I98l. Emphasis on
development, organization and implementation of
program on mobile and stationary diesel engines.
Requirements: Five year's experience or BS in
area and two years' trade experience. New Mexico
State Vocational Teacher Certification^ or
eligibility for entrance into teacher training
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program. Additional teacher education, work
experience and multicultural experience
preferred. Salary commensurate with
education/experience. Proposed start date, June
1, 1981 . Closes May 4, 1981 or until filled.
Placement folder, resume, and copies of
transcripts to Personnel, UNM- Gallup, Gallup,
New Mexico 87301. Affirmative Action, Equal
Opportunity Employer. ( The Chronicle of Higher
Education
,
1981)
This position at the University of New Mexico at Gallup,
demonstrates my point and captures the essence of much of the
development of American higher education.
A real or imagined training need is identified, and
ultimately the university if involved in meeting that need. But
the process rapidly goes beyond mere training. The next step is
credentialling. And, as Berg (1971) demonstrated, even when the
need for training is suspect, the credentialling is critical.
There are further steps involved: pressures are brought to
bear on the university to deliver the credentials or face the
consequences of having denied individuals or groups or classes
the opportunity for employment, for promotion, for tenure, and so
on. Institutions are brought into competition: come up with a
sufficiently attractive, sufficiently flexible, cheap, etc.,
program or lose enrollments, contracts, grants, research money.
The profession of education illustrates this nicely. While
there are several who question whether there is, indeed, a
discipline of "education," the teaching profession and our school
system rely on the degree structure — B.A., M.Ed., C.A.G.S.,
and
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Ed.D.
-to control certification, hiring, promotion, and tenuring
of teachers and school administrators. Ironically, both the
faculty in the teacher-training institutions and those who
graduate from those institutions frequently question the worth of
the courses. But they all recognize the value of the degree. In
such situations, the ’’selling of higher education” becomes more
than a possibility: administrators, pressed for enrollments or
tuition, negotiate degree programs for individuals, or even
school systems with more attention focussed on income than
quality. It doesn’t matter whether an indivdual needs the
credential for personal advancement, or whether a superintendent
is buying a credentialling package so he can upgrade a cohort of
faculty into the administrative ranks. It doesn’t matter if the
aura of the degree provides a halo that allows the person to be
more effective even though he or she really has no more aptitude
than before. What does matter is that we have diminshed the
university.
It follows that, given this relationship between higher
education and the employer, the student-cum-employee is,
ultimately, a commodity used by that employer to develop a
product or deliver a service. The vocational training program,
de facto, devotes its energies to the development of a
’’product-deliverer,” or a ’’service-deliverer.” There is little,
if any room for the growth and development of a whole person.
At the same time, the whole process of credential and
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requirement inflation acts to screen out individuals who may have
the aptitude or ability, who may, in fact, be better performers
in the jobs, but who were unable or unwilling to participate in
the credentialling program. Again, Berg (1971):
Educational credentials have become the new
property in America. Our nation, which has
attempted to make the transmission of real and
personal property difficult, has contrived to
replace it with an inheritable set of values
concerning degrees and diplomas which wiol most
certainly reinforce the formidable class barriers
that remain . . . (The) use of educational
credentials as a screening device effectively
consigns large numbers of people, especially
young people, to a social limbo defined by
low-sill, no-opportunity jobs in the ’’peripheral
labor market.” (pp. 185, l86)
Perversely, even those who benefit from the vocational
training and credentialling are trapped. In Chapters III and IV
references and illustrations of the narrowing of higher education
were provided. The connections between industry needs and the
reorganization of public higher education in Massachusetts may
,
ultimately, detail this. The forces that have joined are
economic, political, and education. But who will benefit?
"The State Aims at Closing a Jobs Gap" (Boston Globe , 1980),
describes the dilemma of the so-called high-technology industries
in Massachusetts. In February, 1979, the Massachusetts
High-Technology Council negotiated a "social contract" with
Massachusetts’ governor, Edward King. In return for creating
by
1982 approximately 60,000 "high-tech" jobs and 90,000 support
jobs with an annual payroll of $2 billion and additional
tax
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revenue of $300 million, the governor agreed to hold the line on
taxes.
With the tax agreement behind them, the high-tech companies
began complaining about their manpower problem. A variety of
studies were cited to show that while the educational system has
become more responsive to high-tech needs, a dwindling supply of
students is widening the gap between job needs and job training
in Massachusetts.
George Kariotis, Governor King's Secretary for Economic
Affairs, is quoted as saying "The educators have made some
progress, . . . but their output is still minimal compared to
what we need" ( Boston Globe , 1980). The article goes on:
Education officials generally agree that changes
need to be made, but where, how and by whom are
sticky points. And their calls for more money
are being greeted by raised eyebrows.
Impatient King administration officials have
difficulty comprehending why the educational
system cannot be run more like a business,
moving from unprofitable product lines (education
and history majors are the two most often
mentioned) into profitable high-tech lines.
We are back to measuring education by the profit that can
be derived from it. Instead of being viewed as an important part
of the individual’s preparation for a whole life as a
responsible, participating, informed number of Massachusetts'
society, the governor and his staff and some extremely willing
"educators" are rushing to develop programs that will prepare
students for carefully defined roles as members in a
very
delineated group of employees.
An important yet rarely discussed aspect of this sort of
training approach is what skills do the Job holders have when the
high technology market diminishes? And what sort of an education
do they have to provide insight and perspective as they engage in
the work of life? Finally, can an institution theoretically
devoted to the free an unfettered pursuit of Truth afford to risk
participation in such practices?
This movement toward resolution was not abrupt, it occurred
gradually and as the result of an extremely complex array of
pressures. One of the most critical of those pressures, however,
has been a loss of our common sense of the place of a liberal
education.
In the Greek polis
,
the public realm of the city-state, the
free man pursued excellence in the tradition of Homeric heroes.
In The Iliad
,
Glaukos says his father ”... sent me to Troy, and
urged upon me repeated injunctions, to be always among the
bravest, and hold my head above others . . .” Arendt (1958)
argues that Homer, as ”the educator of Hellas,” was both setting
and stating the standard of behavior for the free citizen.
The public realm, in other words, was reserved
for individuality; it was the only place where
men could show who they really and inexchangeably
were. It was for the sake of this chance, and
out of love for a body politic that made it
possible to them all, that each was more or less
willing to share in the burden of Jurisdiction,
defense, and administration of public affairs.
(p. i^l)
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The education of that involved citizen was a liberal education,
one appropriate for a free and independent, autonomous
individual. It was not specialized; the specialized tasks of
that period were carried out by slaves. The specialized tasks
were those of the private realm of the household. Arendt and
others (e.g., MoClintook, 1979) see the economic activity of that
period as household, or domestic activity, and not something
worthy of the concern of the public realm. That world view has
been replaced by one that sees work, the production of things,
and the specialization of roles and functions in order to enhance
that production as the proper pursuit and definition of mankind.
We are measured, our arete is determined, by the function we fill
in our specialized society. "We are what we do."
This systematic rationalization of functions was noted by
Weber (1946), Ellul (1964), and Veblen (1961), as well. It
affects our habits of thought, and the way we go about our
training and our education. But a liberal education is not
specialized. If we use the ideal of the polls , a liberal
education endows and enhances the free individual engaged in a
common enterprise, the common weal. Conversely, the specialized
man or woman is limited by the training and ,1ob he or she holds
and is valued for that only.
Our individual potential and our possibilities for
involvement in the life of our society, alike,
have been
diminished, or lost.
250
Paradise Regained
A liberal education values. It Is not the mere teaching
of rhetoric; It Is not enough to argue with sincerity or passion,
one must have a moral foundation and purpose for the argument.
I
believe that, ultimately, we can share a common understanding of
what Is right and just, and that It Is the process of education
that can lead to the discovery of those truths. But we cannot
pursue the truth In a value-neutral fashion. And we cannot
pursue It merely by acquiring technique. We can pursue It by
developing and arguing a position on specific Issues, and through
that dialectic, discovering the better position and so,
throughout our lives, urging ourselves and our societies to the
right and just actions. I may never know the truth, but I can
and should pursue It. In this sense, the teaching and study of
literature Is not, properly, scansion or the memorization of
genres, or dates. It Is the careful and appreciative reading of
descriptions of human Interaction: of human with environment; of
human with self. And the Interest that Is generated Is
predicated on human values.
If we Ignore values, and It Is Interesting that most critics
of higher education do, we find ourselves In awkward and
compromised situations. For example, the very Institutions
responsible for providing a liberal education often go to extreme
lengths to argue that they are "value-neutral." By
value-neutral
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the university intends a form of academic freedom. The
university administration will insure the right of those within
the academy to teach and speak out; it will protect its members
from outside critics while at the same time guaranteeing free
debate within its walls.
In point of fact, universities cannot be value-neutral.
They demonstrate values, or the lack of them by what they do and
do not do. Their investment policies, hiring and tenure
policies, and decisions to expand or contract departments and
schools, all demonstrate values. There can be no neutrality if
there is social interaction. By claiming this neutrality,
however, the university seeks to remove controversial practices
from the arena of debate.
Again, using the value-neutral stance, all disciplines,
classical or newly-minted, appear to acquire the same value or
standing in the university. In turn, this develops into the
multiversity that Kerr celebrates and Wolff deplores. We
recognize that this is not value-neutral, of course, it is rather
a statement of values that is unable to publicly establish a
hierarchy of disciplines (although privately the criticisms are
smug, even vicious), and that willingly develops new, even
inappropriate relationships with outside agencies if the price is
right.
The product of this latter approach is, unfortunately, a
technician. Whether the technician is a surgeon, the principal
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of an urban school, or an architect, without values he or she
acts in a mindless fashion that seems a disease of modern
society. If the school principal, while technically, even
legally correct, participates in the providing of an inferior
education to minority children, then she is guilty of a moral
wrong. If the surgeon’s advice in an abortion case would differ
if the woman were black (or white), then he, too, is guilty. If
the architect designs an aesthetically and functionally sound
building that is to be used for purposes of torture or death, a
gas chamber for example, then he or she is guilty. This is a
kind of thoughtlessness — not stupidity. And when, in a burst
of technical perfection, we do our jobs without any consideration
for the moral consequences
,
we have diminshed our human potential
and, potentially, contributed to the diminishment of us all.
One does not need to be "educated" in order to act rightly,
to be eupractic . But the educated man or woman understands and
articulates his or her conduct as Melville understood Billy
Budd's. Budd, on the other hand, acted admirably yet stood mute.
We read Melville and attempt to understand his creation. We
recognize and comprehend the values Budd demonstrates, and we
appreciate the dilemma of Captain Vere, and we despise Mr.
Claggett. And at the end we understand. We understand the
conflict between forces of darkness and light, we understand
Vere’s retreat into the rules, we understand Budd’s pitiful
final
cry, "God bless Captain Vere!" And, understanding
that, we
n
253
better understand our own existences. We transcend mere essence,
mere doing, mere being because we have expanded the context of
our lives.
The burden of an education is great. If we are to be true
to our increased comprehension of our human condition we must
exist in an exalted and honorable and humane fashion. We will
assign values, not in an arbitrary or "situational” manner but
consistent with those evolved values of the human race. We will
have a hierarchy of values — all values are not equal, but have
an ordering principle.
As we follow that principle, subscribe to those values, and,
through the living of our lives, daily demonstrate our courage in
our commitments, we define ourselves. An increasing number of
men and women are completing courses of study, are being awarded
an expanding number of variety of academic degrees. Whether or
not we are contributing to the education of these individuals
defies mere quantification. We are tested with each act, it can
only be discovered in the "Who" of the person, not in the "What."
What may we conclude from this critique, what can higher
education in America anticipate? I see no reason for the tyranny
of numbers to be mitigated in the near future, nor will the
"unmitigated quest of knowledge, of this matter-of-fact kind"
(Veblen, 1961 ) likely cease. Further, the effect of a rational
and scientific view of the world, and the consequent
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bureaucratization and specialization in institutions will
continue to be felt in the organization and Justification of
higher education. Arendt (1958), Veblen (1961, 1948), and
Freeman (1980) have all demonstrated how this world-view controls
the form of our organizations, and how these, in turn, mold our
activites and even our processes of thought.
While this is inimical to the liberating and liberal
education that I have been proposing, I would hesitate to state
that such an education is now impossible. In fact, even though
the changes that I have delineated have truly been incremental,
taking generations to move the university ever closer to its
present state, so much seems to happen so rapidly in the society
of twentieth century America that I hesitate to make any
projections.
The very sluggishness and torpor that is inherent in the
university may very well inhibit the next phase of the training
phenomenon. As industries continue to expand and diversify, and
as Jobs become increasingly specisli2®*^» the demands for training
will increase and become ever more specific. At some point,
therefore, unless institutions of higher education discard even
more of their vital components and traditions (e.g., permanent
departments and faculties), in order to accomodate the new
"disciplines," they will be unable to accrete these functions.
Or, they will continue to add on and yet not do their Job well,
disappointing industry and driving their best customers away.
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These customers, in turn, would logically seek out new vendors,
or create the service
,
themselves.
Warsh (1981) has described that last scenario, and points
out that those companies that have established their own training
centers figure they do a better job at far less cost. Not only
do they not have to support permanent faculty (with all the
attendant overhead costs) but they can be extremely directed in
their teaching, dealing only with the issues that affect their
particular product line.
There are some signs, as well, within higher education of an
uneasiness with the role of training and the loss of the liberal
arts. I have cited the renewed interest at the University of
Massachusetts; Scully (1977) noted the national trend toward a
re-appraisal of the undergraduate curriculum. I have criticized
some of the more prominent proposals for reform. What I point
out here is that the interest in general education is still
alive: the issue continues to be how to effect significant
change. A combination of external influences (e.g., a move by
industry to provide its own training) and internal pressures may
produce renewed institutionalization of a liberal education.
An example may be emerging in the School of Education at the
University of Massachusetts. The recently drafted "Mission
Statement," (Grennan and Seldin, 198l) of that school's Long
Range Planning Document proposes a commitment to something beyond
narrow professionalization:
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Our choice is to develop and extend
collaboratives with the humanities to ensure that
the primary education of children and the
secondary, on-going education of adults develops
an understanding of the relationship between
ideas and human conduct; an educational
collaborative dedicated to human, informed
standards in the technological society.
Whether those collaboratives are ever erected remains to be
seen. There is a recognition, however, of both the problem of
too narrow training and the reality that a liberating education
does not begin nor does it end with an undergraduate program.
The choices we make, and the manner in which we make them reveal
our values: those may be refined and expanded as we grow toward
maturity, but the effects of our family, our pre-school and
elementary school periods, and the myriad other influences on our
lives play a role as well.
The issue, for me, is whether or not higher education is
going to completely abdicate its role in the development of
involved and informed human beings in favor of developing
technicians and job holders. This issue is critical because the
questions facing us require more than matter-of-fact knowledge or
scientific know-how. As citizens of this world, we should
properly demand to be involved in these questions and in the
formulation of the answers. Arendt (1958) phrased it this way:
This future man, whom the scientists tell us they
will produce in no more than a hundred years,
seems to be possessed by a rebellion against
human existence as it has been given, a free gift
from nowhere (secularly speaking), which he
wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he
257
has made himself. There is no reason to doubt
our abilities to accomplish such an exchange,
just as there is no reason to doubt our present
ability to destroy all organic life on earth.
The question is only whether we wish to use our
new scientific and technical knowledge in this
direction, and this question cannot be decided by
scientific means; it is a political question of
the first order and therefore can hardly be left
to the decision of professional scientists or
professional politicians.
I remain convinced that a liberally educated person can best
grapple with those issues. I remain convinced that we should all
grapple with those issues. And I remain convinced that higher
education must continue, must renew its critical role in the
process.
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